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EN
Post-communist Albanian legislation (1995-2010) provides the preliminary context for the creation of enabling social niches for the engagement of people with disabilities and the family members representing them in the policy-making processes both at the national and local levels. The goal of this study was to determine the pattern of engagement of people with disabilities and their family members in the policy making process at the national and local level and identify the barriers as perceived by them. Participants were 874 persons with disabilities and their family members. The results indicated a strong interest but a poor engagement pattern of people with disabilities and their family members in the policy making process and various structural and attitudinal barriers. Conscious work needs to be done by the government agencies as well as advocacy organizations to create enabling social niches for people with disabilities that encourage their participation in the policy making process as valuable stakeholders in shared governance.
EN
This article examines the inner workings of a private company’s participation in the European policy game. The qualitative analysis shows that the promotion of a company’s interests and its positioning at the level of the European Union is not self-evident and results from internal battles in which European public affairs employees play a pivotal role. Under what conditions do the European public affairs employees of a leading multinational firm endorse, manage, and promote an active position in the Brussels’ polity sphere? This article highlights the process by which these ‘professionals of Europe’ adapt to the specific requirements of the EU and mobilise an informal network to contribute to European policy-making. These lobbyists appear as ‘double entrepreneurs’: as entrepreneurs on behalf of both their employers’ interests and the European cause as they place themselves as the auxiliaries of EU civil servants. Maintaining a delicate balance, interest representatives occupy a position of dependence, both on their employer and on the polity field in which they valorise their ‘European institutional capital’. This position allows these social agents to serve as a broker between their employer and the European arena. In doing so, they nurture the porosity between (economic) interests and the public sector, which cuts across the field of ‘Eurocracy’.
EN
In Europe and across the world, many countries are turning to deliberative democracy to reform their constitutions, and in many others this question is high on the political agenda. Such transformation also shuffles quite radically the role of the citizenry regarding constitutional changes. Traditionally such changes are the sole responsibility of elected officials in collaboration with experts. With the deliberative turn, many more actors may be involved in the designing of constitutions, from citizens both individually and collectively in the forms of informal associations to various civil society organisations. The main aim of this paper is to analyse potential of deliberative democracy in Slovenian national setting, therefore authors are analysing a) framework of constitution making dynamics and b) most successful deliberative democratic tools and opportunities developed so far on both national and sub-national levels of the Slovenian government. As deliberative democracy is well known political phenomenon, we will start not by yet another theoretical pandemonium, but with less-known Slovenian contribution to the global development of deliberative model.
XX
This article explains the relationship between subsidiarity and legitimacy of policies designed at EU level. Through means of theoretically informed analysis this paper claims that if the principle of subsidiarity is respected and implemented throughout the policy process, EU policy-making can aspire to satisfy the condition of both input and output legitimacy. The empirical part of the paper shows how, through a subsidiarity control mechanism known as the Early Warning System, national parliaments can collectively fulfill representative and deliberative functions in EU policy-making. Conclusions about the changing dynamics in parliamentary modus operandi in the field of EU affairs lead to forming a set of recommendations for further research.
Human Affairs
|
2012
|
vol. 22
|
issue 1
31-42
EN
The present paper gives an overview of the reflections of and reactions to publishing the results of the first wave of the OECD study Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) in the Czech Republic and in Germany. The choice of these two countries enables us to document how the same results could be perceived very differently in diverse country contexts and could lead to a different reaction from policy-makers. In spite of large reforms and numerous policy measures being adopted in Germany in reaction to the PISA results, compared with no response from policy-makers in the Czech Republic, it is argued, that in both countries policy-makers failed to tackle the major problem of their educational systems-its selective nature. In the final section we discuss various mis(uses) of PISA and its supranational and global character influencing local policies.
PL
Wybory demokratyczne wyłaniają zwycięzców i przegranych. Co zrozumiałe, zwycięzcy tworzą rząd (koalicję rządzącą), a przegrani – opozycję. W artykule przedstawiono ramy do porównywania uprawnień do kształtowania polityki przez opozycję parlamentarną w demokracjach parlamentarnych Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej (Czechy, Węgry, Litwa, Polska, Ukraina). W 2022 r. demokracja wymaga partii opozycyjnej z perspektywą (odzyskania większości) w parlamencie. Uprawnienie opozycji parlamentarnej do przeciwstawiania się rządowi utworzonemu przez rządzącą większość jest fundamentalną cechą demokracji liberalnej. Realizacja wartości konstytucyjnych (demokracji, rządów prawa itp.) w państwach Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej pokazuje rzeczywisty poziom rozczłonkowania, polaryzacji, a nawet kartelizacji opozycji. Lista Rule of Law Index 2021 wyraźnie wskazuje, że wśród badanych państw Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej Litwa zajmuje 18. miejsce, Czechy – 22., Polska – 36., Węgry – 69., a Ukraina – 74. Wskaźnik praworządności dotyczy ograniczeń władzy rządu, braku korupcji, przejrzystości działań władzy oraz innych spraw związanych z misją opozycji parlamentarnej. Dystans (nie tylko ideologiczny) pomiędzy rządzącą większością a opozycją parlamentarną polega na zdolności do utworzenia rządu, uczestnictwie w kreowaniu polityki, kontrolowaniu strategii czy polityki rządowej (populistycznej).
EN
Parliamentary elections produce winners and losers. For understandable reasons, winners become the government (coalition) and losers – the opposition. The article presents a framework for comparing the rights in policy-making of the parliamentary opposition in parliamentary Central and Eastern European democracies (Czechia, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Ukraine). In 2022, democracy demands an opposition party with a future (reinversion) in parliament. The right of the parliamentary opposition to oppose the government formed by the governing majority is a fundamental feature of liberal democracy. Application of constitutional values (democracy, the rule of law, etc.) in Central and Eastern European states demonstrates the actual level of opposition fragmentation, polarization, and even cartelization. Rule of Law Index 2021 explicitly shows that among researched Central and Eastern European countries, Lithuania is in 18 place, Czechia – 22, Poland – 36, Hungary – 69, and Ukraine – 74. The Rule of Law Index is about constraints of government powers, absence of corruption, open government, and other issues related to the mission of the parliamentary opposition. Distance (not only ideological) between governing majority and parliamentary opposition is based on the capacity for government formation, participation in policy-making, scrutinizing governmental (populistic) strategy and policy.
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