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1

REVERSING STATE FAILURE IN SOMALIA: POLICY AREAS AND POLITICAL PROCESSES IN NEED OF CHANGE

100%

Bużański M., Kopcewicz G., Olszanecka N., Urbański D., Piechowiak-Lamparska J., Bryc A., Bojarczyk B., Jorgensen F. A. E., Niedziołka D., Pacześniak A., Potorski R., Wincławska M., Włodkowska-Bagan A., Jeran A., Mol A., Solsbery A., Dąbrowska I., Głodkowski M., Kopcewicz G., Olszanecka N., Piechowiak-Lamparska J.

The Copernicus Journal of Political Studies

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2017

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issue 2

PL

In 2012, after over twenty years of being a failed state in conflict with the neighbours and a mosaic of warring clans and religious factions, Somalia was offered a chance to become a functioning country. With extensive foreign support, the Somalis adopted a provisional constitution, and elected a parliament, which elected a president. In 2013 Somalia signed a Compact that contained detailed plan for rebuilding state structures and institutions for the following there years. However, the implementation of the plan faces a multitude of challenges, including among others the particular interests of clan leaders, Al-Quaeda-supported Al-Shabab militia, and lack of perspectives for the young generation. What the state needs besides continued external support is the bottom-up process of establishing authorities and young leaders.

2

The Role of Islam in Indonesian Foreign Policy: A Case of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono Introduction

88%

Songbatumis A. M.

Polish Political Science Yearbook

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2021

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issue 2 (50)

89-111

EN

As Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono won the 2004 presidential election, it marked the end of Indonesia’s democratic transition era and experienced a dynamic change in foreign policy. The new international identity that viewed Islam as an asset was introduced by SBY, emphasizing the importance of moderate Islam as opposing extremism. The phenomenon of Islamic influence was not only the result of democratic consolidation domestically but also external factors such as the aftermath of 9/11 that portrayed Muslims as potential terrorists. For this reason, Indonesian foreign policy attempted to diminish such misconceptions and tried to be a peacemaker or a mediator in Muslim-related issues globally. To contextualize the analysis, the study focuses on the influence of Islam in Indonesian foreign policy towards the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and Pakistan. The mutual aspirations on the Palestinian statehood shared by both the government and the Muslim elements in society could be found, while religious sentiments were noticeable, as shown by the Muslim groups. In contrast, the influence of Islam in Indonesia-Pakistan relations, especially regarding the Kashmir dispute, was absent due to the difference in views of the government and the Muslim groups and constraining factors, including Indonesia’s national interest priority.

3

The influence of the Salafi movement on the political transformation of Egypt in 2011–2013

75%

Palamar A.

Reality of Politics

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2020

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issue 14

144-159

EN

Until 2011, Salafimovement held itself aloof from politics. However, Arab Spring resulted in an opportunity to create their own political parties. Egyptian Salafists were the first to follow this path after the fall of the Hosni Mubarak regime. The emergence of these parties proved to be beneficial for the development of Arab democracy. By their convictions, the Salafists are extremely conservative and more radical than the Muslim Brotherhood. Despite its conservatism, the political force used peaceful means to fight for change, attracted a significant part of Arab society to participate in legal politics, and also added diversity to the spectrum of Islamist parties, preventing any one force from claiming that it represented the entire Muslim community. But soon the rise in popularity of jihadist organizations, which call to fight for the implementation of Islamist ideas not by legal political, but by violent methods, undermined the influence of Salafiparties. In addition, discrediting of the Salafimovement was largely influenced by Saudi policy, the main purpose of which was to counter the Muslim Brotherhood inside Egypt. As a result, most of the ultra-conservative forces became Wahhabi, which led to discord within the Egyptian Salafists. The one part of the movement, which continued to support the Brothers, suffered a political defeat with them after the 2013 military coup. The other part, which sided with the military elite, as a result of these actions completely lost support among the population. This article analyzes the process of the Salafimovement entering the political arena in Egypt, the dynamics of its relations with the Muslim Brotherhood and the ideological differences between them. The article also examines the influence of Saudi Arabia on Egyptian Salafism and explains the main differences between Salafism and Wahhabism in the context of this influence.

4

Sweden and the Muslim Brotherhood – is Islamism a natural part of a multicultural society or is it a threat to our civilization?

63%

Herstad B.

Polish Journal of Political Science

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2017

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vol. 3

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issue 4

31-100

EN

A historical parallel of the mood of operation by the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt to the way the organization is operating in Europe is identified. The organization has a very pragmatic ideological view allowing it to align with the political elite in EU and countries such as Sweden. It uses multiculturalism, the fight against Islamophobia and a claim of being representative for all Muslims as the three main bases to leverage influence. The Islamism it represents must be regarded as fundamentalist because it is advocating Islam as a total system encompassing all areas of life and demanding long-term subjugation. In Sweden individuals from Muslim Brotherhood associated groups have entered high-ranking political positions and managed to channel significant governmental funds to build schools, mosques, relief services and “educating” newly arrived immigrants and prison inmates. Due to the fact that the Muslim Brotherhood is trying to create an Islamist parallel structur it controls, and at the same time try to facilitate governmental support for these efforts and lastly due to the fact that it advances an ideological position in conflict with core Western values, it must be considered a threat to Europe and civilization as we know it.

5

Dlaczego prądy świeckie w Egipcie przegrywają?

63%

Umar I.

Przegląd Krytyczny

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2021

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vol. 3

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issue 2

77-82

EN

The article analyzes the background of the modern secular movement in Egypt and the causes of its failure. The Author compares the circumstances of the emergence of secular ideas in the Middle East and in Europe and argues that in order for a secular modernization project to be effective, it should be a bottom-up process, based on the cultural specificity of a given country, not imposed by hegemons. He also investigates the mistakes made by elites in the Middle East, who did not develop the cognitive framework necessary to model their own concept of a secular state.

PL

Artykuł analizuje tło nowoczesnego ruchu świeckiego w Egipcie i przyczyny jego klęski. Autor porównuje okoliczności pojawienia się idei świeckich na Bliskim Wschodzie i w Europie i argumentuje, że aby projekt modernizacyjny odwołujący się porządku świeckiego był trwały, powinien być budowany oddolnie, w oparciu o specyfikę kulturową danego kraju, a nie narzucony przez kraje hegemoniczne. Wskazuje również na błędy popełnione przez elity w regionie Bliskiego Wschodu, które nie wypracowały ram poznawczych potrzebnych do ukształtowania własnej koncepcji państwa świeckiego.

6

Feminizm islamski. Niechciane dziecko islamu politycznego

62%

Bobako M.

Praktyka Teoretyczna

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2013

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vol. 8

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issue 2

219-247

EN

A goal of the paper is to present Islamic feminism as a political-intellectualphenomenon that has been developing in the international Muslim womencommunity for a few decades. The author distinguishes Islamic feminism (thatpostulates gender quality and women’s empowerment on the basis of the religiousprinciples of Islam) from earlier feminist tradition that she labels after Margot Badranas Muslim feminism. The paper discusses political and intellectual background ofthe emergence of Islamic feminism and shows its complex relationships with bothpolitical Islam and the Western feminist discourses. A key factor here is a heritageof European colonialism and anti-Muslim politics of the West. The author refers tothe works of main representatives of Islamic feminism, such as Fatima Mernissi,Amina Wadud, Ziba Mir-Hosseini, Asma Barlas, and examines their attempts toarrive at non-patriarchal reinterpretations of the Muslim tradition, Quranic texts and the established interpretations of the Sharia law.

PL

Celem artykułu jest przedstawienie feminizmu islamskiego jako zjawiska polityczno-intelektualnego, które rozwija się w międzynarodowych społecznościach muzułmańskich kobiet od kilku dekad. Autorka odróżnia feminizm islamski (postulujący równość płci i upodmiotowienie kobiet w oparciu o religijne zasady islamu) od wcześniejszej feministycznej tradycji, którą za Margot Badran określa mianem feminizmu muzułmańskiego. Tekst przedstawia polityczny i intelektualny kontekst powstania feminizmu islamskiego oraz pokazuje jego skomplikowane związki zarówno z islamem politycznym, jak i zachodnimi dyskursami feministycznymi. Kluczowym czynnikiem okazuje się tutaj dziedzictwo europejskiego kolonializmu i antymuzułmańska polityka Zachodu. Przywołując prace głównych reprezentantek feminizmu islamskiego, tj Fatimy Mernissi, Aminy Wadud, Ziby Mir-Hosseini i Asmy Barlas, autorka omawia podejmowane przez nie próby antypatriarchalnych odczytań muzułmańskiej tradycji, tekstów koranicznych i utrwalonych wykładni prawa szarijatu.

7

Ideologiczne aspekty zaangażowania Rosji w syryjskiej wojnie domowej 2011–2017

45%

Kościelniak K.

Krakowskie Studia Międzynarodowe

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2017

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issue 3

233-258

PL

Tekst przedstawia politykę historyczną Rosji w kontekście syryjskiego sekularyzmu – ukazuje nową rundę zmagań pomiędzy anglosaskim optymizmem dotyczącym islamu na Bliskim Wschodzie a historycznym rosyjskim realizmem. Po pierwsze, wspierana przez Rosję świecka partia Baas zapewniła trwałą integrację mniejszości Syrii w pewien typ społeczeństwa i systemu politycznego gwarantującego wolność religijną w przeciwieństwie do systemów radykalnego islamu. Po drugie, Rosja wykorzystuje pamięć zbiorową alawitów i chrześcijan odnoszącą się do sunnickich prześladowań oraz kontrowersyjne alianse USA, utwierdzając swe wpływy zagraniczne, głównie w regionach związanych z prawosławiem. Po trzecie, Stany Zjednoczone i niektóre kraje UE osądzają działalność al-Assada według własnej perspektywy po 1990 r., tzn. eksperymentu wdrażania standardów wielokulturowego społeczeństwa. Z kolei Rosja ocenia sytuację w regionie z perspektywy co najmniej 200 lat, które obfi towały w wiele dramatycznych wydarzeń, z najbardziej bolesnym: ludobójstwem Ormian. Problemem jest to, że w przypadku ewentualnego upadku rządów Baszara al-Asada Zachód nie będzie w stanie zapewnić mniejszościom długoterminowego bezpieczeństwa według swoich demokratycznych standardów. W tej sytuacji alawici i chrześcijanie upatrują w Rosji gwaranta bezpieczeństwa i wolności religijnej. Zachodnie wsparcie dla „demokracji” na Bliskim Wschodzie i Azji Centralnej przerodziło się w pasmo konfl iktów i zaowocowało niebywałym rozwojem radykalnego islamu.

EN

This article presents an overview of the principal results of research on the historically-oriented policy of Russia’s activity in the Middle East in the context of the case of Syrian- Ba’thist secularism. Firstly, supported by Russia the secular approach of the Syrian Baath Party has provided integration of the Alawites, Christians and other minorities into the political system and society. Secondly, Russia has used memories of many religious warfare and Islamic (Sunni) persecution of Alawites and Orthodox Christians. Using this kind of collective memories, Russian policy has linked many Christian nations. Thirdly, one of the misunderstandings is that the United States and some EU countries judge Assad and Syria by the modern standards of post 1990 Western Europe; Putin and Russia are judging matters in the context of over two hundred years of confl icts and persecutions. Probably, it is a new round of competition between the Anglo-Saxon liberal optimism and historical Russian pessimism. The problem is that in the case of Assad’s fall Washington and none of its Western allies are able to provide long-term security for Syrian minorities according to their democratic standards. Paradoxically, the Alawites and Christians automatically see Russia as a natural protector of human rights at least in terms of religious freedom. Unfortunately, today’s western support for ‘democracies’ in the Middle East (Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and Libya) has been unsuccessful.

Refine search results

REVERSING STATE FAILURE IN SOMALIA: POLICY AREAS AND POLITICAL PROCESSES IN NEED OF CHANGE

The Role of Islam in Indonesian Foreign Policy: A Case of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono Introduction

The influence of the Salafi movement on the political transformation of Egypt in 2011–2013

Sweden and the Muslim Brotherhood – is Islamism a natural part of a multicultural society or is it a threat to our civilization?

Dlaczego prądy świeckie w Egipcie przegrywają?

Feminizm islamski. Niechciane dziecko islamu politycznego

Ideologiczne aspekty zaangażowania Rosji w syryjskiej wojnie domowej 2011–2017