In Switzerland there is a parallel society made up of Muslims unwilling to integrate into the society of the country of residence, preferring Muslim law (Sharia) and - for various reasons - closing on their own "world". This leads directly to the formation of a parallel society, whose functioning can not be reconciled for long term with democratic principles and with the tolerance of religious. For Switzerland, this is a new socio-political situation, additionally difficult because of the decentralized federalism and the direct democracy system in this country. The political elites in Switzerland are blocking political rights of the muslim.
Political situation in present-day Spain is complicated because of many types of crisis. Interaction between media, public opinion and political actors is interesting because media’s activity can cause many changes in political system. The main aim of this article is to verify the hypothesis of the aforementioned de-democratisation process in Spain.
The main aim of this article is to identify current issues in the field of local government in Poland, especially the local political elites in the context of their political affiliation. The decentralization process and the gradual transfer of the responsibilities of the national regional and local dimension has led to the development of self-government. This in turn enabled the participation in the process of governance every citizen of the inhabited area. Recent local elections show that localism is a relative term and greatly simplified. Each of the local politician has own connections with a specific option. Those behavior leads to a kind of self-governance crisis that manifests itself among other things: a decrease of public trust, low voter turnout and increase the sense of social alienation.
One of the major challenges faced by king Stanisław August in 1764-1793 was establishing his own political backing. According to some historians, during his tumultuous reign he managed to create and implement a new, informal model of public career. The article is based on conclusions drawn from analysed source material and confirms the scheme using the example of General Augustyn Gorzeński’s political career. He was Poznań Chamberlain and one of the most trusted royal advisors at the decline of the Polish Republic.
In Switzerland there is a parallel society made up of Muslims unwilling to integrate into the society of the country of residence, preferring Muslim law (Sharia) and – for various reasons – closing on their own „world“. This leads directly to the formation of a parallel society, whose functioning can not be reconciled for long term with democratic principles and with the tolerance of religious. For Switzerland, this is a new socio-political situation, additionally difficult because of the decentralized federalism and the direct democracy system in this country. The political elites in Switzerland are blocking political rights of the muslim.
Celem artykułu jest zaproponowanie wkładu empirycznego do badań dotyczących rekrutacji do elit politycznych. Autorki zmierzają do określenia wzorców konstruowania list wyborczych w wyborach do sejmików wojewódzkich w 2010. Praca posiada charakter opisowy i wyjaśniający oraz jest oparta na studium przypadku, w którym dokonano analizy jakościowej biografii kandydatów. Zakres przedmiotowy badań obejmuje cztery największe partie polityczne Platformę Obywatelską (PO), Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (PiS), Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe (PSL) i Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej (SLD).
EN
The aim of the article is to present an empirical contribution towards the research on the recruitment of political elites. It seeks to determine patterns by which candidates’ lists were composed in the 2010 regional assemblies election. It is descriptive and exploratory in nature and based on a case study containing a qualitative analysis of biographies of candidates that ran for seats. The scope of the research includes four national political parties: Civic Platform (PO), Law and Justice (PiS), Polish People’s Party (PSL) and the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD).
The article analyzes the crisis of political and medical elites in the context of honesty, reliability and diligence. The starting point is the notion of “professional elite” and the differences between representatives of both groups. The text emphasizes the public resonance and interpretation of both professions. According to E. Freidson’s theoretical model, the physician`s and politician`s authorities have different reasons, functions and legitimization. Both professions are based on public trust in interaction practices. The public expectations are focused mostly on instrumental and axiological trust. Obeying various rules and norms is expected from both professions but the social control and sanctions are different. Both physicians and politicians have their own ethical codes; the problem is that they are not always respected. The article concludes with discussion on the notion of risk in both professions and presents suggestions about what elites should do to maintain or regain public trust.
Studies conducted inCEEstates by a number of social and political scientists within the elite theory paradigm focus mainly on issues concerning elite circulation and recruitment, struggles between governing and non-governing (contra-) elites. Although, it is still an open question what relational structures, or networks, exist within power elites. This issue becomes even more important when ‘interest groups’ become the basis for creation of internally circulating ‘ruling class’ whose members periodically seize key positions in different institutions and collectively capture the decision-making process at the state level. In order to define how elite members co-operate, to identify central individuals and key decisionmakers, one needs to understand the structure of political elite network. This paper contains an attempt to explore political elite networks formation and functioning in Ukraine 20 years after the regime change. Main research questions are: what ties and to what extent are important for political elite members; what clusters exist within Ukrainian political elite network; to what extent the concepts of social capital and interpersonal trust can be employed to explain the formation of joint legislative initiatives. In addition, model of elite network functioning allows the depiction and verification of the role of central players taking into account their relational patterns. Sample included members of the Parliament,Government, and the Presidential Secretariat (almost 500 biographies). Biographical method and in-depth interviews were applied for collecting both quantitative and qualitative network data. Specific software enabled applying various SNA tools and procedures for hypotheses testing and network modeling.
The purpose of the article is to address an existing challenge of conducting the research on political elites in modern societies, particularly in the emerging democracies. In addition to a significant gap between theoretical and empirical data, there is also no common vision of the best approach to the research on political elites, especially in transition countries. Most of all, it is caused by the absence of unified common view on the role and distinct functions of political elites in emerging democracies by the scientific world. Consequently, there is a problem with appropriate estimation and conducting analyses of elites’ actions, their weight, and strategy in decision making process towards or backwards to establishing democratic institutions and implication of democratic values. Thus, the article is to describe and analyse main divergence of views on the role, scope and dimension of research of political elites, provided by different theories, namely Marxist one, the classic political elites’ theory and the theory of democratic elitism in accordance with the challenges and requirements of the realities of the current political process.Full text: http://bazhum.muzhp.pl/czasopismo/589/?idno=14760
In this article we will consider reconciliation in a post-conflict Macedonia. When Ohrid Framework Agreement (OFA) was signed, the international community greeted the achievements of the international community as it was signed under specific circumstances. Since it stopped the conflict, it had achieved its goal. Legally, the country became a multiethnic one with a power-sharing government. Yet, the political and intellectual elite, which slightly differ from each other, did not invest intellectual and political capital when searching for a specific Macedonian (inter) national identity, which goes beyond the limitations of the ethnic definitions and mythology around them. Instead, the national discourse is emphasized. Using the terms such as multiculturalism, multhiethnicity and polylingualisam creates additional confusion. When media and politicians use these phrases and incorporate their own political discourses, the damage is done. Critical thinking is not on the agenda in the educational process and the young people are expected to listen rather than think. There is a need for a structural communication among the citizens, a social link but also a philosophical and maybe an ideological communication, so as to fill in the gaps and avoid further divisions. The only way to accomplish that is to have an open and inclusive society. In order to achieve this, the culture of dialog should be nurtured. It is not enough for Macedonians and Albanians to know each other’s folklore and cultural history. Coexistence requires knowing the modern reality. Structured communication is a key. Absence of public discourse has a positive effect on the society’s wellbeing. A debate is not a threat to the process of creating politics. Instead, it legalizes the decision-making process. The intellectual elite should take the lead, show its grandiosity, and view Macedonia as a whole in a joint narrative, which considers all the specifics of the different cultures living together and integrates them in a common goal. In that respect, the OFA was the first necessary step, and its treatment as a Holy Grail ignores the fact that the job is not done. Instead it has just started.
The text deals with the topic of civic political competence (civic competence) as an additional criterion of the quality of the democracy. It shows both theoretical aspects of this issue, identifying some specific elements of competence and the methodological problems of the research on civic competence. The article also includes reflections on the implementation of civic competence in the processes of deliberation.
The process of political disintegration of the Soviet Union has not ended with official dissolution of this state in the end of 1991. The best evidence of instability of the post-Soviet space are “frozen” ethno-political conflicts in Transnistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh Republic. The main goal of this article is to analyze the attitude of South Ossetian political elites to the idea of independence. The author presents the development of political life in South Ossetia since the declaration of its independence in 1990. He argues that despite of strong will to get sovereignty, South Ossetian politicians are considering the future of separatist quazi-state within Russian Federation. In fact both Ossetian elite and Russian authorities get advantages of current status quo.
RU
Процесс политической дезинтеграции бывшего Советского Союза не завершился в конце 1991 года. Самым ярким доказательством нестабильности постсоветского пространства являются «замороженные» этнополитческие конфликты в Приднестровье, Абхазии, Южной Осетии и Нагорном Карабахе. Главная цель данной статьи проанализировать отношение южноосетинских политических элит к идее независимости. Автор проследил процесс разивтия политической жизни Южной Осетии с момента объявления суверенитета в 1990 году. Доказано, что несмотря на сильное привержение к идее независимости, южноосетинские политки будуще непризнан- ной республики рассматривают в составе Российской Федерации. Однако текущая ситуация и сохранение статус кво вписывается в интересы южноосетинских политиков и властей России.
The article presents the results of the study on the statements of Janusz Korwin-Mikke on the Polish political elite in the first 25 years of the Polish Third Republic. Aside from the synthesized material on the elite assessment itself, the criteria used by the author and key features of his character, as well as fragments of his life, which shaped and crystallized his views have been presented. Both these factors had major influence on the style and content of the publications of Janusz Korwin-Mikke. The article also presents a short description of the language used by Janusz Korwin-Mikke. There is also a presentation of the conclusions drawn by him on the possible improvement of the condition of Polish political elites and suggested actions to be taken in order to repair them.
The aim of the article is the analysis of the composition of the representation of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania at the last stage of the seym of Lublin in June–August 1569. Most envoys of the Grand Duchy belonged to the lower and middle szlachta. Envoys belonging to the titled or affluent szlachta constituted a minority. Voivodeships and counties in Lublin were normally represented by nobles connected with the land they represented, mostly of Ruthenian (Belarussian and Ukrainian) and Lithuanian origin. The percentage of envoys with Polish roots was relatively high – they had lived in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania for some time. Most envoys of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania were officials at the county level or nobles holding no offices. Many envoys were connected with the judicial system of the Grand Duchy. Let us underline that over half of the envoys had been associated with the hospodar’s court earlier. I think that it is an important evidence for the influence of Sigismund Augustus on the election and activity of representatives of the Grand Duchy in Lublin in the summer of 1569. At the same time, the data acquired show that almost two-thirds of envoys participated actively in the public life of the state. Many envoys enjoyed esteem and authority among the local szlachta – they tended to evince a high level of political culture and legal knowledge. About one-third of the envoys of the Grand Duchy for the seym of Lublin after 1569 achieved higher levels of the political career. Nevertheless, only four of them managed to enter the senate of the Rzeczpospolita.
The process of creation of Albanian modern state had a crucial point in November 1912, during First Balkan War. The group of Albanian national activists from southern part of Albania and from some diaspora communities gathered in Vlora to proclaim independence of Albanian State. In the specific circumstances created by war, only a part of invited delegates could attend in Vlora meeting. The analysis of their age, profession and religious affilation showed significant differences in comparison with contemporary Albanian society. Majority of Albanian acitivists and insurgents (among them very influential Kosovo Albanians) was marginalised in the first phase of creation of Albanian state. The problem of representativeness of delegates in Vlora was one of the main obstacle in the cooperation of Albanians in the times of Principality of Albania (1912-1914).
The underlying aim of the article is to contribute to the understanding the relation between ethnic claims and policies which determine social relations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the debate on the current constitutional crisis in this country. The present ethno‑political regime heavily depends on the perpetual crisis as the primary source of political articulation and action. Though the Dayton Accords ended war and established peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the agreement did not create a functional central government, lacking the capacity to undertake the reforms needed to meet the terms of accession to the European Union. The peace treaty designed future state structures around the very ethnic‑based power struggles that shaped the conflict. As a result, ethnic‑based politics continued to dominate political space. These politics, combined with high levels of international oversight have distorted the state building process, and reduced democratization efforts. Today, Bosnia’s future is still uncertain. Political squabbles have seriously detracted from Bosnia’s ability to engage in reforms needed to boost its economy and move closer to the EU. Conflicting ambitions of national party leaders is an important factor in this failure. Representatives of an ethnic group can veto any decision that they feel does not accord with their interests. This means in effect that all major decisions have to be made by consensus among the main ethnic parties, which is often very difficult since they have fundamentally different views on Bosnia’s future. Although Bosnia and Herzegovina is currently not in danger of being dismembered, awareness that the country cannot survive without multi‑ethnic collaboration should remain one of the guiding principles for Bosnia’s ruling ethnically‑based political parties.
The article attempts to present the role of the Slovak and Czech political elites in the process of disintegration of the Czechoslovak Federation in 1993. The main thesis of the article is that a lack of the common federal opposition elite before 1989 was the main reason why the Czechs and Slovaks went separate ways. Czechoslovakia is a unique example of the state founded on a decision of the political elite in 1918 and it was also by their decision that the “velvet divorce” tookplace. In addition, it is worth underlining that the disintegration of Czechoslovakia came against the opinion of the majority of society. Political winners decided after 1989 that it would be better to become leaders of smaller but independent states than to try to find consensus and work together.
Tematyką podjętą w tym tekście jest nakreślenie najbardziej reprezentatywnych opinii i ocen przedstawicieli elit politycznych i me-ialnych, które można ułożyć w modelowe konstrukcje dyskursywne dotyczące mediów publicznych w polskiej przestrzeni publicznej. Dotyczyć to będzie w przeważającej mierze okresu od grudnia 2015 roku do kwietnia 2016 roku, czyli kluczowego okresu dokonywania radykalnej zmiany w sferze własności i zarządzania mediami publicznymi oraz politycznego, administracyjnego i finansowego nadzoru nad nimi.
EN
The aim of this study is to sketch the most representative opinions and assessments of political and media elite representatives, and then place them within the framework of a discourse model regar-ding public media in the Polish public space. It concerns, principal-ly, the period from December 2015 to April 2016, which constituted the key period of radical change in the sphere of ownership and management of public media as well as political, administrative and financial supervision over them.
In 1809, in the territories of the Austrian Partition, which had been taken away from Austrians by Polish soldiers, the Central Provisional Military Government of Galicia was formed. The duties of the Governement was the reorganization of administration in Galicia and organization of military troops. The President of the Government was Stanisław Kostka Zamoyski, the most popular and richest magnate in Galicia. Representatives of the local nobility were appointed to other positions in the Government and in the poviat administration bodies. Archive materials allowed the tracing of 53 members. They were born between 1740 and 1780, most often from rich landed gentry and nobility. They owned estates in the former Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Their career path was typical of the social state they represented. Educated, most often in the spirit of the Enlightenment, they took their first steps in public service as administrative officials or military personnel. Some of these careers seemed to have been above average, but the fall of the country in 1795 led to their their interruption. Withdrawing from public life, they returned in 1809. This article, an attempt to form a characteristic of this group, is part of the research on the elite of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth at the turn of the 19th century.
PL
W 1809 r. w wyniku wojny polsko-austriackiej wojska polskie wyzwoliły Galicję Zachodnią i część Galicji Wschodniej spod panowania austriackiego. Na tych terenach dekretem wodza naczelnego księcia Józefa Poniatowskiego utworzono Rząd Centralny Tymczasowy Wojskowy Galicji. Miał on się zająć reorganizacją administracji oraz zaopatrzeniem i organizacją oddziałów wojskowych w Galicji. Prezesem rządu został Stanisław Kostka Zamoyski, a na poszczególne stanowiska w samym rządzie oraz w podległych mu organach administracji powiatowej powołano przedstawicieli miejscowej szlachty. Materiał źródłowy pozwolił na ustalenie 53 nazwisk z tego gremium. Były to osoby urodzone między 1740 a 1780 r., wywodzące się najczęściej z bogatego ziemiaństwa i szlachty. Posiadały majątki na terenach byłej Rzeczypospolitej Obojga Narodów. Ścieżka ich kariery była typowa dla stanu społecznego, który reprezentowali. Wykształceni, najczęściej w duchu oświeceniowym, pierwsze kroki w służbie publicznej stawiali jako urzędnicy lub wojskowi. Niektóre z tych karier zapowiadały się ponadprzeciętnie, jednak upadek kraju w 1795 r. przesądził o ich przerwaniu, a rok 1809 okazał się szansą powrotu do życia publicznego. Niniejszy artykuł jest przyczynkiem do charakterystyki tej grupy społecznej, wpisuje się w nurt badań nad elitami Rzeczypospolitej przełomu XVIII i XIX wieku.
By law, the president of modern Estonia is elected indirectly by parliament or, in the absence of a decision in three consecutive votes, by a specially appointed electoral college. In 2016, Estonia experienced an unprecedented political crisis resulting from the impossibility of appointing the head of state according to the procedure specified in the constitution. It was determined both by more general factors related to the electoral system itself, as well as the specificity of Estonia's political life in the second decade of the 21st century. The 2016 presidential election proved to be a complicated game involving major political parties, going well beyond simply appointing a new head of state. The purpose of this article is to discuss the origins, course and immediate effects of these events, culminating in the unexpected election of Kersti Kaljulaid to the office of President of the Republic.
PL
Zgodnie z obowiązującym prawem prezydent Estonii jest wybierany pośrednio przez parlament, a w przypadku braku rozstrzygnięcia w trzech kolejnych turach głosowania – przez specjalnie powołane do tego celu kolegium elektorskie. W 2016 r. doszło w Estonii do bezprecedensowego kryzysu politycznego wynikającego z niemożności wyłonienia głowy państwa w trybie określonym w konstytucji. Wpływ na to miały zarówno czynniki natury ogólnej, związane z samym systemem wyborczym, jak i specyfika estońskiego życia politycznego w drugiej dekadzie XXI w. Wybory prezydenckie w 2016 r. okazały się skomplikowaną rozgrywką z udziałem głównych partii politycznych, dalece wykraczającą poza samą kwestię wyboru głowy państwa. Niniejszy artykuł ma na celu omówienie genezy i przebiegu, a także bezpośrednich skutków wspomnianych wydarzeń, których finałem okazał się niespodziewany wybór Kersti Kaljulaid na urząd prezydenta Republiki.
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