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Measurement of control power in corporate networks

100%
STACH I., MERCIK J.
Operations Research and Decisions
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2021
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vol. 31
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issue 1
97-121
EN
This paper discusses some game-theoretical methods for measuring indirect control in complex corporate shareholding networks. The methods use power indices to estimate the direct and indirect control in shareholding structures. Some of these methods only estimate the control power of investors (firms without shareholdings), and only a few measure the control power of all firms involved in shareholding networks (which means investors and stock companies). None of them takes measuring the importance of mutual connections (edges in the networks) into consideration; thus we focus in particular on an extension of these methods in this paper to measure both the control-power of the firms involved in complex shareholding structures (represented by nodes in networks) and the importance (power) of linkages between the firms as elements of a whole corporate shareholding network. More precisely, we apply our approaches to a theoretical example of a corporate network. Moreover, we continue the considerations about reasonable properties for indirect control measurement. Some ideas of new properties are proposed. The paper also provides a brief review of the literature concerning the topic.
2
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Indirect control and power

100%
BERTINI C., MERCIK J., STACH I.
Operations Research and Decisions
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2016
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vol. 26
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issue 2
7-30
EN
To determine who has the power within a stock corporate company can be a quite complex prob-lem, especially when control is achieved through alliances between shareholders. This problem arises especially in cases of indirect control of corporations, that is, in situations involving shareholders and companies with cross-shareholdings. The first to solve the problem of measuring power in the case of indirect share control were Gianfranco Gambarelli and Guillermo Owen in [10]. In the following years, numerous other models were introduced. In this paper, we critically examine the models of: Gambarelli and Owen, Denti and Prati, Crama and Leruth, Karos and Peters, as well as Mercik and Lobos, taking into account two well-known, illustrative examples, one with an acyclic corporate structure and the other with a cyclic structure.
3
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Computing power indices for weighted voting games via dynamic programming

88%
STAUDACHER J., KÓCZY L. Á., STACH I., FILIPP J., KRAMER M., NOFFKE T., OLSSON L., PICHLER J., SINGER T.
Operations Research and Decisions
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2021
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vol. 31
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issue 2
123-145
EN
We study the efficient computation of power indices for weighted voting games using the para- digm of dynamic programming. We survey the state-of-the-art algorithms for computing the Banzhaf and Shapley–Shubik indices and point out how these approaches carry over to related power indices. Within a unified framework, we present new efficient algorithms for the Public Good index and a recently proposed power index based on minimal winning coalitions of the smallest size, as well as a very first method for computing the Johnston indices for weighted voting games efficiently. We introduce a software package providing fast C++ implementations of all the power indices mentioned in this article, discuss computing times, as well as storage requirements.
4
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Podział wpływów między frakcjami i grupami w Najwyższej Radzie Ukrainy (1990 - 2012)

63%
Olejnik W., Lebediuk W.
Facta Simonidis
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2013
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vol. 6
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issue 1
93-117
EN
The article analyses the distribution of power among factions and groups in Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (1990-2012). It uses Banzhaf’s power index including the simple and constitutional majority’s index and α-index which takes into account factions’ and groups’ preferences for coalition making. It is shown that the power of a faction evaluated on the basis of Banzhaf index might significantly differ from its actual share of seats. It is shown that when the α-index is used groups and fractions who have indirect power increase their influence whereas radical ones lose it.
PL
W artykule poddano szczegółowej analizie podział wpływów między frakcjami i grupami w Najwyższej Radzie Ukrainy od 1 do 7 kadencji. Oparto je na modelach teoretycznych Banzhafa, a więc uwzględniających wskaźnik dla większości zwykłej i konstytucyjnej, jak również sekwencji α-wskaźnika – indeksu złożonego, który bierze pod uwagę preferencje frakcji i grup do budowania koalicji. Wykazano, że wpływ frakcji lub grupy, mierzone wskaźnikiem Banzhafa, mogą się znacznie różnić od ich partycypacji w liczbie miejsc w parlamencie. Ustalono też, że w ocenie wpływu za pomocą α-wskaźnika, frakcje i grupy zajmujące pośrednie stanowisko zwiększają swoje wpływy, zaś zmniejszają je zajmując postawy radykalne.
5
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ZASTOSOWANIE INDEKSÓW SIŁY W ANALIZIE STRUKTURY WŁASNOŚCIOWEJ SEKTORA BADAWCZO-ROZWOJOWEGO

63%
Tomczyk E.
Metody Ilościowe w Badaniach Ekonomicznych
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2018
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vol. 19
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issue 3
303-310
PL
Celem artykułu jest zbadanie nacisku, jaki mogą wywierać właściciele jednostek sektora badawczo-rozwojowego na zatrudnionych w nich naukowców. Na podstawie indeksów siły Shapleya-Shubika i Banzhafa stwierdzono, że sektor badawczo-rozwojowy w Polsce obejmuje w większości ośrodki, w których dominującą rolę odgrywa pojedynczy silny właściciel. Może on potencjalnie nadzorować i ingerować w prace zatrudnionych w nich naukowców, choć na pytanie, czy presja taka rzeczywiście jest w praktyce stosowana, indeksy siły nie dają odpowiedzi.
EN
The article aims to analyze the pressure that can be exerted by owners of research and development (R+D) companies in Poland over their employees. To analyze the power of co-owners of the R+D companies, cooperative game theory tools are used, namely, Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf power indices. It is found that there is an owner with a dictatorship power, with power index equal to 1, in the vast majority of the companies, and there are few cases with dispersed ownership. Therefore, the R+D sector in Poland is comprised primarily of the units in which the single powerful owner plays the major role. Pressure exercised over the scientists employed in these companies may follow; however, whether the pressure is actually exerted, cannot be determined by analysis of power indices.
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