Search results

1

Some conclusions of chaos and non predicability in physics to theologia naturalis

100%

Ambrozy M.

Społeczeństwo i Edukacja. Międzynarodowe Studia Humanistyczne

|

2014

|

issue 1(13)

69-76

EN

Deterministic chaos counts among noteworthy fields of natural science. Its truly extraordinary attributes enable not only various interpretations from the point of view of predictability but also interesting consequences from the sphere of theologia naturalis. The situation starts to be interesting, if we figure explication of influence of God on a human through Augustine Aurelius in possible unpredictability in a sense of impossibility to predict future of a physical state on a macro level. Interconnection of both of these theories provides interesting conclusions.

2

A firm’s perspective on econophysics-based currency risk analysis

100%

Fiedor P., Hołda A.

Nauki o Finansach

|

2014

|

issue 4(21)

92-107

EN

In this article the authors presents an approach to quantifying currency risk based on the methodology of econophysics. This article continues the authors’ study into the currency risk, this time simplifying it for the purpose of rendering it useful for companies without technical abilities. A method of analysing the dependencies between currencies based on correlations is introduced to facilitate the analysis of currency risk involved in being exposed to one or more foreign currencies. Also a model estimating a risk-free horizon is introduced and tested against price formation models and empirical data from FX markets.

3

The effects of bankruptcy on the predictability of price formation processes on Warsaw’s Stock Market

100%

Fiedor P., Hołda A.

Finansowy Kwartalnik Internetowy e-Finanse

|

2016

|

vol. 12

|

issue 1

32-42

EN

In this study we investigate how bankruptcy affects the market behaviour of prices of stocks on Warsaw’s Stock Exchange. As the behaviour of prices can be seen in a myriad of ways, we investigate a particular aspect of this behaviour, namely the predictability of these price formation processes. We approximate their predictability as the structural complexity of logarithmic returns. This method of analysing predictability of price formation processes using information theory follows closely the mathematical definition of predictability, and is equal to the degree to which redundancy is present in the time series describing stock returns. We use Shannon’s entropy rate (approximating Kolmogorov-Sinai entropy) to measure this redundancy, and estimate it using the Lempel-Ziv algorithm, computing it with a running window approach over the entire price history of 50 companies listed on the Warsaw market which have gone bankrupt in the last few years. This enables us not only to compare the differences between predictability of price formation processes before and after their filing for bankruptcy, but also to compare the changes in predictability over time, as well as divided into different categories of companies and bankruptcies. There exists a large body of research analysing the efficiency of the whole market and the predictability of price changes enlarge, but only a few detailed studies analysing the influence of external stimulion the efficiency of price formation processes. This study fills this gap in the knowledge of financial markets, and their response to extreme external events.

4

O nowelizacji, do której nie doszło, czyli blaski i cienie obiektywnego przypisania skutku

88%

Konieczniak P.

Studia Iuridica

|

2016

|

vol. 65

41-69

PL

The subject is the 2013 draft law, that was to amend the Polish Penal Code of 1997, but was finally abandoned. It concerned implementation of the „objective attribution of an effect” concept, an equivalent of German „objektive Zurechnung”. Numerous types of crimes (so-called „przestępstwa materialne”) are causally defined and their definitions fit only the cases where the cause-effect relationship (sc. between human behaviour and the effect specifically prescribed by law) is present. For the complete fulfilment of crime existence of the cause-effect relationship is a necessary condition, but from the point of view of equity it can be regarded an insufficient condition. Therefore the „objective attribution” idea proposes some additional limitations to criminal responsibility for an effect of a human behaviour. The paper discusses five criteria (limiting conditions) proposed so far: (1) the behaviour must cause harm to some „legal value” through breaking a legal norm that’s purpose was protecting just the same value (norm purpose identity condition); (2) the harm must result from the same causal mechanism, for which the legal norm was intended (mechanism identity condition); (3) the behaviour must bring on a substantial increase of risk of such harm (increase of risk condition); (4) the harm would not happen if the behaviour did not break the norm (negative test condition); (5) the harm was predictable for a hypothetical „reliable person” being in identical conditions („objective predictability” condition). These conditions are logically independent, i.e. neither none is implied by any other nor none is excluded by any other. They can all potentially be „building blocks” for the legal future construction. Of the further three proposed conditions one is only subsidiary („substantial breach of the norm”), one is redundant and unnecessary („adequacy of causal course”) and one is practically undesired („socially accepted increase of risk”). Polish Common Courts and the Supreme Court have appealed to the „objective attribution” concept in criminal cases for over 15 years, though infrequently. Such a practice has only partial and unclear legal basis (now it is Article 9 § 2 of the Penal Code). The would-be amendment to the Penal Code would not remove the previous doubts. What is more important, the proposed amendment was premature, as the set of conditions listed above allows to design many different versions of the „objective attribution”, and so far there is not a common acceptance for a particular one.

5

Assistance devices and autonomous vehicles, or the fourth industrial revolution in the automotive industry. Reflections on criminal liability

88%

Pawelec K.

Cybersecurity and Law

|

2021

|

vol. 6

|

issue 2

103-110

EN

The fourth technical revolution has undoubtedly become a fact. It has affected, and that to a large extent, the automotive industry. Motor vehicles provided with driver-assistance systems have appeared, such as those warning of obstacles, maintaining a safe distance from preceding vehicles, informing of a blind spot, or autonomously automatically adjusting speed, slowing down, following navigation, etc., the role of the driver only being to indicate the destination. However, should the driver have full confidence in those systems, and allow for the mistakes they make, and what impact will this have on their possible criminal liability? These are the issues raised in the publication, which at the same time points out that the legal systems are absolutely not adapted to modern technologies, artificial intelligence, or the assessment of so-called robot drivers.

6

Emergence in Dynamical Systems

88%

Collier J.

Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne

|

2013

|

issue 24

17 - 42

EN

Emergence is a term used in many contexts in current science; it has become fashionable. It has a traditional usage in philosophy that started in 1875 and was expanded by J. S. Mill (earlier, under a different term) and C. D. Broad. It is this form of emergence that I am concerned with here. I distinguish it from uses like ‘computational emergence,’ which can be reduced to combinations of program steps, or its application to merely surprising new features that appear in complex combinations of parts. I will be concerned specifically with ontological emergence that has the logical properties required by Mill and Broad (though there might be some quibbling about the details of their views). I restrict myself to dynamical systems that are embodied in processes. Everything that we can interact with through sensation or action is either dynamical or can be understood in dynamical terms, so this covers all comprehensible forms of emergence in the strong (nonreducible) sense I use. I will give general dynamical conditions that underlie the logical conditions traditionally assigned to emergence in nature.The advantage of this is that, though we cannot test logical conditions directly, we can test dynamical conditions. This gives us an empirical and realistic form of emergence, contrary those who say it is a matter of perspective.

51%

Konieczniak P.

Studia Iuridica

|

2016

|

vol. 65

41-70

EN

The subject is the 2013 draft law, that was to amend the Polish Penal Code of 1997, but was finally abandoned. It concerned implementation of the „objective attribution of an effect” concept, an equivalent of German „objektive Zurechnung”. Numerous types of crimes (so-called „przestępstwa materialne”) are causally defined and their definitions fit only the cases where the cause-effect relationship (sc. between human behaviour and the effect specifically prescribed by law) is present. For the complete fulfilment of crime existence of the cause-effect relationship is a necessary condition, but from the point of view of equity it can be regarded an insufficient condition. Therefore the „objective attribution” idea proposes some additional limitations to criminal responsibility for an effect of a human behaviour. The paper discusses five criteria (limiting conditions) proposed so far: (1) the behaviour must cause harm to some „legal value” through breaking a legal norm that’s purpose was protecting just the same value (norm purpose identity condition); (2) the harm must result from the same causal mechanism, for which the legal norm was intended (mechanism identity condition); (3) the behaviour must bring on a substantial increase of risk of such harm (increase of risk condition); (4) the harm would not happen if the behaviour did not break the norm (negative test condition); (5) the harm was predictable for a hypothetical „reliable person” being in identical conditions („objective predictability” condition). These conditions are logically independent, i.e. neither none is implied by any other nor none is excluded by any other. They can all potentially be „building blocks” for the legal future construction. Of the further three proposed conditions one is only subsidiary („substantial breach of the norm”), one is redundant and unnecessary („adequacy of causal course”) and one is practically undesired („socially accepted increase of risk”). Polish Common Courts and the Supreme Court have appealed to the „objective attribution” concept in criminal cases for over 15 years, though infrequently. Such a practice has only partial and unclear legal basis (now it is Article 9 § 2 of the Penal Code). The would-be amendment to the Penal Code would not remove the previous doubts. What is more important, the proposed amendment was premature, as the set of conditions listed above allows to design many different versions of the „objective attribution”, and so far there is not a common acceptance for a particular one.

13

Naturalistyczne wyjaśnienie wolnej woli (I)

38%

Munévar G.

Filozoficzne Aspekty Genezy

|

2013

|

vol. 10

111-137

PL

Celem tego artykułu jest wykazanie, że naturalizm jest zgodny z ideą wolności woli. Wielu filozofów twierdzi, że jeśli determinizm jest prawdziwy, a przeto nie jesteśmy istotami wolnymi, to tym samym nie jesteśmy odpowiedzialni moralnie. Wówczas ten "problem wolnej woli" najwyraźniej byłby szczególnie kłopotliwy dla naturalizmu. Naturalizm bowiem uznaje, że ludzie są swoiście zorganizowaną materią i dlatego, jak sądzi wielu uczonych, jest zgodny z determinizmem. Kilku naukowców, którzy poruszyli ten temat, włączywszy Francisa Cricka i E.O. Wilsona, próbowało wyjaśnić fenomenologię wolnej woli (nasze wrażenie, że jesteśmy panami samych siebie) w kategoriach biologicznych, argumentując, że ludzki mózg jest tak bardzo złożony, że przewidywalność działań poszczególnych jednostek w praktyce okazuje się niemożliwa. Niemniej rozwiązania takie zawodzą, ponieważ determinizm i przewidywalność nie są tym samym. Przykładowo zjawiska o charakterze chaotycznym są niemożliwe do przewidzenia, ale i tak są deterministyczne. Zatem te interesujące naukowe propozycje mogą wykazać co najwyżej, że wolna wola jest jedynie złudzeniem. Lecz jeśli tak, to złudzeniem jest również odpowiedzialność moralna. Niniejszy artykuł wyjaśnia także, dlaczego odwołanie się do indeterminizmu kwantowego leżącego u podstaw przypuszczalnie deterministycznej nauki również nie rozwiązuje problemu. Problemu tego nie można także unieważnić ani wskazując na mylenie w języku praktycznej nieuchronności praw przyrody z przymusem związanym z prawami społecznymi, jak próbowali to uczynić Hobbes, Hume, Schlick i inni, ani poprzez jakieś dalsze "analizy lingwistyczne". Artykuł ten rozwija sugestię Gary'ego Watsona, że kwestia wolnej woli sprowadza się raczej do pytania, czy jaźń może determinować nasze działania. Jak zobaczymy, okaże się, że jaźń to (w przeważającej mierze) mózg, zaś mózg rzeczywiście determinuje działania poszczególnych jednostek. Pomimo że prawa fizyki i chemii obowiązują w mózgu i że wszelkiego rodzaju czynniki zewnętrzne wywierają wpływ na ten narząd, to każdy mózg jest układem sui generis, charakteryzującym się własnym zbiorem "praw" emergentnych, które sprawiają, że każdy organizm jest niezależną jednostką w relacji do świata. W każdym razie taka niezależność od świata wystarczy do uzasadnienia wniosku, że mózg (jaźń) determinuje własne działania, a przeto, że - w normalnych warunkach - każda osoba jest odpowiedzialna moralnie. Najważniejszą z przesłanek dyskutowanych w artykule jest istnienie "silnej emergencji" procesów mózgowych. Pierwszy poziom emergencji to dobrze znany fakt, że składowe procesów mózgowych (na przykład impulsy elektryczne przesyłane z siatkówki oka do mózgu) nie gwarantują przeżycia jakiegoś konkretnego doświadczenia. Silniejszy poziom emergencji polega zaś na tym, że sieci neuronowe w mózgu oddziałują na pojedyncze składowe tych sieci (na przykład na wagi synaptyczne). Zatem stan neuronalny jest emergentny w tym sensie, że konstytuujące go wagi połączeń synaptycznych nie wystarczą do określenia go. Jest emergentny również w tym sensie, że wagi synaptyczne częściowo zależą także od samego stanu neuronalnego.

EN

The aim of this paper is to argue that naturalism is consistent with free will. Many philosophers claim that if determinism is true, and thus we are not really free agents, then we are not morally responsible. This „problem of free will” would then seem to be particularly pressing for naturalism, since naturalism considers human beings to be arrangements of matter, and therefore many scholars expect it to be consistent with determinism. Several scientific writers who have touched on the subject, including Francis Crick and E.O. Wilson, have tried to explain the phenomenology of free will (our feeling that we are free agents) on biological terms, while arguing that the human brain is so complex that the predictability of individual human action is practically impossible. Such solutions fail, however, because determinism and predictability are not the same thing. Chaotic phenomena, for example, may be unpredictable, but they are still deterministic. So the most these interesting scientific proposals can show is that free will is an illusion. But if free will is an illusion, so is moral responsibility. This paper will also explain why appeals to quantum indeterminism, which underlies presumably deterministic science, are not much help either. Nor can the problem be dismissed as Hobbes, Hume, Schlick and others have tried to do, by pointing to a linguistic confusion between the practical inevitability of natural law and the compulsion of social laws, nor by some further „linguistic analysis”. This paper develops Gary Watson’s suggestion that the question of free will is rather whether our actions can be determined by the self. The self, it will be seen, turns out tobe (largely) the brain, and the brain does indeed determine the individual’s actions. Even though the laws of physics and chemistry apply in the brain, and even though all sorts of external influences leave their imprint on the brain, each brain is sui generis and has its own set of emergent „laws” that pit the organism as an independent entity vis-à-vis the world. This is enough independence from the world, in any event, to justify the conclusion that the brain (the self) does determine its own actions, and thus that, under normal circumstances, the individual is morally responsible. The most important of the reasons discussed in the paper is the existence of „strong emergence” in brain processes. The first level of emergence is the well-known fact that the components of a brain process (e.g., electrical pulses sent by the retina to the brain) do not guarantee a particular experience. The stronger level of emergence is that the brain networks affect the individual components of the networks (e.g., synaptic weights). Thus a neural state is emergent in the sense that the weights of the synaptic connections that constitute it are not sufficient to determine it, and also emergent in the sense that those weights are also partially dependent on the neural state itself.

Refine search results

Some conclusions of chaos and non predicability in physics to theologia naturalis

A firm’s perspective on econophysics-based currency risk analysis

The effects of bankruptcy on the predictability of price formation processes on Warsaw’s Stock Market

O nowelizacji, do której nie doszło, czyli blaski i cienie obiektywnego przypisania skutku

Assistance devices and autonomous vehicles, or the fourth industrial revolution in the automotive industry. Reflections on criminal liability

Emergence in Dynamical Systems

Determinizm Laplace'a w świetle teorii fizycznych mechaniki klasycznej

Leisure Traveling for 21stCentury Americans: Mass Tourism as a Cultural Trap

Selected Administrative Principles and Their Regulation in Sapiential Literature in Ancient Egypt

L’istituto della vincolatività del precedente tra prevedibilità delle scelte giurisdizionali e libertà di stabilimento

Wpływ jakości zysku na zależność pomiędzy zyskiem a stopą zwrotu z akcji na przykładzie GPW w Warszawie

O nowelizacji, do której nie doszło, czyli blaski i cienie obiektywnego przypisania skutku

Naturalistyczne wyjaśnienie wolnej woli (I)