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Gas Distribution Benchmarking of Utilities from Slovenia, the Netherlands and the UK: an Application of Data Envelopment Analysis

100%
Zorić J., Hrovatin N., Scarsi G.
South East European Journal of Economics and Business
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2009
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vol. 4
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issue 1
113-124
EN
This paper carries out non-parametric relative efficiency comparisons using an international sample of gas distribution utilities from two old and one new EU members, namely the Netherlands, the UK, and Slovenia. By conducting DEA on a cross-sectional sample of gas utilities, we discover that, on average, Slovenian utilities perform less efficiently than UK and Dutch utilities. To a large extent, this is due to the less extensive regulation of the Slovenian gas industry as seen in the past. The incentive-based price-cap regulation recently introduced in Slovenia could help close this efficiency gap over time. The authors also find out that different model specifications lead to very similar efficiency scores and rankings, implying that benchmarking can be employed as a useful complementary instrument for monitoring utility performance. In this way, the informational asymmetry between distribution utilities and regulatory authorities can be significantly mitigated. For the wider and more successful implementation of international benchmarking in the future, it is also important that coherent regional and international data is made available to regulators.
2
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Michał Kalecki i problem racjonalnej alokacji zasobów w socjalizmie

81%
Winczewski D.
Praktyka Teoretyczna
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2015
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vol. 24
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issue 2
196-225
EN
The aim of this article is the reconstruction of the views of Michael Kalecki and his followers on rational calculation and allocation of resources in a socialist economy, and also to try to compare their statements with the views of both supporters of capitalism, as well as alternative models of socialism. In this matter the piece examines articles of Polish economists on the pattern formation of prices in capitalism and socialism, the role of the working class and the system of incentives and economic governance. In this paper, we have also discussed the views of the authors who, based on the work of Kalecki, took up a controversy with a circulation narrative explaining the failure of socialism. The conclusion that flows from the preceding analysis is as follows: Real capitalism and real socialism struggle with problems of imperfect information, and soft budgets; a particular model of economic management in this regard is not the direct cause of the failure of the socialist project. In addition to the problem of innovation and optimal investment, from the Kaleckian perspective, a fundamental problem of socialism appears to be the appropriate relations of production in the Marxist sense, understood as democratization of the relationship between the working class and the production management layer.
PL
Celem artykułu jest rekonstrukcja poglądów Michała Kaleckiego i jego zwolenników na temat racjonalnej kalkulacji i alokacji zasobów w gospodarce socjalistycznej, a także próba zestawienia tych poglądów z poglądami zwolenników zarówno kapitalizmu, jak i alternatywnych modeli socjalizmu. Pod tym kątem przeanalizowano artykuły polskiego ekonomisty dotyczące schematu tworzenia się cen w kapitalizmie i socjalizmie, roli klasy robotniczej oraz systemu bodźców i sposobu zarządzania gospodarką. W artykule omówiono też poglądy autorów, którzy bazując na pracach Kaleckiego, podjęli się polemiki z obiegową narracją wyjaśniającą porażkę realnego socjalizmu. Zarówno realny kapitalizm, jak i realny socjalizm zmagają się z problemami niedoskonałej informacji i miękkich budżetów, nie istnieje również doskonały model zarządzania gospodarką, w związku z tym nie są to bezpośrednie przyczyny niepowodzenia projektu socjalistycznego. Oprócz problemu innowacji i optymalnych nakładów inwestycyjnych z perspektywy kaleckiańskiej zasadniczym problemem socjalizmu wydaje się ustanowienie właściwych stosunków produkcji w marksistowskim sensie, rozumianych jako zdemokratyzowanie relacji pomiędzy klasą robotniczą a warstwą zarządzającą produkcją.
3
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Investment and Regulation in Telecommunications

72%
Piątek S.
Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies
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2008
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vol. 1(1)
109-129
EN
This article presents the difficulties associated with the implementation of the regulatory goal of promoting investment and innovation within the area of sector specific regulation in telecoms. The encouragement of efficient investment is one of the major goals reflected in the EC and domestic legal rules on telecoms access as well as price- and rate of return regulation. The law and the interplay of the interests of incumbents and alternative operators create a fertile soil for the emergence of various regulatory concepts of stimulating investment and facility-based competition. Considered here are the concepts most frequently referred to in this context including: the notion of new and emerging markets, the ladder of investment theory, sunset clauses and dynamic pricing policies. However, most of these concepts had little influence on regulatory practice so far, seeing as telecoms regulation is mostly directed at service competition and effective utilisation of existing infrastructures. This fact is the result of national regulators balancing their various regulatory goals in the existing technical and economic environment of the sector. The approach of the Polish regulatory authority towards these concepts constitutes an example of this reality. The urgent need to establish a new policy for next generation networks and access, bringing new technologies and business models to the sector, will have to induce more recognition for some concepts presented in this article.
4
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K prvání kvalifikaci ujednání odporujících cenovým předpisům

72%
Bakeš M., Eliáš K.
Právník. Teoretický časopis pro otázky státu a práva (The Lawyer - Scientific Review for Problems of State and Law)
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2017
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vol. 156
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issue 1
1-19
EN
This treatise takes into account that even in the most liberal economic system, the public power does not renounce its possible interference into economic life, regulation of prices is no exception. For the rule of law system, price control represents an exceptional measure and is accepted only under limited condition, conditional upon intense public interest. The authors deal in this paper with issues connected with cases of contractual arrangements for the remuneration in situations where the agreed amount of consideration contradicts the regulated price. The analysis highlights the findings associated with changing regulations in the Czech law, which, over the many centuries, have tried almost all the possible approaches for a legislative solution to such conflicts. The article specifically highlights the illogic of the rule we find in § 758 of the Commercial Code, according to which any violation of price regulation (i.e. also in agreements on rates lower than minimally allowed) the price to be paid by the Parties, as permitted by the law, counts as the maximum price. The authors conclude that the best way how to solve this conflict is by maintaining the validity of that contract which included the arrangements for the court to change to the price so that it reflects the price regulations in place and which the court determines as fair.
CS
Pojednání bere v úvahu, že ani v tom nejliberálnějším ekonomickém systému se veřejná moc nezříká zásahů do hospodářského života, regulaci cen z toho nevyjímaje. V právním státě představuje cenová regulace výjimečné opatření a akceptovat ji lze jen za podmínek zcela omezených, podmíněných intenzivním veřejným zájmem. Autoři se v příspěvku zabývají řešením otázek souvisejících s případy smluvních ujednání o úplatě za situace, kdy dohodnutá výše úplaty odporuje regulované ceně. Rozbor poukazuje na poznatky spojené s měnícími se úpravami v českém právu, v němž se v průběhu století vystřídaly snad všechny možné přístupy k právnímu řešení takového konfliktu. Stať zvláště upozorňuje na nelogičnost právního pravidla § 758 obchodního zákoníku, podle kterého měla při jakémkoli porušení cenové regulace (tedy i při ujednání ceny nižší než nejméně přípustné) platit pro smluvní strany cena přípustná podle cenových předpisů jako maximální. Autoři uzavírají, že nejpřijatelněji lze tento konflikt řešit zachováním platnosti smlouvy s tím, že ujednání o ceně soud na návrh strany změní tak, aby úplata vyhovovala cenovým předpisům, a určí ji jako spravedlivou.
5
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Zulässigkeit und Grenzen mitgliedstaatlicher Eingriffe in die freie Preisgestaltung bei Agrarerzeugnissen. Rechtsdogmatische Überlegungen im Lichte der Rechtsprechung der Europäischen Gerichtshofes

58%
Busse C.
Przegląd Prawa Rolnego
|
2021
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issue 2(29)
135-167
PL
Celem artykułu jest odpowiedź na pytanie, w jakim zakresie państwa członkowskie mogą ingerować w swobodne ustalanie cen produktów rolnych, przyjmując regulacje krajowe. Instrumenty regulacji cen są integralną częścią Wspólnej Polityki Rolnej. Powszechnie uważa się, że unijne prawo wtórne dotyczące rynku rolnego zawiera dorozumiany zakaz krajowych regulacji cenowych. Istnieje również alternatywne uzasadnienie takiego zakazu, które można wywieść bezpośrednio z TFUE. W artykule dokonano oceny dopuszczalności stosowania cen minimalnych na produkty rolne i środki spożywcze w zależności od kosztów produkcji, omawiając różne jej aspekty.
IT
L’articolo si propone di rispondere alla domanda fino a che punto gli Stati membri possano interferire nella libera formazione dei prezzi dei prodotti agricoli attraverso le regolazioni nazionali. Gli strumenti di regolazione dei prezzi sono parte integrante della politica agricola comune. Tradizionalmente, la legislazione derivata dell’UE in materia di mercato agricolo vieta, in maniera implicita, ai Paesi di regolare i prezzi. Una giustificazione alternativa per tale divieto può essere ricavata direttamente dal TFUE. L’articolo valuta l’ammissibilità di applicare i prezzi minimi per i prodotti agricoli e alimentari in funzione dei costi di produzione, sotto vari aspetti.
EN
The aim of this article was to answer the question to what extent the Member States may, by adopting national regulations, interfere in the free determination of the prices of agricultural products. Price regulation instruments are an integral part of the Common Agricultural Policy. According to the traditional view, EU secondary legislation on the agricultural market contains an implicit prohibition on national price regulation. Moreover, an alternative justification for such a prohibition may also be derived directly from the TFEU. The article assesses the admissibility of the application of minimum prices for agricultural products and foodstuffs depending on production costs, discussing various aspects.
DE
Der Beitrag untersucht die streitige Frage, in welchem Umfang Mitgliedstaaten in die freie Preisgestaltung bei Agrarerzeugnissen durch nationale Regelungen eingreifen dürfen. Zunächst wird dargestellt, dass das Instrument der Preisregelung ein integraler Bestandteil der Gemeinsamen Agrarpolitik ist. Nach traditioneller Auffassung enthält das Agrarmarktsekundärrecht der EU ein implizites Verbot nationaler Preisregelungen. Dazu legt der Beitrag dar, dass es auch eine alternative Begründung zu einem solchen Verbot gibt, die sich unmittelbar aus dem AEUV ableiten lässt. Es folgt eine Beschreibung der jahrzehntelangen ständigen Rechtsprechung des EuGH zum grundsätzlichen Verbot nationaler Preisregelungen. Ausgehend von dieser Rechtsprechung und den unterschiedlichen sachlichen Zusammenhängen von Preisreglungen werden zwei Grundkonstellationen entwickelt und anhand mehrerer Urteile des EuGH überprüft. Der Beitrag analysiert zudem die beiden jüngsten Urteile des EuGH in den Rechtssachen Lietuvos Respublikos Seimo von 2019 und Kommission/Ungarn von 2021, die in den Bereichen unlautere Handelspraktiken und Preisdifferenzierungen spielen. Den Abschluss des Beitrages bildet eine Bewertung der Frage, ob an Produktionskosten gekoppelte Mindestpreise für Agrarprodukte und Lebensmittel zulässig sind, und diskutiert dabei die verschiedenen Aspekte.
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