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EN
The goal of this paper is a philosophical explication and logical rectification of the notion of concept. We take into account only those contexts that are relevant from the logical point of view. It means that we are not interested in contexts characteristic of cognitive sciences, particularly of psychology, where concepts are conceived of as some kind of mental objects or representations. After a brief recapitulation of various theories of concept, in particular Frege’s and Church’s ones, we propose our own theory based on procedural semantics of Transparent Intensional Logic (TIL) and explicate concept in terms of the key notion of TIL, namely construction viewed as an abstract, algorithmically structured procedure.
Logic and Logical Philosophy
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2017
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vol. 26
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issue 4
473–508
EN
In this paper we examine two approaches to the formal treatment of the notion of problem in the paradigm of algorithmic semantics. Namely, we will explore an approach based on Martin-Löf’s Constructive Type Theory (CTT), which can be seen as a direct continuation of Kolmogorov’s original calculus of problems, and an approach utilizing Tichý’s Transparent Intensional Logic (TIL), which can be viewed as a non-constructive attempt of interpreting Kolmogorov’s logic of problems. In the last section we propose Kolmogorov and CTT-inspired modifications to TIL-based approach. The focus will be on non-empirical (i.e., mathematical and logical) problems only.
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Procedurální sémantika TIL

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EN
In this contribution I focus on perhaps the most significant and, at the same time, the most revolutionary characteristic of Tichy’s transparent intensional logic (TIL), which is procedural semantics. Despite the fact that in the second half of the last century there was already a clear need for an explication of hyperintensionality – a structual explication, if possible – hyperintensionality was defined only in a negative way. Hyperintensionality is the kind of context in which the substitution of logically equivalent expressions fails and it is necessary to have a more refined distinction of meanings than one of mere equivalence. Tichý, however, not only defined hyperintensions positively as algorithmically-structured procedures, that is TIL constructions which are assigned to expressions as their context-invariant meanings, but at the same time he showed that in the framework of this system it can hopefully adequately solve all the problems which traditional PWS semantics of possible worlds could not deal with. In this article I demonstrate that structured procedures are the central element of our communication across various cultures, specialisations and time. At the same time, however, I outline the problems which this evidently plausible conception of meaning brings with it, and I propose a solution to them.
PL
W artykule przedstawiono analizę logiczną aparatury pojęciowej proceduralnej semantyki neooperacjonalistycznej Jana M. Żytkowa (1944–2001). Koncepcja ta jest rozwinięciem i udoskonaleniem operacjonalizmu Percy W. Bridgmana, a zamierzeniem jej autora było przezwyciężenie nieakceptowanych konsekwencji klasycznego operacjonalizmu. W tym celu Żytkow zaproponował koncepcję nowego operacjonalizmu, na gruncie której chciał wykazać jednoznaczność terminów występujących w nauce oraz bronić stanowiska realistycznego odnośnie ich ekstensji. W niniejszym artykule zbadano podstawowe defi nicje i twierdzenia neooperacjonalizmu. Wnioskami z przedstawionych analiz są dwa stwierdzenia. Pierwsze z nich głosi, że neooperacjonalizm nie ustala pełnej jednoznaczności terminów naukowych, ale daje podstawy do systematyzacji ich wieloznaczności. Stwierdzenie drugie głosi natomiast, że na gruncie neooperacjonalizmu ekstensja terminów naukowych nie jest niezależna od poznawczo-praktycznej aktywności badaczy. Tym samym realistyczny charakter neooperacjonalizmu ulega osłabieniu. Nie znaczy to jednak, że semantyka neooperacjonalistyczna nie jest przydatnym narzędziem analizy języka nauki.
EN
The article presents logical analysis of conceptual apparatus of Jan M. Żytkow’s procedural neooperational semantics. This concept develops and refi nes Percy W. Bridgman’s operationalism. Żytkow’s intention was to overcome the unacceptable consequences of the classical operationalism. In order to demonstrate the unambiguity of scientifi c terms and defend realistic position regarding their extension, Żytkow proposed the concept of new operationalism. This article examines the basic defi nitions and theorems of neooperationalism. Two conclusions follow from the presented analyzes: the fi rst one is that the neooperationalism does not determine the full unambiguity of scientifi c terms, but provides a basis for systematization of their ambiguity; the second one is that within the framework of neooperationalism extension of scientifi c terms is not independent from epistemic-practical activity of researchers. Therefore, the realistic character of the neooperationalism becomes attenuated. Nevertheless, the neooperational semantics remains a useful tool for analyzing the language of science.
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