The paper concerns Immanuel Kant’s view on ontological argument for the existence of God by Anselm of Canterbury. Arguing from his critical philosophy, Kant remains sceptical about the possibility of proving the very existence of God, which he takes as only the idea (ideal) of pure reason. Seen along such lines the concept of God cannot be verified in the matter of experience. Kant’s critique was based on refutation of speculative character of theological speculation related to the tradition of natural (rational) theology. From this point of view he takes it as impossible to derive a priori the real existence of subject merely on the basis of taking it as the greatest thing that can be conceived, that is the best thing that might exist. The idea of the highest being has in Kant merely intellectual status, that is, it has it source in (pure) reason only and in this sense its real existence cannot be subject of analysis (scrutiny). Interestingly, what Kant has in mind in his critique of ontological argument (besides other arguments) is Descartes’ argument which is to an important degree different from the one by Anselm. In this paper similarities and differences between Kant’s refutation and Anselm’s support of the ontological argument are discussed.
This article discusses the critical position of Immanuel Kant towards the tradition of so called ontological proof of God’s existence. Kant treats the proof sceptically – he is convinced that any proof of God’s existence is impossible. However, Kant accepts the concept of God as the idea of pure reason, i.e. a sum of total positive “properties” and the ideal of pure reason. This ideal – an unconditional possibility of all – has a positive sense, but only as a formal concept. The ideal of pure reason – God is not something existing in reality, but it is only a postulate of pure reason and an a priori source idea. According to Kant, any attempt at finding a proof of real existence of this ideal (and in consequence of God’s real existence) makes no sense because it has no “objective” content and this ideal is only a formal condition of transcendental knowledge.
The chief aim of this paper is to demonstrate beyond reasonable doubt how, through an essential misunderstanding of the nature of philosophy, and science, over the past several centuries, the prevailing Western tendency to reduce the whole of science to mathematical physics unwittingly generated utopian socialism as a political substitute for metaphysics. In short, being unable speculatively, philosophically, and metaphysically to justify this reduction, some Western intellectuals re-conceived the natures of philosophy, science, and metaphysics as increasingly enlightened, historical and political forms of the evolution of human consciousness toward creation of systematic science, a science of clear and distinct ideas. In the process they unwittingly wound up reducing contemporary philosophy and Western higher education largely into tools of utopian socialist political propaganda.
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