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Proč nemůže množinový objekt hrát roli Fregova „smyslu“

100%

Materna P.

Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)

2016

vol. 64

issue 6

869-881

The phenomenon of “hyperintensionality” can be linked to Frege’s famous article “Über Sinn und Bedeutung” (1892). Frege here showed the need in semantics to take account not only of reference but also of the way in which referent is given – and this “mode of presentation” he named sense (Sinn). The basic property of sense (which Frege did not, however, define) is that two expressions, though they differ in sense, may pick out (refer to) the same object. For example (Frege offered other examples), the expression “integer larger than 1 and divisible only by itself and the number 1” certainly differs from the expression “integer having exactly two divisors”, but both expressions pick out, by virtue of their (different) senses, one and the same object, that is, the set of prime numbers. It can be shown that no set-object can have this property. In order that the proof of this important property of set-objects be easily comprehensible, the main part of the paper focuses on an account of the basic characteristics of Tichý’s transparent intensional logic (TIL), in which hyperintensionality is defined as a procedural property. There may seem to be a disproportion between the several pages of the text and the brief and straightforward proof. In this brief proof, however, it is assumed that the concept of construction is clear, that the sense of an expression is represented as a construction, and that the reference (if it exists) is that which the sense-construction construes, so that the property of Frege’s sense given by the statement VS can be thus formulated by an assertion concerning not expressions, but primarily the relation between sense and referent, for example thus: Two differing senses can be the mode of presentation of the same object (referent). The preponderance of text providing concise information about the basic concepts of TIL over the proof itself can therefore be easily explained.

Sémiotique des démonstratifs cataphoriques

51%

Kleiber G.

Neophilologica

2023

vol. 35

1-23

The studies of anaphoric expressions have shown that we can and must link the stable results acquired over the last forty years on their functioning to more recent socio-cognitive, taxonomic, multimodal, etc. perspectives and examine and explain two aspects of cataphoric demonstratives (CDs): on the one hand, their constructional scheme and, on the other, the formal and semantic nature of their subsequent or postcedent. We propose here to continue this analysis of CDs, this time looking at their referential operation as such and asking the question: how do CDs make us reach the intended referent? What precisely is the interpretative procedure involved? Our analyses show that rather than directly contrasting CDs with anaphoric demonstratives, it is more relevant and, therefore, more fruitful to compare them directly with gestural demonstratives. As we have seen, the two uses of demonstratives correspond to the same cognitive situation, that of introducing a new referent into discourse memory. This cognitive kinship gives rise to a common semiotic hybridity and, consequently, a referential operation, which we have detailed in nine points, that turns out to be largely identical, the differences observed being directly due to the difference in the nature of the index.

Nous nous proposons ici de poursuivre l’analyse des démonstratifs cataphoriques (DC) en nous penchant cette fois-ci sur leur fonctionnement référentiel proprement dit : comment s’effectue exactement la saisie cataphorique de leur référent ? Ou, dit autrement, comment nous font-ils atteindre le référent visé ? Quelle est précisément la procédure interprétative mise en jeu ? Notre enquête comportera quatre parties. La première, très rapide, rappellera pourquoi les DC sont habituellement, aussi bien dans les typologies anciennes que récentes, rangés avec les démonstratifs anaphoriques dans la catégorie des démonstratifs endophoriques. Nous montrerons dans la deuxième partie qu’une telle classification, pour justifiée qu’elle puisse être si l’on prend uniquement en compte le critère du passage par le texte (soit antérieur ou subséquent), présente néanmoins un inconvénient majeur, celui de masquer l’asymétrie cognitive qu’il y a entre les DC et les démonstratifs anaphoriques. Cette asymétrie cognitive conduit à abandonner la piste classique de l’opposition intra-endophorique entre DC et démonstratifs anaphoriques et pousse à emprunter une autre voie comparative, qui conduit aux démonstratifs ostensifs. La comparaison que nous opèrerons, dans les troisième et quatrième parties, entre les démonstratifs ostensifs et les DC, en même temps qu’elle établira la vicinité cognitive des deux types de démonstratifs, permettra de mettre au jour, de façon plus précise et plus juste qu’auparavant, quel est le réel fonctionnement des DC.

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1 Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)

1 Neophilologica

1 Kleiber G.

1 Materna P.

1 2023

1 2016

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Proč nemůže množinový objekt hrát roli Fregova „smyslu“

Sémiotique des démonstratifs cataphoriques