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Religious Belief is Not Natural. Why Cognitive Science of Religion Does Not Show That Religious Belief is Trustworthy

100%
Van Eyghen H.
Studia Humana
|
2016
|
vol. 5
|
issue 4
34-44
EN
It is widely acknowledged that the new emerging discipline cognitive science of religion has a bearing on how to think about the epistemic status of religious beliefs. Both defenders and opponents of the rationality of religious belief have used cognitive theories of religion to argue for their point. This paper will look at the defender-side of the debate. I will discuss an often used argument in favor of the trustworthiness of religious beliefs, stating that cognitive science of religion shows that religious beliefs are natural and natural beliefs ought to be trusted in the absence of counterevidence. This argument received its most influential defense from Justin Barrett in a number of papers, some in collaboration with Kelly James Clark. I will discuss their version of the argument and argue that it fails because the natural beliefs discovered by cognitive scientists of religion are not the religious beliefs of the major world religions. A survey of the evidence from cognitive science of religion will show that cognitive science does show that other beliefs come natural and that these can thus be deemed trustworthy in the absence of counterevidence. These beliefs are teleological beliefs, afterlife beliefs and animistic theistic beliefs.
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Projekt reorientacji epistemologii przekonań religijnych w myśli Paula Mosera

81%
Dobrzeniecki M.
Przegląd Religioznawczy
|
2019
|
issue 2/272
EN
The paper presents the basic theses of Paul Moser’s epistemology of religious beliefs. This author stands against the most popular among analytical philosophers models of argumentism and reformed epistemology. He emphasizes that if God is a personal being, then it is up to Him to determine the conditions and aims of His revelation. According to Moser, God’s purpose would be to reveal His moral perfection and redemption. This is why an experience of being called to a moral conversion by an intentionally acting external agent is the salient evidence justifying the rationality of theism. New epistemological perspective allows polemics with the hiddenness argument formulated by J.L. Schellenberg. Moser, in his refutation of this argument, shows that the existence of cognitively non-resistant non-believers does not prove God’s nonexistence, because lack of cognitive resistance to God is not a sufficient disposition allowing the reception of the transformative gift. The necessary condition for experiencing agapē as a divine self-manifestation is readiness to conform one’s own will to the demands of the divine love.
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