Full-text resources of CEJSH and other databases are now available in the new Library of Science.
Visit https://bibliotekanauki.pl

Results found: 3

first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last

Search results

Search:
in the keywords:  regulatory authorities
help Sort By:

help Limit search:
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
EN
The aim of this article is to identify limitations of political independence of the Polish regulatory authorities. To that end the author presents the theoretical conception of political independence of regulatory authorities. Next, based on the EU directives in electronic communications and energy sectors, a standard of political independence of National Regulatory Authorities (NRAs) is established. Using such a standard the author examines Polish statutory provisions which may present a threat to the independence of regulatory authorities. The main thesis of the article is that the legal status of the Polish regulatory authorities does not guarantee the level of independence required by the EU legislator. Therefore, the author suggests that the Polish regulatory authorities be removed from the government administration and linked with the parliament. Lastly, the articles discusses the current trend in the EU legal order to gradually widen the political independence of NRAs and the problems arising therefrom and makes de lege ferenda proposals in that sphere.
EN
The energy market is one of the network industries, where competition can not develop under natural conditions. The energy market in Poland is one of the sectors that are subject to regulation and reglamentation. Regulatory authority has been created to bring competition and provide universal services/essential facilities, on this part of monopolistic market. The regulator has a lot of law instruments to create a competition market where every entrepreneur will be able to effectively undertake an economic activity and prices will be shaped by the market. If the regulator will use all legal instruments, he must be independent of other private entities operating in the market. In particular he must be independent of the government, which is pursuing to implement particularistic policies of each Member State. How Polish regulator can be independent if the government can create a national energy policy? On the basis of European law and the rights of Polish, indicated that the regulatory authority should not implement government policy as a whole, but take into account only government general policy guidelines. Prime Minister or member of the government cannot impose resolution of the case in a particular way if regulatory authority performs his own regulatory duties and powers. However, Prime Minister supervises the regulator and he may issue him binding guidelines and recommendations, which do not apply, however, the regulatory tasks.
PL
Celem opracowania jest ukazanie właściwości rzeczowej SOKiK w świetle konstytucyjnej zasady równości podmiotów. W przepisach art. 32 Konstytucji RP została sformułowana zasada równości, która obejmuje również przedsiębiorców. W Polsce obok sądownictwa administracyjnego, które oparte jest na kontroli legalności decyzji administracyjnych, funkcjonuje SOKiK, który rozpatruje decyzje administracyjne pod kątem merytorycznym. Analiza przepisów wskazuje, że właściwość tego sądu została ustalona w sposób nieuzasadniony. W ramach artykułu będzie udowadniana teza, że właściwość rzeczowa SOKiK została określona arbitralnie przez ustawodawcę z naruszeniem konstytucyjnej zasady równości. Główną płaszczyzną prowadzonych rozważań są przepisy prawa polskiego oraz orzeczenia Trybunału Konstytucyjnego. Zostały zastosowane metody: dogmatyczno – prawna oraz analityczno – syntetyczna.
EN
The goal of the paper is to present the material jurisdiction of the Court of Competition and Consumer Protection in light of the constitutional principle of entity equality. The regulations of Art. 32 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland include the principle of equality, which also covers entrepreneurs. In Poland, in addition to administrative courts that control the legality of administrative decisions, there is also the Court of Competition and Consumer Protection, which hears cases concerning administrative decisions from a material perspective. The analysis of the regulations indicates that the jurisdiction of this court has been determined without justification. The paper proves the thesis that the material jurisdiction of the Court of Competition and Consumer Protection has been determined arbitrarily by the legislator violating the constitutional principle of equality. The following methods were applied: dogmatic-legal and analytic-synthetic.
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
JavaScript is turned off in your web browser. Turn it on to take full advantage of this site, then refresh the page.