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1

A De Jure Criticism of Theism

100%
Goodnick L.
Open Theology
|
2016
|
vol. 2
|
issue 1
EN
An evolutionary by-product explanation entails that religious belief is an unintended consequence of a cognitive process selected for by evolution. In this paper, I argue that if a by-product explanation is true, then religious belief is unwarranted (even if God exists). In particular, I argue that if the cause of religious belief is the god-faculty (HADD + ToM + eToM + MCI), then it is likely unreliable; thus, religious belief is unwarranted. Plantinga argues that de jure criticisms are not independent of de facto criticisms: without knowing whether or not God exists, one can’t say that belief in God is unwarranted, since if God exists, it is possible that God has planned that this mechanism would lead to belief in Him. Against Plantinga, I show that in order for de jure criticisms to have force, it is not necessary to know that God does not exist. Instead, one only needs to doubt His existence. And if by-product explanations turn out to be supported by the evidence, this fact alone gives us reason to doubt God’s existence. Thus, if the by-product explanation is true, belief in God is not warranted; if we know this, then we have reason to doubt theism.
2

Religious Belief is Not Natural. Why Cognitive Science of Religion Does Not Show That Religious Belief is Trustworthy

88%
Van Eyghen H.
Studia Humana
|
2016
|
vol. 5
|
issue 4
34-44
EN
It is widely acknowledged that the new emerging discipline cognitive science of religion has a bearing on how to think about the epistemic status of religious beliefs. Both defenders and opponents of the rationality of religious belief have used cognitive theories of religion to argue for their point. This paper will look at the defender-side of the debate. I will discuss an often used argument in favor of the trustworthiness of religious beliefs, stating that cognitive science of religion shows that religious beliefs are natural and natural beliefs ought to be trusted in the absence of counterevidence. This argument received its most influential defense from Justin Barrett in a number of papers, some in collaboration with Kelly James Clark. I will discuss their version of the argument and argue that it fails because the natural beliefs discovered by cognitive scientists of religion are not the religious beliefs of the major world religions. A survey of the evidence from cognitive science of religion will show that cognitive science does show that other beliefs come natural and that these can thus be deemed trustworthy in the absence of counterevidence. These beliefs are teleological beliefs, afterlife beliefs and animistic theistic beliefs.
3
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Above Reason Propositions and Contradiction in the Religious Thought of Robert Boyle

63%
Marko J. S.
Forum Philosophicum
|
2014
|
vol. 19
|
issue 2
227–239
EN
In this essay, I argue that Robert Boyle does not hold that true religion requires us to believe doctrines that are in violation of the law of noncontradiction or that it yields logical contradictions. Rather, due to the epistemological limitations of human reason, we are sometimes called to believe doctrines or propositions that are at first blush contradictory but, upon further inspection, not definitively so. This holds for doctrines considered singly or together and is an important qualifier to the traditional line of scholarship’s flat claim that Boyle’s limits of belief are logical contradictions. My conclusions here are at odds with Jan W. Wojcik’s claim, in her important, revisionist work on the famous natural philosopher, that he teaches that sometimes we are required to believe religious doctrines that violate the law of noncontradiction.
4
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Gouvernance de la religion et liberté de conscience

38%
Aguilon C.
Studia z Prawa Wyznaniowego
|
2017
|
vol. 20
135-166
FR
La religion est souvent conçue comme une limite à la liberté de conscience. Cependant, du point de vue de la philosophie de la religion, il est nécessaire de souligner l'importance de l'adoption de la démocratie, qui reconnaît la liberté de conscience comme un moyen mais aussi comme finalité du pouvoir politique, en tant que principe de gouvernement. La limitation de la liberté de conscience par la religion peut être expliquée, sur le plan anthropologique, par la fonction dentitaire assurée par la religion. Néanmoins, la religion, pouvant exister sans être acceptée par tous, n'implique pas en elle-même une telle contrainte. Au-delà de la preuve d'une possible coexistence de la religion et du pluralisme politique, la religion implique intrinsèquement la reconnaissance de la liberté de conscience, résultant de la condition humaine elle-même. En retour, la foi en la valeur égale de la conscience de chaque être humain apparaît comme une motivation de la consécration juridique de la liberté de conscience.
EN
The influence of religion on the freedom of conscience cannot be defined in simple terms. Religion is often conceived as limiting the freedom of conscience. However, from the perspective of the philosophy of religion it is necessary to underline the significance of the adoption of democracy as a principle of government. The limitation of the freedom of conscience by religion could be explained, on an anthropological level, by the identity function realized by religion. Nevertheless, religion can exist without being accepted by all. Beyond the evidence of a possible coexistence of religion and political pluralism, religion inherently implies the recognition of the freedom of conscience. The respect for the freedom of conscience results from the human condition itself. Religion makes it possible to transcend one’s cultural identity. In return, the freedom of conscience is based on a faith in the equal value of the conscience of every human being. The latter is recognized not only as the means but also as one of the purposes of political power. Religion and the freedom of conscience seem to derive from common foundations. The legal recognition of the freedom of conscience has a concomitant impact on religion by the regulation of its exercise.
PL
Wpływu religii na wolność sumienia nie sposób wyjaśnić za pomocą prostych schematów. Często religia jest postrzegana jako ograniczenie wolności sumienia. Z perspektywy filozofii religii należy jednak podkreślać znaczenie wyboru demokracji jako zasady ustroju. Na poziomie antropologicznym ograniczanie znaczenia wolności sumienia przez religię może być wyjaśniane z odwołaniem się do funkcji identyfikacyjnej realizowanej przez religię. Z drugiej strony, dla swego istnienia religia nie potrzebuje akceptacji ze strony wszystkich. Poza tym, że istnieją oczywiste dowody na możliwą koegzystencję religii i pluralizmu politycznego, religia zakłada w swojej istocie uznanie wolności sumienia. Poszanowanie wolności sumienia wynika z samej natury człowieka. Religia pozwala człowiekowi na przekroczenie jego tożsamości kulturowej. Natomiast wolność sumienia opiera się na przekonaniu o równej wartości sumienia każdego człowieka. Nie jest ona jedynie środkiem, ale również jednym z celów władzy politycznej. Religia i wolność sumienia mają wspólne podstawy. Prawne uznanie wolności sumienia ma pośredni wpływ na religię poprzez regulacje dotyczące korzystania z tej wolności.
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