The French Revolution sought to discover the way to view freedom. At the end of the Revolution, they proclaimed the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen. In French society, these fruits of the Revolution were con-sidered something sacred. Paradoxically, in a country that did so much to cleanse public life of religious factors, the same state has begun to create a religion of the state. All of the process after the Revolution, in particular, the Law of 1905 regarding the separation between the state and the church, has fortified the idea of secularism in French society. This process of the state was introduced in the schools because they wished to construct a society which was entirely secular which believed in the values of the Republic. They therefore made divisions between the public schools and the private ones. The public schools had a secular and a national character. The substantial difference be-tween the schools was that in the public schools, the teaching of religion as a separate subject was expelled and the religious issues in the teaching curricu-lum was reduced to the minimum. It appeared only as a background in the his-torical issues. Commenting on the Charter of Secularism, I seek to respond to the ques-tion – what happened which caused them to introduce this Charter of Secular-ism in the schools? We find the first response in the actions of the young peo-ple who want to be respected along with having their religious systems respect-ed. Such problems arose when the French introduced the prohibition of reli-gious symbols. However, the prohibitions did not resolve the problem. They therefore invented and introduced the Charter of Secularism of the French School. This is a kind of new way of presenting the idea of secularism to the students. The Charter was implemented as a way of reinforcing the prohibitions which had been previously introduced. It repeats the ideas which have been presented in the schools since the end of the French Revolution. Looking at the Charter, we have the impression that it is simply a repetition of the same phrases – that it is pure theory that has nothing in common with the reality. However, the French Ministry of Education always creates new initiatives which promote the presence of secularism in the schools. Unfortunately how-ever, they do not look at the problems of the young people. They don’t want to understand their identities and especially, their religious identities.
The discourse on tolerance began over two centuries ago and yet is still unfinished. Was Voltaire in 1763 with his “Treatise on Tolerance”, condemned religious intolerance persuaded by religious fanaticism of the judgment of the Court of Toulouse. Although the idea of tolerance was born in Europe, it saw and still sees intolerance. Intolerance of yesterday reminds us wars, inquisitions and crusades, instead the modern Europe shows that even between globalization and multiculturalism often proves incapable of “import” different cultures. But from the legal point of view the term tolerance is far from that of secularism. It follows that individuals in a system that tolerates doesn’t enjoy equality their fundamental rights, because they are not legally placed on the same level. Legal Italian tolerance experience has been for many years a condition for the cults other than Catholic. The Albertine Statute in 1848 welcomed it in the article 1, and it was the task of the new Constitution outlining the principles of a State not only secular but also pluralistic.
Year 2017 marked the 25th anniversary of the bull Totus Tuus Poloniae populus promulgated on 25 March 1992, with which John Paul II reorganized the administrative structure of the Roman Catholic Church in Poland. The document sanctioned the elevation of 14 new dioceses in Poland. The 25th an-niversary, like any other for that matter, is urging us to carefully evaluate the past years, as well as to ask questions about the near future of the Polish Church. To better understand changes that have taken place in that period of time, let us imagine the average 25-year-old boy and the average girl of the same age: who are they, how do they live, what do they do? Most probably, they are still students, they work or are looking for a job. They may have a wife, a husband, or a partner with whom they live together without marriage, despite their being Catholics who had Religious Education as a mandatory sub-ject starting (as required in accordance with the instruction of Ministry of Na-tional Education issued on 30 August 1990) in the first grade of primary school. There is a substantial probability that these average young people have emigrated and having found abroad better job and better perspectives do not want to come back. Perhaps they are very religious and live out their faith and their national affinity consciously. It is probable that such people tell us more than official statistics does about directions and trends, values and priorities that are recognisable and prevailing in Polish society and the Polish Church. 25-year anniversary cannot only be the occasion for celebrating, it should also become an opportunity to seriously reflect on the past and on the challenges of the future. In the context of the anniversary of the reorganization of Polish dio-ceses we should ask ourselves some important questions: how to resist the negative aspects of the digital revolution? How it can be showed that a good and happy life should be built not on egoistic impressions, but on clear moral norms that delineate the categories of good and evil? How is Christian ethos to be sustained in the modern era, whereas preservation of clearly defined models and principles is impeded by consumptionist logic that entails the illusion of achieving satisfaction through „devouring the world”?
The Ethiopian Ortodox Tewahedo Church played a significant role in the history of Ethiopia from ancient times, providing ideological legitimization for her emperors and influencing every sphere in the lives of the Christian population. After the revolution in 1974, the Church lost its privileged position in the country. In 1991 the new regime of EPRDF established ethnically based federalism, under which religion was effectively banned from politics. This situation poses a number of challenges for the EOTC. The Church has since suffered two major institutional crises: after separating with the Eritrean Orthodox Church and after the schism in the Ethiopian diaspora in the US. Without the previous support from the state, it has had to face competition from Pentecostal churches which have been gaining popularity over the last decades. It also seeks to reinvent its relations with the faithful, among whom appear movements (such as Mahbärä Qəddusan) which to some extent contest the teaching of the bishops.
In the third volume of the History of England, David Hume considers the political ramifications of the Protestant reformation with a “Digression concerning the ecclesiastical state.” He advocates the establishment of a state church, believing it will dampen religious “enthusiasm” in the polity. Unlike later secularization theorists, Hume assumes an intractable basis for religion in the human passions. Tensions in Hume’s “cooptation” strategy are evident from Adam Smith’s famous attack upon it in section five of The Wealth of Nations, and in Hume’s own treatment of seventeenth century independency in the fifth volume of the History. Smith argues that public competition among sects facilitates political moderation. In History V Hume stresses the positive role of enthusiasm in fostering civil liberty. This article traces Hume’s indecision to his “external” mode of moral and historical analysis, arguing that a secular policy on religion cannot proceed fruitfully without engaging the theological particulars of the religions at issue.
The article refers to the concept of force in Poland lessons of religion, which is neither catechesis, although the work of catechesis in part, or religious studies lesson, though knowledge about religion provides. It tries to answer the following questions: What are the basic determinants of the concept of school religion classes? What is the concept of school religion classes in Poland? What are the opportunities and threats of this concept of religion classes?
The accommodation of a plurality of values within the same institutional framework is one of the main challenges with which contemporary democracies have been persistently confronted. This challenge has recently gained strength even in such traditionally homogeneous countries as Italy, as a consequence of an increase in the number of residents committed to diverse religious beliefs. Against this backdrop, this paper focuses on the case of requests for the legal recognition of religion-specific holy/rest days in Italy. The analysis of such a case will disclose-or so we believe-some valuable pointers as to how democratic societies could try to accommodate religious diversity in a way that is both respectful of the specificities of each religious group and compatible with the typically liberal commitment to the safeguard of individual freedom.
The criminalization of homosexuality in Nigeria has partially been inspired and acclaimed by a number of religious schools of thought, including Christian opinion leaders. Such an influence of religion on politics has been seriously questioned. Using observations and literary sources, this paper underlines the unconstitutionality of Christian antigay proselytism at the political sphere of the Nigerian State, anchoring its claim on the constitutional provision stipulating the secular character of Nigeria. It however interprets such a move (the “influential” Christian anti-gay proselytism) as an inevitable expression of the religious character of Nigeria’s social and cultural spheres. Furthermore, the paper argues that the Nigerian Federation is “fully secular” only on paper and not in practice. Secularity is partially observed at the political sphere of the State. Religion and populism continue to shape major socio-political schemes (as seen in the criminalization of homosexuality in Nigeria). With such a socio-political influence of religion, legislative projects such as the Same-Sex Marriage (Prohibition) Act and political strategies such as the Nigerian Government’s resistance against western gay-proselytism can only be massively celebrated. In line with this, (Christian) anti-gay proselytism at the Nigeria’s political sphere is logically viewed less as an anathema, and more as socio-political heroism.
This article proposes a new way of approaching the roots of secularism and its outcome that is secularization. The fact that this phenomenon arises precisely in a Christian world, which ultimately leads to a complete emancipation of that what is worldly toward religion, profanum toward sacrum, is astonishing. The process of European secularism has its beginning in the 11th century, when the so-called dispute about reason was initiated resulting, in the next epochs of human history, in an intensifying departure from transcendence in favour of a secular interpretation of reality. What ensued is a fading away of the classical understanding of truth as a “compatibility of entities with intellect” (adaequatio rei et intellectus), that is compatibility of understanding and reality, replacing understanding with one’s own crafting of reality, making of a new society. An examination of the history of the European secularization can contribute to a rise of a new humanism, which rests upon reasonableness that originates at the deepest basis of the Logos.
This article explores feminisms and women’s activisms in today’s Iraq and highlights the heterogeneity of both their religious and secular expressions in analysing them in relation to each other rather than as distinct. I argue that not only do we need to go beyond the Islamist/secular dichotomy but we need to analyse what’s in-between these categories. In order to understand their in-betweenness, Iraqi women’s activisms and feminisms have to be examined in their imbricated and complex social, economic and political contexts both discursive and material. I start by refl ecting on conceptual considerations regarding the relationships between feminisms, Muslimness, and Islam(s) and examining notions of piety and morality in contemporary Iraq. Then I explore the context and nature of women’s social and political activisms in Baghdad, Erbil, and Sulaymaniyah and provide an ethnographically informed examination of the different trends of feminisms and women’s political activisms in Iraq and the ways these trends overlap. In doing so I introduce an alternative way of understanding the too often argued secular/Islamist opposition and analyse the relevance and meaning of ‘Islamic/Muslim feminisms’ in the Iraqi context.
The aim of my paper is to assess in a critical way the views presented by Graeme Smith in his book A Short History of Secularism (2008) as well as in his paper Talking to Ourselves: An Investigation into the Christian Ethics Inherent in Secularism (2017). According to Smith, secular Western societies are underpinned by Christian ethics. An example of a moral norm that – in Smith’s opinion – derives from medieval Christianity and shapes the moral condition of the members of contemporary societies, is the concern about the poor. My criticism of Smith’s thesis is based on the distinction between moral norms and the ways of justifying them. Referring to this distinction, my objective is to show that certain norms which appear to be the same cannot be treated as identical due to the significant differences in their justification.
This paper argues that Kant’s distinction between “civil union” (i.e., the state) and “ethical community” can be of great value in dealing with a problem that causes considerable trouble in contemporary political and social philosophy, namely the question of the normative significance and role of religion in political and social life. The first part dwells upon the third part of Kant`s Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason with the intention of exposing the general features of ethical community. It highlights the fact that Kant considers publicity, and indeed public authority, to be constitutive of the ethical community. The second part discusses his argument that we have a unique ethical duty to enter into an ethical community. This discussion clarifies the constitutive purpose of ethical community and sets forth why Kant thought that the ethical community should have a religious form. The third part presents an account of the constitutive purpose of the state (i.e. the political-legal community) in light of the Doctrine of Right. Throughout these steps, as is concluded, the essentials of a model for the relations between law, ethics, and religion emerge, which shows the way in which both religious and secularist worries can be met on a principled basis.
The secular interpretation of Kant is widespread and Kant is viewed as the most prestigious founding father of liberal secularism. At the same time, however, commentators note that Kant’s position on secularism is in fact much more complex, and some go as far as to talk about an ambiguous secularism in his work. This paper defends a refined version of the secular interpretation. According to this refined version, Kant can offer a limited, political secularism on the basis of a simple argument which focuses on the distinct epistemic statuses of political and religious claims; however, the paper argues, a more general secularism is unwarranted on the basis of the same argument. If my argument is correct, then it will account at least in part for the plurality of interpretations. Moreover, any further attempt to show that Kant’s relation to secularism is ambiguous or dismissive should take into consideration the argument from epistemic grounds presented here.
This paper traces the history of the philosophical and political justification of religious tolerance from the late 17th century to modern times. In the Anglo-Saxon world, John Locke’s Letter Concerning Toleration (1689) gave birth to the doctrine of the separation of Church and State and to what is now called secularization. In France, Pierre Bayle refuted, in his Philosophical Commentary (1685), the justification of intolerance taken from Saint Augustine. Following him, Voltaire campaigned for tolerance following the Calas affair (1763), and the Declaration of the Rights of Man (1789) imposed religious freedom which, a century later, resulted in the uniquely French notion of laïcité, which denies religion any supremacy, and any right to organize life in its name. Equality before the law takes precedence over freedom: the fact of being a believer does not give rise to the right to special statutes or to exceptions to the law.
The article seeks to sketch the outlines of an approach, based upon the work of MacIntyre and Hauerwas, which provides Christian moral theology with some congenial meta-ethical equipment. This sketch relies upon an examination of three concepts – freedom, virtue and narrative – together with the occasional sideways glance at contemporary secular moral traditions with which the Chris-tian tradition finds itself in competition. The author suggests that this approach has to pay more attention to what seems to be a basic epistemological difference between so-called scientific and moral narratives. He claims that, in opposition to the MacIntyre/Hauerwas affirmation that “the activities of natural science” are merely another “species of moral activity,” science in some way transcends the boundaries of rival moral traditions, though not as moral tradition, but in the subordinate role of an instrument of traditions. He gives some hints at possible ways of dealing with this challenge.
In this article, I would like to analyse two stage productions Parsifals of Richard Wagner at the Festival in Bayreuth. The first production from the years 2008-2012 is made by Stefan Herheim and has in the center the problems of history, politics and psychoanalysis. The second production from the years 2016-2019 is made by Uwe Eric Laufenberg and has in the center the problems of religions and faith. The both productions can be indicators for the processes of secularism and postsecularism in the contemporary world and I would like to show that we can observe this processes also in art.
PL
Richard Wagner był jednym z największych kompozytorów w historii muzyki, twórcą przede wszystkim dzieł operowych, a jednocześnie teoretykiem sztuki. Jego ostatnim utworem muzycznym jest misterium sceniczne w trzech aktach Parsifal, którego premiera odbyła się 26 lipca 1882 r. podczas Festiwalu w Bayreuth. Po śmierci Wagnera, która nastąpiła rok później, Parsifal był dramatem muzycznym cieszącym się do dziś niezwykłą popularnością i wystawianym niezliczoną ilość razy – najpierw w Bayreuth, a potem na całym świecie.
Obecna polityka syryjska stanowi swoisty paradoks. Z jednej strony – rządzący reżim basistowski z prezydentem Baszszarem al-Asadem głosi jedność narodową zbudowaną na rzekomym sekularyzmie. Z drugiej strony – ten sam reżim, kierując się swoim interesem, powiększa podziały między poszczególnymi grupami etniczno-religijnymi. Dzisiejsza Syria zdaje się być rozdarta między dwa pozornie wykluczające się zjawiska – sekularyzm i sektarianizm. Aby rozwiązać ten paradoks, autorzy poddali analizie ramowania prezydenckie przemówienia od wybuchu konfliktu w 2011 roku. Udowodnili, iż Al-Asad przeczy faktom, zręcznie konstruując dyskurs desektarianizacyjny przy jednoczesnym pogłębianiu sektarianizmu. W ten sposób prezydent wzmacnia legitymizację swoich rządów, jak również zwiększa szanse na przetrwanie. Syryjski reżim oficjalnie zwalcza sektarianizm, lecz de facto go podsyca. Jest to więc szczególny przypadek desektarianizacji jako sektarianizacji.
EN
Contemporary Syrian politics is a paradox. On the one hand, the ruling Baath regime led by President Bashar al-Assad claims national unity and co-existence based on alleged secularism. On the other hand, the same regime foments existing sectarian strife for its benefit. Today’s Syria seems to be torn between two seemingly opposite realities – secularism and sectarianism. To solve this puzzle, the authors conducted the frame analysis of the presidential speeches since the eruption of conflict in 2011. They have proved that Assad has denied the facts, skilfully constructing desectarianisation discourse, while deepening the sectarian divisions. By doing so, he increases the legitimisation of his rule as well as chances for survival. The Syrian regime has entrenched the sectarian practices which it theoretically stands against. It is a unique case of de-sectarianisation as sectarianisation.
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