The article is devoted to the problem of choosing an effective scenario of monetary integration within the EurAsEC. A fundamentally new approach is that the Eurasian integration is considered to become an alternative to disintegrative tendencies of post-Soviet countries. The advisability for a common currency and a system of supranational governance structure are given on the basis of the analysis of development of EurAsEC member states. The reasonability and timeliness of this event as a basis for further development of integration processes and sustainable development of EurAsEC is substantiated.
The official rescue loans recently granted to a number of the Eurozone states cannot be treated as being in lieu of reforms that must be implemented in those countries in order to improve their economy, which they need so much to regain confidence of financial markets. There are two major structural weaknesses of the single currency (Euro) identified in literature: (i) the uniform monetary policy is incapable of accounting for differences among individual member states and single currency renders devaluation in Eurozone impossible; (ii) the eurozone exists without the ‘political union.’ The paper contains an analysis of the legitimacy of both theses.
PL
Oficjalne kredyty ratunkowe dla niektórych krajów w strefie euro nie mogą zastąpić tam reform, które – poprawiając sytuację gospodarczą – pozwolą odzyskać owym krajom zaufanie rynków finansowych. W literaturze wymienia się dwie główne strukturalne słabości wspólnej waluty (euro): 1. Jednolita polityka pieniądza nie jest w stanie uwzględnić odmienności sytuacji poszczególnych krajów, a wspólny pieniądz nie pozwala na dewaluację w obrębie strefy euro; 2. Strefa euro istnieje bez „unii politycznej”. Artykuł analizuje zasadność tych tez.
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