‘The special military operation’ conducted by the Russian Federation, including the ‘anti-terrorist operation’ in the Black and Azov Seas carried out by its Black Sea Fleet, meets the definition of aggression, which, in addition to violating the UN Charter, also violates the provisions of UNCLOS (Article 301) and the San Remo Manual (general provisions, first three sections). The unilateral announcement (through a navigational warning) of an ‘anti-terrorist operation’, and in fact a sea blockade of Ukrainian ports, is contrary to the content of UNCLOS (freedom of navigation) and does not meet the requirements for methods of fighting at sea (sea blockade, zones - San Remo Manual). The missile attacks on civilian and protected objects located on the territory of the Ukrainian state, carried out by ships and aircraft of the Black Sea Fleet, as well as artillery and missiles shelling of coastal towns, constitute a gross violation (war crime) of the international humanitarian law of armed conflicts (San Remo Manual). On contrary, the use of unmanned surface vehicles (drones) by the Ukrainian side in the arak on the Sevastopol base is in accordance with the provisions of the Manual (means of warfare at sea). Particular attention in the discussed armed conflict deserves art. 35 (c) UNCLOS relating to the Turkish Straits, which allows Turkey (based on the Montreaux Convention) to significantly influence the strategic and operational situation in the Black Sea by denying the use of the straits to warships (Turkey closed them to warships all flags). The voting procedure for informal members of the UN Security Council should be considered ineffective, which in the discussed case, when the aggressor is a state – a permanent member of the Security Council makes it difficult to apply measures provided for by international law against it and forces the use of ad hoc solutions, such as ‘grain corridors’.
Niniejszy artykuł podejmuje problematykę działań sił zależnych od Federacji Rosyjskiej na terenie Ukrainy po 2014 roku. Celem tej pracy jest naświetlenie kontekstu i wyeksponowanie powiązań rządu Federacji Rosyjskiej z wydarzeniami na Krymie oraz w Donbasie. Autor rozpatruje te wydarzenia w kontekście tak zwanej ,,maskirovki” czy doktryny Gierasimowa, wzbogacając swoje rozważania ukazaniem szerszego tła stosunków cywilno-wojskowych w Rosji. Omówiono rolę Grupy Wagnera, będącej ważnym elementem działań rosyjskich zarówno przed, jak i po rozpoczęciu tak zwanej specjalnej operacji wojskowej przez Federację Rosyjską. Główne pytanie badawcze brzmi: w jakim zakresie i przy użyciu jakiego katalogu podmiotów Federacja Rosyjska oddziaływała na sytuację we wschodniej Ukrainie od 2014 roku?
EN
This article addresses the issue of actions by forces dependent on the Russian Federation in Ukraine after 2014. The aim of this article is to illuminate the context and highlight the factual connections between the Russian government and events in Crimea and Donbas. The author examines these events in the context of the so-called ‘Maskirovka’ or Gerasimov Doctrine, additionally enriching these considerations with a broader background of civil-military relations in Russia. Therefore, an equally important point of consideration in this article is the Wagner Group, a significant element of Russian actions both before and after the initiation of the ‘Special Military Operation’ by the Russian Federation. The primary research question is: to what extent and through what catalog of entities did the Russian Federation influence the situation in eastern Ukraine since 2014?
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