A traditional type of strike movement the aim of which was to achieve better wages was seen mainly in the initial phase of the Nazi occupation. Its main reason was inflation, and the Protectorate government reacted to it as early as on 13 June 1939, by banning strikes and lockouts. It is true that the strike wave continued even after this date, but it was petering out fast, thanks to government decrees on wage adjustments. Since the beginning of 1940, strikes were regarded as attempts to sabotage industrial production. Strike cases were initially tried by German military courts, but the jurisdiction over the prosecution of acts of sabotage later fell under special tribunals of the Land Courts in Prague and Brno. Another strike wave in the Protectorate took place in the summer of 1941 and was one of the reasons why Reinhard Heydrich was ultimately appointed the Acting Reichsprotektor. The occupation power reacted not only by swift actions of the Gestapo, but mainly by exemplary punishments. As a result of the repressions, strikes ceased to be used as an organized form of social protests. There were therefore only a few strikes between 1943 and 1944, which broke out quite spontaneously. The best known of them was the one which took place in the ČKD factory in Vysočany on 24 August 1943; although causing only negligible damage, the special court passed one death sentence and four sentences of imprisonment for three to seven years. These intimidating punishments were the reason why strikes as a form of protest were quickly receding into the background, being replaced by slow work or escapes of individuals assigned to forced labour. Strikes as a form of political protest appeared mainly on the list of actions of the illegal Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, for the first time in the autumn of 1939 in connection with the cancellation of the national holiday commemorating the birth of the republic. While the democratic resistance was organizing public demonstrations on the occasion of 28 October 1939, the illegal Communist Party of Czechoslovakia was preparing manifestation strikes which indeed took place in Prague, Plzeň, Rakovník, and a few other places. Between 1939 and 1941, the Communist press was also promoting a traditional-type strike movement, but attempting to direct the illegal movement in the Protectorate only toward the struggle for social requirements. In the final phase of the war, the Communists’ concept was that of an all-out general strike as a prologue to a nationwide uprising. However, the concept was illusory; first, it overrated the abilities of the heavily decimated illegal Communist Party. Second, it disregarded the fact that the industrial production in the Protectorate in the spring of 1945, only a few months until the final defeat of Germany, would quickly collapse, and the importance of strikes would thus be significantly reduced.
Worker strikes were a common phenomenon in the socialist Yugoslavia, although they officially never existed. They were called work interruptions and were not something that complex Yugoslav self-managed socialism recognised as part of political struggle, since workers officially influenced on all major decisions through so-called self-managing process. This strikes were mostly spontaneous and without the back-up of state and party controlled syndicates. Their origin usually laid in the profit distribution, which was not used for basic investments and living standard of the workers, since it was spent for other capital investment, determined by higher self-management administrative bodies. Strikes were therefore attacking the system by criticizing its own foundations, but not seriously endangering it. Number of strikes was relatively big, their number depending mostly on the changing condition of the Slovene/Yugoslav economy, booming in the late 1980s, when the word strike entered into the official vocabulary once again.
Strikes were not the object of the legal system in socialist Czechoslovakia. In the system of ideology there was no place for them. Nevertheless strikes occurred, unofficially. During the so called Prague Spring substantial changes were taking place which limited the power of the Communist Party and supported the introduction of democratic principles. Trade unions up to that time controlled by the Communist Party began to enforce such changes. Their newly elected representatives were able to assure soon that without strikes and threads of strikes it was impossible to realize important reforms and to be protected against the pressure of entrepreneurial management and state authorities. They wanted to achieve the legalisation of the right to strike. The discussions about this topic were relatively far-reaching. A law concerning strikes was ready for publication, in principle, but the change of the situation after the occupation of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 and the following enforcement of the Communist Party did not allow the adoption of any rights to strike.
In the years 1945–1949, there were at least 1,220 strikes in Poland, of which the majority – 73 % – took place in three voivodships: Lodzkie, Silesian and Krakow, and in two industries: mining and textiles – over 56 %. The article presents the socio-economic conditions of strikes, in particular the relationship between socio-demographic characteristics of the workers’ milieu and the intensity of strike actions. The responses of the political authorities and the security apparatus to the strike actions organized by the workers were also taken into account.
The economic crisis began in France in the second half of 1930. It reached its peak in 1934 and 1935 and resulted in a very high unemployment rate. To cope with these difficulties, the French government decided to protect French workers by limiting the number of foreign workers. The Poles had to return to their country under increasingly restrictive conditions. Woe betide strikers, union members and communists. The number of Poles fell by 17% between 1931 and 1936. After the respite provided by the Front Populaire, which was more concerned about foreign workers, the Poles lived in fear of having to leave France. The most politically committed joined the International Brigades during the Spanish Civil War.
Strajki stały się zjawiskiem dość częstym – są ostateczną formą protestu pracowników, domagających się poprawy płacy i warunków pracy. Celem artykułu jest analiza strajków na Litwie w XXI wieku. Badania zostały przeprowadzone na podstawie danych statystycznych Departamentu Statystyki Litwy. W artykule zastosowano metodę porównawczą wskaźników uzwiązkowienia z innymi krajami UE oraz przestrzennego zróżnicowania liczby strajków w okręgach kraju. Decyzje o strajku podejmują związki zawodowe. Litwa ma niskie wskaźniki udziału pracowników w związkach zawodowych, zaś prawo litewskie (Kodeks pracy) stawia wysokie wymagania wobec organizatorów strajku, stąd też w poszczególnych latach strajków nie było wcale albo było niewiele. Jednak w latach 2007-2008 przez cały kraj przeszła lawina strajków w oświacie. Nastąpił wzrost wynagrodzeń pracowników oświaty, jednak okazał się on krótkotrwały. Kolejna fala strajków w tej branży miała miejsce w latach 2014-2016, ale nie przyniosła efektów.
EN
The aim of the article is to analyze strikes in Lithuania in the 21st century. Decisions on strike are made by trade unions. Lithuania has low employee participation rates in trade unions, while Lithuanian law (Labor Code) places high demands on the organizers of strikes. The Lithuanian economy collided with several large waves of strikes: in 2007-2008, 2014-2016 and in 2017. The first two waves of strikes were organized by trade unions of education workers and were partially successful. However, the strike situation is still ongoing. The last wave of strikes in 2017 was organized by trade unions of forestry workers and ended in fiasco. The most active districts were Telšiai and Klaipėda.
This article examines the social protest movement against the socialist regime in the Baltic port cities of Szczecin and Gdańsk, in particular between 1970 and 1981. It intends to discuss the impact of these strikes on the formation of a regional and national political culture, which is widely connected to the concept of civil society, in a longer perspective. While Szczecin, after the bloody clashes with the regime’s law enforcement in mid-December 1970, saw a longer-lasting period of strikes, which led to an intervention by First Secretary Edward Gierek, these protests remained limited to the community of workers and did not yet challenge the rule of the Polish United Workers’ Party. They contributed, however, to the formation of a local Polish identity from below. However, in Gdańsk and, in a broader perspective, in the entire Polish Tricity (consisting of Gdańsk, Gdynia and Sopot) a close cooperation between workers and intellectuals emerged during the 1970s, which proved to be decisive during the strike of August 1980. In Szczecin, the similarly strong strike movement of summer 1980 lacked the national (and international) resonance of the protests in Gdańsk. In addition, the political impact and the collective commemoration (as well as the scholarly research) of the workers’ protests in the case of Szczecin remained mostly a local issue even after the fall of the socialist regime. Which stands, once again, in sharp contrast to the situation of Gdańsk.
The text is an analysis of the socio-political situation in Western Pomerania during the political crisis in the Polish People’s Republic at the turn of 1971. Szczecin lay in the heart of the workers’ protests, however, it was the events in Gdańsk that received the most spotlight at that time and later on. The article aims to gather and analyse information from primary sources on how the inhabitants of the country learned about social unrest in big cities, how they interpreted and commented on it, and how it all translated into social sentiments. Such an approach to the problem also provides an opportunity to carry out an analysis based on the dichotomy between the ‘core’ and ‘peripheral’ areas. This is possible due to the accessibility of appropriate primary sources, which in the examined cases are constituted mostly by the documentation gathered by the Security Service, so far used to a small extent. It should also be stressed that the documents on the events of December 1970 in the context of the country in Western Pomerania were rather scant. The analysis of the documentation demonstrates how important Szczecin and Gdańsk were for social sentiments in 1970 and 1971. The incidents in ‘core’ cities were closely observed, and the patterns of protesting were then copied by the country. The scale of those ‘peripheral’ protests was smaller, and they usually did not turn into street fights, but their impact was felt, heard and seen. The methods of protesting in the country involved distributing leaflets, making inscriptions, conversing on related topics and, above all, sharing a desire to bring about a socio-political change expressed by strikes and public protests. These occurrences showed how much the ‘peripheral’ areas were inspired by the ‘core’ ones. There is no doubt that December 1970 left a lasting mark on the memory of the inhabitants of the country in Western Pomerania.
The purpose of the presented article is to indicate to what an extent and how the most opinion-forming dailies and weeklies in Germany reported events taking place on the Polish coast in December 1970. The workers’ revolt, which ended with a bloody suppression by the army and militia, took place only a week after the agreement between the People’s Republic of Poland and West Germany had been concluded. Analyzing this issue, research questions can be asked, both about the number and size of articles as well as their nature. Were they predominantly accounts of the course of events or were commentaries also popular? Was, and if so, to what an extent social unrest in the People’s Republic of Poland and the removal of Władysław Gomułka from power perceived as a threat to the just initiated process of rapprochement on the Warsaw–Bonn line? To what an extent did the publications in dailies and weeklies differ from each other? Finally, the question is whether the press appearing in the Federal Republic of Germany published information on reactions of the public of this country, acts of solidarity, or voices of condemnation addressed to the authorities in Warsaw? The study undertook a critical analysis of texts describing the events of December 1970, establishing the chronology of these events. This analysis was also comparative in nature, as the content of the articles was compared with the former researchers’ findings on the course of individual days of the December tragedy. No less important for this text was the linguistic analysis, aimed at indicating to what an extent reports and columns regarding the situation in Poland were emotionally loaded, and to what an extent they constituted substantive, emotionless political analyzes. The next research method used in the presented research was the quantitative method. Its application made it possible to determine the number of articles referring to events in Poland and to indicate specific days when they had appeared in individual dailies and weeklies. The results of the query and analysis of press articles indicate that, despite the information blockade, journalists managed to map, with a high degree of vagueness, the real course of workers’ protests, especially their causes and the actions of the authorities leading to the brutal suppression. From the point of view of the West German editors, reports obtained from journalists from Scandinavia who had managed to get to Szczecin and Słupsk played a significant role here. In this way, the descriptions of events from both cities quickly obscured the dramatic situation in Gdańsk and Gdynia, including the symbol of December 1970 – an episode related to the death of Zbyszek Godlewski (“Janek Wiśniewski”), which hardly appeared in the media in Germany. A separate research problem to which special attention should be paid are the numerous social and economic analyzes of the situation in Poland published in West German press in December 1970. They pointed to the economic premises as the main reasons for the outbreak of protests, while criticizing the policy of Gomułka, which had led Poland to the economic stagnation. A similar position was taken by the government of Chancellor Willy Brandt, who at first took an expectant attitude, and then, through the words of the government’s spokesman Conrad Ahlers, drew attention to the chronic economic problems of the so-called Eastern Bloc. Despite some anxiety, journalists calmly accepted events in Poland, especially the removal of Gomułka from power and him being replaced by Edward Gierek. It was anticipated that the new Polish leader would continue the policy of rapprochement with Germany, and more broadly with the West.
The purpose of the presented article is to indicate to what an extent and how the most opinion-forming dailies and weeklies in Germany reported events taking place on the Polish coast in December 1970. The workers’ revolt, which ended with a bloody suppression by the army and militia, took place only a week after the agreement between the People’s Republic of Poland and West Germany had been concluded. Analyzing this issue, research questions can be asked, both about the number and size of articles as well as their nature. Were they predominantly accounts of the course of events or were commentaries also popular? Was, and if so, to what an extent social unrest in the People’s Republic of Poland and the removal of Władysław Gomułka from power perceived as a threat to the just initiated process of rapprochement on the Warsaw–Bonn line? To what an extent did the publications in dailies and weeklies differ from each other? Finally, the question is whether the press appearing in the Federal Republic of Germany published information on reactions of the public of this country, acts of solidarity, or voices of condemnation addressed to the authorities in Warsaw? The study undertook a critical analysis of texts describing the events of December 1970, establishing the chronology of these events. This analysis was also comparative in nature, as the content of the articles was compared with the former researchers’ findings on the course of individual days of the December tragedy. No less important for this text was the linguistic analysis, aimed at indicating to what an extent reports and columns regarding the situation in Poland were emotionally loaded, and to what an extent they constituted substantive, emotionless political analyzes. The next research method used in the presented research was the quantitative method. Its application made it possible to determine the number of articles referring to events in Poland and to indicate specific days when they had appeared in individual dailies and weeklies. The results of the query and analysis of press articles indicate that, despite the information blockade, journalists managed to map, with a high degree of vagueness, the real course of workers’ protests, especially their causes and the actions of the authorities leading to the brutal suppression. From the point of view of the West German editors, reports obtained from journalists from Scandinavia who had managed to get to Szczecin and Słupsk played a significant role here. In this way, the descriptions of events from both cities quickly obscured the dramatic situation in Gdańsk and Gdynia, including the symbol of December 1970 – an episode related to the death of Zbyszek Godlewski (“Janek Wiśniewski”), which hardly appeared in the media in Germany. A separate research problem to which special attention should be paid are the numerous social and economic analyzes of the situation in Poland published in West German press in December 1970. They pointed to the economic premises as the main reasons for the outbreak of protests, while criticizing the policy of Gomułka, which had led Poland to the economic stagnation. A similar position was taken by the government of Chancellor Willy Brandt, who at first took an expectant attitude, and then, through the words of the government’s spokesman Conrad Ahlers, drew attention to the chronic economic problems of the so-called Eastern Bloc. Despite some anxiety, journalists calmly accepted events in Poland, especially the removal of Gomułka from power and him being replaced by Edward Gierek. It was anticipated that the new Polish leader would continue the policy of rapprochement with Germany, and more broadly with the West.
The Kraków incidents of November 1923 arouse emotions up to this day. Quite decent literature has been developed on this subject, mainly before 1989, however, several contributory studies have been published over the last 30 years. The catalog of sources is also being expanded, which can be used to improve the current state of knowledge of the events from 100 years ago. The presented account, hitherto completely unknown, kept in private family collections, fits into the trend. Its author is Ludwik Kłeczek, commander of the State Police in Krakow during the events of November 1923. His critical assessment of the activities of the Krakow police forces resulted in his transfer to Volhynia, and ultimately to the Silesian Voivodeship. Therefore, it was not the end of his professional career.
PL
Wypadki krakowskie z listopada 1923 r. do dzisiaj budzą emocje. Mają one już całkiem przyzwoitą literaturę przedmiotu, stworzoną przede wszystkim przed 1989 r., choć także na przestrzeni ostatnich 30 lat ukazało się kilka opracowań o charakterze przyczynkarskim. Poszerza się też katalog źródeł, które mogą poprawić stan naszej wiedzy o wypadkach sprzed 100 lat. W ten nurt wpisuje się prezentowana relacja, zupełnie dotychczas nieznana, bo przechowywana w prywatnych zbiorach rodzinnych. Jej autorem jest Ludwik Kłeczek, komendant Policji Państwowej w Krakowie podczas wypadków listopadowych 1923 r. Dla niego samego krytyczna ocena działalności policji krakowskiej spowodowała przeniesienie na Wołyń, a ostatecznie do województwa śląskiego. Nie była zatem końcem kariery zawodowej.
Wśród wielu tematów, które w swoim nauczaniu, głoszonym podczas Mszy św. za Ojczyznę (1982-1984), podejmował bł. ks. Jerzy Popiełuszko, na wyróżnienie zasługuje kontekst patriotyczny. Miał on na celu m.in. formację tożsamości narodowej, miłości do Ojczyzny wiernych oraz przekaz dziejów Polski. Służyły temu odwołania męczennika komunizmu do przeszłości kraju, które zawarł w swoim nauczaniu. Wśród wielu wydarzeń przywołanych przez błogosławionego należy wskazać m.in. na: powstania narodowe w XIX w., dwie wojny światowe, bitwę warszawską, odzyskanie niepodległości w 1918 r., powstanie warszawskie, pamięć o Żołnierzach Wyklętych czy powojenne strajki robotników, aż do tych z sierpnia 1980 r. Wszystkie powyższe odwołania w przepowiadaniu warszawskiego kaznodziei były nie tylko zwykłym prezentowaniem faktów, skądinąd równie potrzebnym w państwowej propagandzie komunistycznej, ale przede wszystkim ukazaniem rodakom istoty poświęcenia i cierpienia, jaką okupiona były idee narodowe i wolność Ojczyzny na przestrzeni wieków. Celem było również podtrzymanie w wiernych, umęczonych terrorem stanu wojennego, nadziei oraz religijno-patriotycznych wartości, w realizacji których ks. Popiełuszko dostrzegał realną drogę ku przyszłej wolności oraz suwerenności Polski.
EN
There was a number of recurring themes appearing in Blessed Jerzy Popieluszko’s (1982–1984) sermons. Patriotism, however, is a chief one. The martyr priest wanted to form the national awareness, promote the love for the Country and present the Polish past. The historical examples include the 19th-century uprisings, the world wars, the Battle of Warsaw, the restoration of independence in 1918, The Warsaw Uprising, the anti-Soviet guerrilla warfare and the working-class strikes spanning till 1980. The preacher did not include the historical references just to present facts, although this would have made sense in the context of the Communist propaganda. The main purpose was to show to the fellow Poles the meaning of self-sacrifice and suffering as a price which had to be paid in the struggle for national liberty over centuries. Moreover, the preacher intended to keep up the spirits of the nation terrorised by the martial state and to give hope stemming from the religious and patriotic values. In Blessed Jerzy Popieluszko’s mind they would eventually pave the way towards Polish freedom and independence.
This article applies the three workers' strikes in Huta Stalowa Wola in Stalowa Wola in 1988. Their description was made on the background of nationwide protests, which forced the communist government to discussions with representatives of the opposition. The text based on the rich source material − archives of the Polish United Workers' Party, the documents of the Security Service (special service in PRL), records of judicial process and the press. The article shows that the members of the illegal Independent Self-Governing Trade Union “Solidarity” from Stalowa Wola could count on the support of the local Roman Catholic priests. Only in this way, it was possible the success of the strike (22 August - 1 September 1988.), whose aim was to re-register the “Solidarity”. Protesting workers and supporting their priests (especially Edward Frankowski) were victimized and persecuted by the communist authorities.
PL
Artykuł dotyczy trzech strajków robotniczych zorganizowanych w Hucie Stalowa Wola wStalowej Woli w dniach 29-30 kwietnia, 13 lipca i 22 sierpnia – 1 września 1988 r. Powodem protestów była pogarszająca się sytuacja ekonomiczna w kraju, lekceważenie postulatów pracowniczych przez komunistyczne władze oraz brak niezależnej, legalnej reprezentacji związkowej robotników. Opisywane wydarzenia wpisywały się w ogólnopolskie nastroje społeczne i działania opozycyjnej „Solidarności”. Sukces letniej fali strajków w 1988 r. w kraju, do którego wyraźnie przyczynili się strajkujący pracownicy huty, spowodował, że władze partyjno-rządowe musiały iść na ustępstwa wobec opozycji i podjąć oficjalne rozmowy z jej przedstawicielami, na czele z Lechem Wałęsą. W oparciu o przeanalizowany materiał źródłowy – archiwalia wytworzone przez Polską Zjednoczoną Partię Robotniczą, dokumenty Służby Bezpieczeństwa, akta sądowe i prokuratorskie oraz prasę, stwierdzić można, że członkowie opozycyjnego i nielegalnego NSZZ „Solidarność” ze Stalowej Woli mogli liczyć na wyjątkowe wsparcie miejscowych księży rzymskokatolickich, szczególnie proboszcza parafii Matki Bożej Królowej Polski w Stalowej Woli ks.Edwarda Frankowskiego. Tylko dzięki współpracy robotników z miejscowymi duchownymi, strajk z sierpnia 1988 r. mógł przybrać takie rozmiary. Po jego zakończeniu, biorący w nim udział pracownicy i wspierający ich duchowni byli represjonowani i prześladowani przez władze komunistyczne.
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