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Hylemorphism within a new formal framework

100%
Wojciechowski E.
Kwartalnik Filozoficzny
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2020
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vol. 48
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issue 4
213-227
EN
In Aristotle's philosophy the term form has multiple meanings. The object of the present analysis is the notion of form in its static meaning. The term form in this meaning appears in two syntactically different propositional phrases: (1) x is a form of a, where a is a proper name or a common name and (2) x is a form of y, where is a form is a relative expression. A conversion of x is a form of y is y is a matter of x. The term matter from the equivalent of phrase (2) is treated here as logically primal and characterised axiomatically (B1-B4). These axioms are an interpretation of Frege's predication scheme (with specific axioms A1-A4). Our base system is elementary ontology. The term form which appears in phrase (1) is a functor in the substantial meaning. The theory of hylemorphism (HM) proposed here can be extended to include the postulate of singularity or non-singularity of the substantial form. The functor of form (F) in the abstract sense is introduced by definition. The expression xεFa is a formal equivalent of phrase (1). The special cases of form in this sense, which are defined, are individual form and species form.
2
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Skąd pochodzą nowe formy substancjalne? – Polemika z teistycznym ewolucjonizmem w ujęciu Mariusza Tabaczka

67%
Chaberek M.
Roczniki Filozoficzne
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2020
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vol. 68
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issue 4
199-215
EN
Contemporary Thomists strive to demonstrate a compatibility between Aristotelian-Thomistic metaphysics and the theory of biological macroevolution. Recently such positions have been promoted by Dr Mariusz Tabaczek. However, he admits that Aquinas’s teachings need to be substantially modified to make them compatible with theistic evolution. On his view, the main point of controversy is whether the creation of the world has been completed (as Aquinas maintains) or it continues (as it is required by theistic evolution). But the evolutionary postulate of continual creation understood as emergence of totally new substantial forms contradicts not only Aquinas’s doctrine but the classic Christian understanding of creation. Thomistic evolutionists cannot explain the origin of new substantial forms; they refer to accidental changes, such as random genetic mutations, whose accumulation over time would produce new species. This, however, is not possible in the light of Thomistic metaphysics because an accidental change does not produce a substantial change. Additionally, the Thomistic evolutionist concept does not tally with many facts discovered by contemporary science. Thomistic evolutionists abandon the fundamental concepts of Aquinas’s philosophy such as the substance-accidents fold and moderate realism as a cognitive attitude. Hence the conclusion that it is not possible to reconcile biological macroevolution with Aquinas’s teachings.
PL
Współcześni tomiści usiłują wykazać zgodność metafizyki arystotelesowsko-tomistycznej z teorią makroewolucji biologicznej. W ostatnim czasie stanowisko takie poparł Dr Mariusz Tabaczek. Jednak przyznaje on, że naukę Tomasza należy zmodyfikować w istotny sposób, aby można ją było pogodzić z teistycznym ewolucjonizmem. W jego ujęciu główny punkt takiej modyfikacji stanowi kwestia tego, czy stworzenie się zakończyło, czy nadal powstają nowe gatunki. W istocie ewolucyjny postulat powstawania nowych gatunków uderza nie tylko w naukę Tomasza, ale klasyczne chrześcijańskie rozumienie stworzenia. Tomistyczni ewolucjoniści nie potrafią wyjaśnić pochodzenia nowych form substancjalnych. Odwołują się do zmian przypadłościowych, takich jak przypadkowe mutacje genetyczne, których kumulacja miałaby prowadzić do powstania nowych gatunków. To jednak nie jest możliwe w świetle metafizyki tomistycznej, ponieważ zmiana przypadłościowa nie tworzy nowej substancji. Dodatkowo koncepcja tomistycznych ewolucjonistów nie harmonizuje z wieloma faktami odkrywanymi przez współczesną biologię. Tomistyczni ewolucjoniści muszą porzucić fundamentalne pojęcia filozofii św. Tomasza, takie jak złożenie bytowe substancja-przypadłości czy umiarkowany realizm. Nie da się więc pogodzić makroewolucji biologicznej z nauką Akwinaty.
3
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The Compatibility of Evolution and Thomistic Metaphysics: A Reply to Dennis F. Polis

51%
Delfino R. A.
Studia Gilsoniana
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2021
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vol. 10
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issue 1
71–102
EN
In this article the author discusses Dennis F. Polis’ defense of the compatibility of biological evolution and Thomistic metaphysics. Some of Polis’ methodological and metaphysical arguments are examined and it is explained why they are unfaithful to the Thomistic tradition of metaphysics. There is a discussion of why metaphysics can, within certain parameters, critique the science of evolutionary biology, as well as a discussion of the role of metaphysics in the hierarchy of the sciences. The relationship between biological species to the notion of species in philosophy, including related metaphysical topics, such as essences and Divine ideas in God, is discussed. It is determined that Polis’ view suffers from a kind of relativism and nominalism that is incompatible with the moderate realism of Aquinas. Some of Aquinas’ key existential insights in metaphysics are discussed in this context as well. In addition to being corrective, this essay helps point the way to a better defense of the compatibility of biological evolution and Thomistic metaphysics.
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