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1
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O roli orzecznictwa TSUE w procesie harmonizacji prawa Unii Europejskiej z prawem krajowym

100%
Będźmirowska P.
Studia Iuridica Agraria
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2016
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vol. 14
329-340
EN
Upon entry into force of the accession treaty, Poland – as a member state of the European Union – became bound by the body of EU law (the acquis communautaire), including its primary and secondary law as well as the interpretation of EU law contained in the Court of Justice of the European Union case-law. Due to a very close approximation of Polish legislation to EU law – resulting from the obligation to consider, employ, and apply in the process of implementing the former a number of EU legal acts, i.e. regulations, directives, as well as acts of soft law such as guidelines and recommendations that are not acts of common law – the problem of the scope of application of EU law within the Polish legal system has occurred; this problem, or a gap in the legal sense, has been addressed and resolved, to a large extent, by case-law of the CJEU.
2
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LACK OF THE NOTIFICATION THE LAW ON GAMBLING TO THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION AND THE POSSIBILITY OF APPLYING ADMINISTRATIVE SANCTIONS AGAINST ENTITIES CONDUCTING ECONOMOC ACTIVITY USING GAMBLING MACHIN

75%
GIBASIEWICZ D.
Kultura Bezpieczeństwa. Nauka – Praktyka – Refleksje
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2017
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vol. 26(26)
81-101
EN
The aim: The purpose of this article is to present the application of Article 14 paragraph 1 and Article 89 paragraph 1 point 2 of the Act of 19 November 2009 on gambling law by the administrative courts. These provisions have not been notified to the European Commission in spite of such a requirement under EU law – Art. 8 paragraph 1 and Art. 1 point 11 of Directive 98/34/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 June 1998 laying down a procedure for the provision of information in the field of technical standards and regulations and rules on information society services, as amended by Council Directive 2006/96/EC of 20 November 2006. Introduction: In the article, the positions taken by the Polish administrative courts in this area are analyzed and their assessment is made in the context of EU law, the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union and fundamental principles of jurisprudence and legal theory. Particularly, the question of linkage and the relationship of these two provisions of the law on gambling is exposed. The methodology: The work is based on the formal-dogmatic method, because it refers to the specific provisions of the law both national and EU, and shows their interpretation and implications of subsumption of specific facts and the legal issues in the national and EU jurisprudence. It also discusses – very important for the clarifying the analyzed issues – Resolution of the Supreme Administrative Court of 16 May 2016 year. The author also analyzes the principle of estoppel in relation to the imposition of administrative penalties on private parties, despite of the fact that a State did not fulfill its obligation to notify technical regulations to the European Commission. Conclusions: The work ends up with the conclusions, which show that the Polish administrative courts including the Supreme Administrative Court, in the vast majority erroneously red out the relationship between the content of Art. 14 paragraph 1 and Art. 89 paragraph 1 point 2 of the Act of 19.11.2009 r. on gambling ignoring the achievements of the Court of Justice of European Union and the fundamental principles of EU law. There are in this field, however, a few exceptions, ie. different rulings of administrative courts or dissenting opinions to incorrect judicial decisions.
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Zasada pewności prawa w działaniu administracji Unii Europejskiej oraz jako zasada ogólna prawa Unii Europejskiej

75%
Kluczewska-Rupka A.
Studia Prawa Publicznego
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2014
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issue 1(5)
159-180
EN
“Certainty of law” is an expression often present in the justifications of decisions of the Constitutional Court and the European Court of Justice. Philosophers consider certainty of law as a major value that law should adhere to. The right to bear the qualification of “certain” is to encourage the need for safety which, according to psychologists, is one of the basic human needs. The principle of legal certainty derives from a broadly defined set of principles protecting citizens’ confidence in the state, the predictability of law, confidence in the law and the reliability of a legally established order, and is reflected in the decision delivered by the European Court of Justice of the European Union. Under the rule of law a citizen must be ascertained protection of his predictions or expectations based on the existing legal norms, upon which his confidence in the state regime is based. Legal certainty is achieved once stability of law is guaranteed and its abolition, or even modifications, as some claim, if at all admissible, should be precisely determined by statute. This paper is divided in two parts. The first relates to the compliance with the principle of legal certainty by EU bodies, in which access to information as well as the compliance of the EU administration operations in practice with the principle of legal certainty are analysed. The second part of this paper touches upon the problem of legal certainty – as a general rule, which is frequently referred to in justifications of judgments delivered by the Court of Justice of the EU and addressed to Member States. The purpose of this paper is to present adherence to the principle of legal certainty as an intrinsic value which provides citizens with a sense of certainty, stability and predictability. Without a guarantee of these values, the principle of legal certainty remains only a theory.
PL
„Pewność prawa” jest wyrażeniem często obecnym w uzasadnieniach orzeczeń Trybunału Konstytucyjnego oraz Europejskiego Trybunału Sprawiedliwości. Filozofowie prawa uznają pewność prawa za jedną z głównych wartości, którym prawo winno hołdować. Prawo opatrzone kwalifikacją „pewne” ma sprzyjać potrzebie bezpieczeństwa, zdaniem psychologów – jednej z podstawowych potrzeb człowieka. Zasada pewności prawa jest pochodną szeroko zakreślonych zasad: ochrony zaufania obywateli do państwa, przewidywalności prawa, bezpieczeństwa prawnego lub pewności prawa, znajdujących swój wyraz w orzecznictwie Trybunału Sprawiedliwości Unii Europejskiej. W systemie praworządnym obywatel musi mieć zapewnioną ochronę swoich przewidywań opartych na istniejących normach prawnych, gdyż do tego sprowadza się jego „zaufanie do systemu”. Zasada pewności prawa realizowana jest w taki sposób, że raz nabyte prawo powinno być stabilne, a możliwości jego odjęcia (a jak twierdzą niektórzy – również możliwości jego modyfikacji), jeżeli mogą w ogóle istnieć, powinny być ściśle określone przez ustawę. Niniejszy artykuł został podzielony na dwie części. Pierwsza z nich dotyczy przestrzegania zasady pewności prawa przez organy UE. Autor analizuje problem dostępu do informacji, a także to, czy administracja UE w samej praktyce działa w poszanowaniu zasady pewności prawa. Część druga dotyka problemu zasady pewności prawa – jako zasady ogólnej, bardzo często powoływanej w uzasadnieniach wyroków Trybunału Sprawiedliwości UE, adresowanych do poszczególnych państw członkowskich. Celem niniejszego artykułu jest ukazanie, że przestrzeganie zasady pewności prawa jest wartością samoistną, dającą obywatelom poczucie stabilności i przewidywalności.
4

British-Polish Protocol in light of the Court of Justice of the European Union jurisprudence (N.S. v Secretary of State, Bonda, Fransson)

75%
Kazalska O.
Studia Iuridica
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2016
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vol. 68
125-140
PL
The Protocol No. 30 on the application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union to Poland and to the United Kingdom, so called “British-Polish Protocol”, annexed in 2007 to the Treaties by means of the Lisbon Treaty, led to many interpretational disputes about its legal status and consequences for application of the Charter in Poland and United Kingdom. However, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), continuing the protection of human and fundamental rights contained in the Charter, dispels some doubts concerning the Protocol significance through its case law. Judgment of the CJEU of December 21, 2011 in joined cases N.S. (C-411/10) v Secretary of State for the Home Department et M. E. and Others (C-493/10) v Refugee Applications Commissioner and Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform, as well as Advocate General’s Verica Trstenjak opinion delivered on September 22, 2011, confirms the normative content of art. 51 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, so that the applicability of the Charter in the United Kingdom or in Poland is unchallengeable. Significance of the Advocate General’s Juliane Kokott’s opinion, delivered on December 15, 2011, in case General Prosecutor v Łukasz Marcin Bonda (C-489/10) should not go unnoticed. It states that Protocol No. 30 cannot be seen as an opt-out clause, but shall be regarded as having only clarifying character and as construction guidelines. Broad scope interpretation of the Charter was what CJEU called in the case Åklagaren v Hans Åkerberg Fransson (C-617/10). It allowed to develop common standards for the interpretation and application of European Union fundamental rights.
5
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British-Polish Protocol in light of the Court of Justice of the European Union jurisprudence (N.S. v Secretary of State, Bonda, Fransson)

75%
Kazalska O.
Studia Iuridica
|
2016
|
vol. 68
125-140
PL
The Protocol No. 30 on the application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union to Poland and to the United Kingdom, so called “British-Polish Protocol”, annexed in 2007 to the Treaties by means of the Lisbon Treaty, led to many interpretational disputes about its legal status and consequences for application of the Charter in Poland and United Kingdom. However, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), continuing the protection of human and fundamental rights contained in the Charter, dispels some doubts concerning the Protocol significance through its case law. Judgment of the CJEU of December 21, 2011 in joined cases N.S. (C-411/10) v Secretary of State for the Home Department et M. E. and Others (C-493/10) v Refugee Applications Commissioner and Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform, as well as Advocate General’s Verica Trstenjak opinion delivered on September 22, 2011, confirms the normative content of art. 51 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, so that the applicability of the Charter in the United Kingdom or in Poland is unchallengeable. Significance of the Advocate General’s Juliane Kokott’s opinion, delivered on December 15, 2011, in case General Prosecutor v Łukasz Marcin Bonda (C-489/10) should not go unnoticed. It states that Protocol No. 30 cannot be seen as an opt-out clause, but shall be regarded as having only clarifying character and as construction guidelines. Broad scope interpretation of the Charter was what CJEU called in the case Åklagaren v Hans Åkerberg Fransson (C-617/10). It allowed to develop common standards for the interpretation and application of European Union fundamental rights.
6
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Czy zablokowanie przystąpienia unii europejskiej do europejskiej konwencji praw człowieka jest zgodne z normami konstytucyjnymi?

63%
Sozański J.
Kwartalnik Naukowy Uczelni Vistula
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2016
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issue 2(48)
63-74
PL
Celem rozważań jest ocena podstaw prawnych i skutków Opinii 2/13 Trybunału Sprawiedliwości Unii, blokującej jej przystąpienie do EKPC, przewidziane Traktatem z Lizbony. Dokonano analizy porównawczej instrumentów prawnych i literatury. Należy stwierdzić, że Opinia jest niekonstytucyjna i contra legem, choć wywiera istotne skutki dla porządku prawnego i ochrony jednostek. Artykuł ma charakter badawczy.
EN
An aim of considerations is to assess the legal grounds and effects of the Opinion 2/13 of the Court of Justice of the European Union, blocking its accession to the ECHR, envisaged by the Lisbon Treaty. The author carried out a comparative analysis of the legal instruments and literature. It must be said that the Opinion is unconstitutional and contra legem, though it yields crucial consequences for the legal system and protection of individuals. The article is of the research nature.
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Konsumenci versus przedsiębiorcy w kontekście opłaty za obsługę posprzedażną

38%
Dobosz D.
Studenckie Prace Prawnicze, Administratywistyczne i Ekonomiczne
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2016
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vol. 20
131-145
EN
Consumers versus Entrepreneurs through the lens of a rate of the after-sales service The article delves into preliminary questions to the Court of Justice of the European Union posed by the Landgericht in Stuttgart in the case Zentrale zur Bekämpfung unlauteren Wettbewerbs Frankfurt am Main e.V against Comtech GmbH. The author refers to a recent opinion of Maciej Szpunar, the Advocate General. The introductory part of the paper starts with the in-depth study of EU and Germany’s regulations due to their application in the case at issue. The crucial issue is to decide whether arranging higher fees by entrepreneurs - as far as off-premises or distance contracts are concerned — is proceeding in accordance with the Directive of the European Parliament and the Council 2011/83/UE. Then the author adumbrates the factual circumstances presented by the Advocate General, comments them and — by detailed analysis, indicates staples of the case. Afterwards the author contemplates widely understood legal implications. Finally, compensation claims are taken into consideration.
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