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Odmowa mianowania sędziów konstytucyjnych (casus Słowacji)

100%

Chmielarz-Grochal A., Sułkowski J.

Przegląd Sejmowy

2016

issue 2(133)

29-46

The procedure for appointing judges of the Constitutional Court in Slovakia does not differ significantly from the solutions adopted in other European countries. The Slovak model has similarities with the solutions adopted in 1991 in relation to the judges of the Constitutional Court of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic. The procedure for appointing constitutional judges included — at the initial stage — the entities involved in legal practice and study of law, whereas the creative power was de lege ferenda based on the cooperation between the National Council and the President of the Slovak Republic. Despite the involvement of various stakeholders, the appointment is de facto a political process, since the fi nal decisions are taken by political authorities. An important issue, which concerns the nomination of judges, is the scope of discretionary powers of the head of state in the assessment of candidates for appointment to judicial office. Given that the President appoints judges from among candidates nominated at the request of the National Council, the we cannot accept the approach limiting the role of the President of the Republic to that of the notary public devoid of the possibility of effecting membership of the constitutional court. Disputable is also the view expressed in the judgment of 17 March 2015 imposing on the President an absolute obligation to appoint a judge from among of the two candidates. The appointment of judges is the responsibility of President of the Republic and is associated with its obligation to ensure continuous work of the constitutional court. Continuity may be threatened not only if the President refuses to appoint in an arbitrary manner, but also when he appoints to the membership of the court persons whose activities may interfere with its proper functioning. It is also hard to accept the idea that the head of state would have the full impact on the process of nominating judges. The President cannot freely decide who will be the judge, nor can he/she spontaneously assess whether the candidate meets the requirement of having appropriate work experience. Possessing a knowledge of law should be the subject of public debate, a kind of competition between the candidates, and not a tool by which the President may reject the candidates nominated to him.

Naczelny Sąd Administracyjny wobec reformy sądownictwa 2015–2019 – zagadnienia wybrane

44%

Michalak A.

Acta Universitatis Lodziensis. Folia Iuridica

2020

vol. 93

25-45

2015–2019 – the period of the first coalition rule under the leadership of the Law and Justice party (PiS) brought a number of legislative changes regarding the judiciary, or more broadly, the justice system. Beginning with a number of amendments and new laws adopted in 2015–2016 changing the organization and operation of the Constitutional Tribunal, the government also merged the offices of the Prosecutor General and the Minister of Justice, reformed the National Council of the Judiciary, introducing a new (and constitutionally questionable) procedure for appointing its members, and reformed the Supreme Court (establishing two new chambers). All changes raised and still raise doubts as to their compliance with the Polish Constitution and EU law. The purpose of this article is to summarize the rulings of the Supreme Administrative Court in matters resulting from the legislative changes introduced by the PiS government in 2015–2019. The publication takes into account the judgments of the Supreme Administrative Court issued until December 31, 2019 and discusses the position of the Supreme Administrative Court with regard to three issues: the right to demand – in the mode of access to public information – disclosure of lists of support of candidates for the newly appointed National Council of the Judiciary; the possibility of lodging appeals with the Supreme Administrative Court in individual cases concerning the appointment to the office of a judge of the Supreme Court, the power to adjudicate by a judge appointed at the request of the National Court Register in the current composition.

Lata 2015–2019 – okres pierwszych rządów koalicji pod przewodnictwem partii Prawa i Sprawiedliwości (PiS) – przyniósł szereg zmian legislacyjnych dotyczących wymiaru sprawiedliwości czy szerzej sądownictwa. Począwszy od szeregu nowelizacji i nowych ustaw uchwalonych w latach 2015–2016 zmieniających organizację i tryb funkcjonowania Trybunału Konstytucyjnego, rząd dokonał także połączenia urzędu Prokuratora Generalnego i Ministra Sprawiedliwości, zreformował Krajową Radę Sądownictwa, wprowadzając nowy (a przy tym wątpliwy konstytucyjnie) tryb powoływania jej członków, a także zreformował Sąd Najwyższy (ustanawiając dwie nowe izby). Wszystkie zmiany budziły i nadal budzą wątpliwości co do ich zgodności z Konstytucją i prawem UE. Celem artykułu jest podsumowanie wypowiedzi orzeczniczych Naczelnego Sądu Administracyjnego, w sprawach stanowiących konsekwencję zmian legislacyjnych wprowadzanych przez rząd PiS w latach 2015–2019. Publikacja uwzględnia orzecznictwo NSA do dnia 31 grudnia 2019 r. i omawia stanowisko NSA w odniesieniu do trzech kwestii: prawa żądania – w trybie dostępu do informacji publicznej – udostępnienia list poparcia kandydatów dla nowo powołanej KRS; możliwości wnoszenia odwołań do NSA w sprawach indywidualnych dotyczących powołania do pełnienia urzędu na stanowisku sędziego SN; uprawnienia do orzekania przez sędziego powołanego na wniosek KRS w obecnym składzie.

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1 Acta Universitatis Lodziensis. Folia Iuridica

1 Przegląd Sejmowy

1 Chmielarz-Grochal A.

1 Michalak A.

1 Sułkowski J.

1 2020

1 2016

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Odmowa mianowania sędziów konstytucyjnych (casus Słowacji)

Naczelny Sąd Administracyjny wobec reformy sądownictwa 2015–2019 – zagadnienia wybrane