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Thinking Through Tools: What Can Tool-Use Tell Us About Distributed Cognition?

100%

Baber C.

Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric

2015

vol. 41

issue 1

25-40

In this paper, I question the notion that tool-use must be driven by an internal representation which specifies the “motor program” enacted in the behaviour of the tool-user. Rather, it makes more sense to define tool-use in terms of characteristics of the dynamics of this behaviour. As the behaviour needs to be adjusted to suit changes in context, so there is unlikely to be a one-to-one, linear mapping between an action and its effect. Thus, tool-use can best be described using concepts from Nonlinear Dynamics. Such an approach can be used to create a sort of cybernetic model of tool-use. However, there is a danger that such a model can either lead us back to internal representations (in that the comparator used to evaluate feedback during behaviour could be assumed to be pre-defined) or could fail to capture cognitive aspects of behaviour. In particular, the question of how the craftworker’s intent can be enacted in the use of tools to produce a specific object seems to be lost in the cybernetic account. My solution is two-fold. First, the “model” is created on-the-fly and adapted through moment-by-moment interactions in the system of tool-user–tool–material–environment. This means that, rather than assuming a pre-defined internal representation that drives behaviour, I propose that cognition involves the selection of salient parameters that characterize the behaviour and the continued monitoring and management of behaviour in terms of these parameters. Second, intent is only loosely defined a priori but crystallizes through the continued interactions between craftworker and object through a process in which the affordances of the object become apparent to, and responded to by, the craftworker.

Against Smallism And Localism

63%

de Oliveira G. S., Chemero A.

Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric

2015

vol. 41

issue 1

9-23

The question whether cognition ever extends beyond the head is widely considered to be an empirical issue. And yet, all the evidence amassed in recent years has not sufficed to settle the debate. In this paper we suggest that this is because the debate is not really an empirical one, but rather a matter of definition. Traditional cognitive science can be identified as wedded to the ideals of “smallism” and “localism”. We criticize these ideals and articulate a case in favor of extended cognition by highlighting the historical pedigree and conceptual adequacy of related empirical and theoretical work.

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2 Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric

1 Baber C.

1 Chemero A.

1 de Oliveira G. S.

2 2015

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Thinking Through Tools: What Can Tool-Use Tell Us About Distributed Cognition?

Against Smallism And Localism