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Resilience and Resistance 2.0: initial lessons of Ukraine and the implications of resilience and resistance efforts to deter and respond to invasion and occupation by revisionist powers

100%
Jones D., Love J. B.
Bezpieczeństwo. Teoria i Praktyka
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2022
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vol. XLVIII
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issue 3
21-40
EN
Civil-defence resilience capacities focus on man-made threats to national security. While terror attacks like 9/11 drove civil-defence efforts throughout the 2000s, the Russian invasion of portions of Ukraine in 2014 forced nations to build resilience against new threats. These included covert grey-zone and disinformation operations. Additionally, the 2014 events forced nations bordering or within the sphere of influence of revisionist nations to begin to prepare for possible invasion and occupation. Recognition of these threats resulted in two multinational doctrinal concepts that set the stage for what is collectively referred to as resilience and resistance (R&R). Resilience is the efforts by a nation prior to a conflict to build pre-crisis capacity to resist a host of threats, including invasion and occupation, in hopes of deterring threat actions. If deterrence fails, then the efforts transition into resistance to invasion and occupation. The Russian 2022 invasion of Ukraine demonstrated the need for R&R and the strengths and weaknesses of national resistance in action. This event is a strategic R&R inflection point. Nations developing R&R should reflect on and apply the lessons learned from Ukraine’s efforts and ultimately establish R&R 2.0 as an irregular deterrent on par and mutually supporting conventional and nuclear deterrents.
2
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Differing concepts of total defence in small states: comparing the cases of New Zealand and Poland

100%
Johanson T.
Bezpieczeństwo. Teoria i Praktyka
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2022
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vol. XLVIII
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issue 3
199-210
EN
This article proposes that a small state’s approach to total defence will be strong influenced by the nature of its strategic environment. It compares the defence approaches of Poland and New Zealand to identify whether the different contexts of their strategic environments necessitate divergent strategies for defending their state. The theory of population ecology of organisations will be used to frame the different options available to small states in their strategic environments and applied to the cases in order to explain their different approaches to total defence.
3
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Total Defence in a consumer society: a real possibility or wishful thinking? The case study of Sweden

88%
Czarny R. S., Kubiak K.
Bezpieczeństwo. Teoria i Praktyka
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2022
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vol. XLVIII
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issue 3
63-74
EN
The article presents the demographic and social conditions of the Swedish civil defence subsystem known as total defence (Totalförsvar). The authors explain the original meaning of the term and its role in the national defence system. They draw attention to the existing threats related mainly to the uneven distribution of the population and the aging of the population The issue of the progressive ethnic and cultural differentiation of the Swedish society has been treated separately.
4
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A tale of two hemispheres: Norwegian and Australian approaches to national resilience. A comparative analysis

88%
Grandi M. M.
Bezpieczeństwo. Teoria i Praktyka
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2022
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vol. XLVIII
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issue 3
257-273
EN
Paper conducts a comparative analysis of two different national approaches to national resilience in an attempt to identify useful considerations and recommendations for Poland: two models chosen were the Norwegian Total Defence Concept (TDC) and Australia’s National Disaster Response and Resilience approach. They were selected due to their different areas of focus: the Norwegian model is centred on societal mobilisation and its military enablement with the primary purpose of national defence against conventional military and hybrid threats, while the Australian approach is still focused on enhancing national resilience in order to respond to major natural calamities. By examining both models and extrapolating their strengths while noting their vulnerabilities, the basis for a well-rounded national resilience strategy can be identified. While the TDC appears to best suit Poland’s current security challenges, the country would benefit from enhancing its comprehensive local engagement, perhaps through its Territorial Defence Forces. Caution should be exercised with regards to over-committing the Polish military in its support to disaster response at a time when the nation’s eastern flank is once again highly volatile.
5
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Stronger together: the integration of a nation’s special operations forces and voluntary-based formations in comprehensive and total defence

88%
Jones D., Mehan B.
Bezpieczeństwo. Teoria i Praktyka
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2022
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vol. XLVIII
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issue 3
141-155
EN
Special operations forces (SOF) have a history of integrating with voluntary-based formations (VBF) overseas against a wide variety of threats. Despite the historical record, the current doctrine does not provide any applicable concepts to inform SOF-VBF integration. This study aims to fill this doctrinal gap and explores the concepts of a nation applying its SOF-VBF to its own comprehensive defence or total defence to make any territorial incursion or occupation too costly for an adversary. Using a mixture of qualitative and comparative research methodologies, based on secondary historical resistance sources, this study achieves four goals: defining the purpose behind SOF-VBF integration during resilience and resistance; establishing a seven-option SOF-VBF integration framework at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels; assessing these options based on strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and risks of each to inform the implementation; and finally addressing overarching risks common to all options to inform broader risk mitigation measures. The result is seven integration options focused specifically on resilience and resistance to invasion and occupation. This paper will assess the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and risks of each. This study sets the stage for future analysis and additional research on this important topic.Special operations forces (SOF) have a history of integrating with voluntary-based formations (VBF) overseas against a wide variety of threats. Despite the historical record, the current doctrine does not provide any applicable concepts to inform SOF-VBF integration. This study aims to fill this doctrinal gap and explores the concepts of a nation applying its SOF-VBF to its own comprehensive defence or total defence to make any territorial incursion or occupation too costly for an adversary. Using a mixture of qualitative and comparative research methodologies, based on secondary historical resistance sources, this study achieves four goals: defining the purpose behind SOF-VBF integration during resilience and resistance; establishing a seven-option SOF-VBF integration framework at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels; assessing these options based on strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and risks of each to inform the implementation; and finally addressing overarching risks common to all options to inform broader risk mitigation measures. The result is seven integration options focused specifically on resilience and resistance to invasion and occupation. This paper will assess the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and risks of each. This study sets the stage for future analysis and additional research on this important topic.
6
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The education system in the development of total defence. Poland’s perspective

88%
Czornik K.
Bezpieczeństwo. Teoria i Praktyka
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2022
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vol. XLVIII
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issue 3
359-368
EN
One of the key pillars of total defence is an increased social resilience to aggression, which is inextricably linked to an adequate model of security education. Poland’s security in the 21st century is based on the state’s military capacity and on the military and political alliances formed by decision-makers. However, this model of building security is not sufficient in the face of constantly changing and evolving security threats and challenges. Therefore, security should be based not only on a hard dimension, but also on a soft one, whose main pillar is security education. The idea of an effective model of security education is that, apart from giving young people theoretical knowledge, it is necessary to instil in them practical skills related to responding in crisis situations, including situations posing a threat to human health and life. Security education should constitute the first stage in training society in total defence. The educational model currently functioning in Poland definitely needs to be reformed.
7
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What role can Stability Policing play in total defence and building resilience?

75%
Bonomi N., Bergonzini S.
Bezpieczeństwo. Teoria i Praktyka
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2022
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vol. XLVIII
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issue 3
87-97
EN
Threats to peace, stability and human rights of states and civil societies are increasingly of a non-military nature and fending them off requires adopting innovative approaches. These encompass, first and foremost, veering from the strictly military- and security-centred focus applied hitherto and looking at more comprehensive and holistic responses. Furthermore, they seek to include all stakeholders within a state, including its military, the civil apparatus, the civilian populace, and private enterprises in a common defensive effort, namely the concept of total defence. Creating and improving positive interaction amongst relevant stakeholders and increasing their chances of successfully absorbing and surviving external shocks and attacks showcases another significant notion, namely resilience, not only in its acceptation within the Alliance, but in a wider understanding of the term. Stability Policing as a spearheading concept expanding the reach of NATO into the policing remit and as a cutting-edge deployable military capability is defined as suggesting, describing, and highlighting possible roles and contributions to both endeavours. Stability Policing offers innovative avenues of approach and a policing mindset by applying relevant police-related ways and means, and its “blue lens”, and thus contributes to achieving the overarching goal of identifying, deterring, stopping, and countering threats, including those of a hybrid nature and in grey zones, also below the threshold of war.
8
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Professional resistance forces as a defence framework for small countries

75%
Fabian S.
Bezpieczeństwo. Teoria i Praktyka
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2022
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vol. XLVIII
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issue 3
187-197
EN
Due to Russia’s aggressive actions in their neighbourhood, Eastern and Northern European countries were forced to take a critical look at their homeland defence capabilities and realised that their defence capabilities have significant gaps. However, instead of developing strategies and designing defence organisations that reflect their available resources and fit the challenges they are facing, these countries once again implemented solutions that reflect the dominant Western conventional military norms. Although through the implementation of the so-called “total defence” strategies some of these countries have augmented their conventional approach with some paramilitary, unconventional formations, their solutions still reflect how the West thinks wars should be waged and professional military organisations should act and be organised. This article suggests that these countries need to abandon their military orthodoxy and completely redesign their defence approaches based on unconventional warfare foundations and build a new version of state-owned, standardised, and professional military that is organised, equipped, and trained to fight based on different norms than our current ones. To propose some ideas to such changes, the article draws lessons from the case studies of the First Russo-Chechen War and the Second Lebanese War.
9
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The total defence snap link for national resistance: territorial defence forces – the Swiss example

75%
Stringer K. D.
Bezpieczeństwo. Teoria i Praktyka
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2022
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vol. XLVIII
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issue 3
237-246
EN
For nations facing expansionist and revisionist neighbours such as Russia or China, a total defence approach provides a mechanism to protect both territorial integrity and political sovereignty. A key component for any effective total defence concept is volunteer, citizen- soldier territorial defence forces (TDF). This paper emphasises the role these territorial formations play as the critical snap link between the military and civilian population in such a national defence strategy. The territorial defence forces, like the snap link in mountaineering, connect the military to the civilian population in a way to ensure popular support for national resistance efforts. The article offers the historical example of Switzerland as an exemplar of total defence from 1939 to 1991 and demonstrates the role its citizen-soldier forces played in linking the population to overall resistance efforts. This Swiss historical experience provides three main concepts for consideration today: (1) the creation of a government directed and functional levée en masse that mobilizes the entire population to support total defence; (2) the establishment of a national redoubt or refuge, either in-country or abroad, to provide sanctuary for the resistance movement; (3) and the organisation of specialised, multi-crisis capable territorial units for the full range of total defence missions.
10
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Zmiany w polityce obronnej Szwecji po 2014 roku

63%
Lasoń M.
Krakowskie Studia Międzynarodowe
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2019
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issue 1
133-145
EN
The aim of the article is to analyze the changes that took place in the defence policy of Sweden after 2014. The annexation of the Crimea Peninsula by the Russian Federation, the creation of the socalled People’s Republics in the East of Ukraine, along with military provocations aimed in Sweden, led to the reconstruction of defence policy. The Swedish authorities have recognized that they don’t have enough capabilities to meet the challenges of a potential crisis or war. Regardless of the assessment that it’s unlikely. Therefore, thanks to obtaining a political consensus around defence policy, the process of its change was initiated. Including increasing expenditures and expanding the armed forces. It’s necessary for the implementation of the total defense concept pursued by Sweden during the Cold War. Taking into account the conditions that must be met in the 21st century. The analysis was carried out primarily on the basis of source and neorealistic approach to the policy of small states in the defense field.
PL
Celem artykułu jest analiza zmian, jakie zaszły w polityce obronnej Szwecji po 2014 r. Aneksja Krymu przez Federację Rosyjską, powstanie tzw. republik ludowych na Wschodzie Ukrainy wraz z prowokacjami wojskowymi wymierzonymi m.in. w Szwecję, doprowadziły do rekonstrukcji polityki obronnej. Władze Szwecji uznały, że nie posiada ona wystarczających sił i środków, by moc sprostać wyzwaniom potencjalnego kryzysu lub wojny, niezależnie od oceny stopnia jej prawdopodobieństwa. W związku z tym dzięki uzyskaniu konsensusu politycznego wokół polityki obronnej rozpoczęto proces jej zmian, w tym zwiększenia wydatków i rozbudowy sił zbrojnych. Służyć to ma wprowadzeniu w życie koncepcji obrony totalnej, realizowanej przez Szwecję w czasie zimnej wojny, z uwzględnieniem uwarunkowań, jakim sprostać musi w XXI w. Analizę przeprowadzono przede wszystkim w oparciu o materiały źródłowe i neorealistyczne podejście do polityki państw małych w dziedzinie obronnej.
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