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第二次世界大戦における日本の＜終戦＞をめぐって

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Jun’ichirō S.

Analecta Nipponica

2017

issue 7

59-76

The guidelines for unconditional capitulation, formulated in January 1943 at the Casablanca Conference, ultimately caused a hindrance at the end of the war. Germany continued to fight until the fall of Berlin after which they were ushered towards unconditional surrender. In the case of Japan, the capitulation happened through accepting the Potsdam Declaration, since there was no decisive battle that would take place on Japanese soil. Japanese researchers mostly focus on analyzing the reasons for the significant delay of this political capitulation in the face of obvious military defeat. The article, focused on the difference in circumstances at the end of war in Germany and in Japan, is an attempt at an analysis of the background and factors that shaped the Japanese capitulation. First of all, by the end of the war the aim of the war effort became limited to the preservation of the kokutai (the national identity, national character). As argued by Paul Kecskemeti, a Hungarian political scientist, the defeated side will stop fighting if reassured that the capitulation will not damage the essential values that define the given nation (Strategic Surrender). Japanese leaders all came to the conclusion, that as long as the kokutai would be preserved, it was crucial to end the war. While in Germany the Nazi ideology and dictatorship system supported Hitler’s lack of willingness to lay down arms, and so the fight lasted until the (bitter?) end. Secondly, it is important to remember that Japan and the US kept their “relations based on trust” despite the current state of war. Both countries witnessed the activity of the socalled moderate circles. Already in the early stages of the conflict, groups of US and Great Britain sympathizers were looking for paths towards the restoration of peace. On the part of the US, Joseph Grew played a major role in this regard (a Japanese historian, Iokibe Makoto, calls his involvement “a lucky break”). Such efforts helped to speed up the end of war, beckoned by the common conviction that the agreement in the case of kokutai was achieved. Thirdly, there were military factors. In the times prior to the US troop invasions of the Japanese islands, both countries were aware of each other’s military potential. The slogan “100 millions will die together” was quite popular at the time. Hence it was not only the atomic bomb attacks or the Soviet invasion that resulted in the end of war. The US, following the hardships of Iwojima and Okinawa, cautious about military costs provided an armed conflict would happen on the main Japanese islands, were revisiting the idea of pressuring Japan towards unconditional capitulation. Both the terrain (an island country), as well as a still numerous and determined army, made the Japanese case harder than that with Germany. As the American historian John Ferris points out, the Japanese army caused the US great losses in the Pacific, but the fight with Japanese forces facilitated a few political goals. In turn, the Japanese defeat was a victory of a sort. The Japanese leaders were unable to reach an agreement in the case of accepting the Potsdam Declaration, so the end of the war was announced due to the twofold “decision of the divine Emperor” (seidan). If the fight continued on the main islands, the war would have generated more victims on both sides, more destruction, and just as in the case of Germany, Japan would have been placed under the direct supervision of the Allies and the country, most likely, would have been divided. There are reasons for which in Germany the end of war is called “liberation” (from the Nazi) or the fall (demise), while in Japan it is referred to as simply “the end of war” (shūsen) or defeat (haisen).

Alternatives to Dropping the A-bomb in Bringing the War with Japan to an End

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Huczko M.

Kwartalnik Naukowy Uczelni Vistula

2014

issue 1(39)

128-137

The following analysis looks at the issue of necessity to drop the atomic bomb on Japan in mid-1945. At that time the war in the Pacific Theatre against Japan was unilateral. Japanese military was crippled and unable not only to pose any threat but also to defend itself. The ports were mined and American Air Force dominated the sky over Japan. Moreover, there is certain evidence that Japanese diplomats were searching for mediator to bring the war to an end with diplomatic tools. Despite those circumstances, President Harry S. Truman decided to employ the new, as it has proven, deadly weapon to force the Emperor to accept the unconditional terms of surrender. Th e aim of this research paper is to elaborate on the available data alternatives to the A-bomb in ending the war against Japan and also demystify why it was finally used.

Poniższa analiza dotyczy kwestii konieczności zrzucenia bomby atomowej na Japonię w połowie roku 1945. W owym czasie teatr wojny z Japonią na Pacyfiku miał jednostronny charakter. W sensie militarnym Japonia była okaleczona i niezdolna nie tylko do stwarzania jakiegokolwiek zagrożenia, ale nawet do obrony. Porty zostały zaminowane, zaś amerykańskie lotnictwo wojskowe zdominowało przestrzeń powietrzną nad Japonią. Co więcej, istnieje pewien materiał dowodowy, że dyplomaci japońscy szukali mediatora, by doprowadzić wojnę do końca drogą dyplomatyczną. Mimo tych okoliczności prezydent Harry S. Truman postanowił użyć nowej i, jak się okazało, śmiercionośnej broni, by zmusić cesarza do przyjęcia bezwarunkowej kapitulacji. Celem tego artykułu badawczego jest przedstawienie na podstawie dostępnych danych alternatyw dla bomby atomowej w zakończeniu wojny z Japonią oraz zdemistyfikowanie uzasadnienia dla jej ostatecznego użycia.

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第二次世界大戦における日本の＜終戦＞をめぐって

Alternatives to Dropping the A-bomb in Bringing the War with Japan to an End