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Research in Language
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2015
|
vol. 13
|
issue 4
352-367
EN
The purpose of this paper is to discuss two phenomena related to the semantics of definite descriptions: that of incomplete uses of descriptions, and that of the underdetermination of  referential uses of descriptions. The Russellian theorist has a way of accounting for incomplete uses of descriptions by appealing to an account of quantifier domain restriction, such as the one proposed in Stanley and Szabó (2000a). But, I argue, the Russellian is not the only one in a position to appeal to such an account of incomplete uses of descriptions. Proponents of other theories, such as the Fregean, which does not treat descriptions as quantifiers, might benefit from this account of domain restriction. In the second part of the paper I discuss referential uses of incomplete definite descriptions. Relative to such uses, Wettstein (1981) and others have argued that the Russellian theory faces a problem of underdetermination of semantic content. Neale (2004) has replied to this objection showing why it does not pose a threat to the Russellian theory. Again, I argue that not only the Russellian, but also the Fregean can subscribe to Neale’s (2004) suggestion.
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Underdetermination and models in biology

75%
EN
Since the early 20th century underdetermination has been one of the most contentious problems in the philosophy of science. In this article I relate the underdetermination problem to models in biology and defend two main lines of argument: First, the use of models in this discipline lends strong support to the underdetermination thesis. Second, models and theories in biology are not determined strictly by the logic of representation of the studied phenomena, but also by other constraints such as research traditions, backgrounds of the scientists, aims of the research and available technology. Convincing evidence for the existence of underdetermination in biology, where models abound, comes both from the fact that for a natural phenomenon we can create a number of candidate models but also from the fact that we do not have a universal rule that would adjudicate among them. This all makes a strong case for the general validity of the underdetermination thesis.
CS
Nedourčenost je jedním ze zásadních problémů filosofie vědy od počátku 20. století. Ve svém příspěvku vztahuju tezi o nedourčenosti k biologickým modelům a obhajuju následující dva argumenty: Za prvé, použití modelů v této disciplíně dodává silnou váhu tezi o nedourčenosti. Za druhé, modely a teorie v biologii nejsou determinovány striktně logikou reprezentace studovaného jevu, ale také dalšími faktory, jako jsou výzkumné tradice, background vědců, cíle výzkumu a dostupné technologie. Přesvědčivý důkaz o existenci nedourčenosti v biologii, která modelů v hojné míře využívá, pramení nejenom z faktu, že pro každý přírodní jev můžeme vytvořit velký počet alternativních modelů, ale také z faktu, že nedisponujeme univerzálním pravidlem pro výběr mezi nimi. To vše mluví ve prospěch platnosti teze o nedourčenosti.
EN
The paper, drawing on ancient ideals of knowledge: pure versus practical, argues that natural sciences cannot provide a real worldview by themselves. This is because they have features such as ambiguity of the scientific description of reality, meaninglessness of mathematical models employed, and non-referential character of many important scientific notions. This would leave the human desire to understand the world unfulfilled, if other sources of knowledge are excluded. But if they are allowed, then a proper way of reconciling independent or even seemingly divergent views has to be found. Among complementary sources of a worldview, many accept religion, or rather the rational reconstruction of religious beliefs – theology. This paper suggests that some important concepts found in the contemporary philosophy of science – among them underdetermination and incommensurability – point to ways which may allow for the provision of methodologically acceptable constructs, based on the two pillars – science and theology; constructs, which could go beyond vague metaphors towards a consistent worldview.
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