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1
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Dilemmas of Modern International Law – Between Legal Inhumane Non-Intervention and Illegal Humanitarian

100%
Aleksandrowicz T.
Securitologia
|
2018
|
issue 2 (28)
57-71
EN
Over the past decades, threats have arisen in the international security environment related to the functioning of weak and countries unable to fulfill their functions in ensuring security and basic human rights for their citizens, referred to in the doctrine as failed/failing states. The international community has responded with humanitarian intervention that is part of the concept of responsibility for protection (Responsibility to Protect). This article is devoted to the issue of placing this concept in positive international law (remarks de lege lata) and the resulting applications (de lege ferenda comments).
2
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Cyberwarfare and responsibility of states

100%
Węgliński K.
Torun International Studies
|
2016
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issue 9
79-86
EN
The aim of this paper is to provide a general insight into the questionable nascence of the international custom in the context of cybersecurity and the most relevant attempt to draft a document regarding the subject matter from the Western perspective, taking into account the lack of any widely accepted international convention regarding the cyber security. Moreover, the paper analyzes legal requirements for finding a state responsible for a cyber attack by means of Article 2 of the ILC’s Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts. Specifically, it analyzes legal requirements necessary to attribute a certain conduct to a state. Also, it considers if cyber attacks in general can be treated as the use of force within the meaning of article 2.4 of the UN Charter. Moreover, it examines whether the doctrine of due diligence can be used while accusing a state for a breach of its international obligations.
3
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When ‘the Use of Force’ is Prohibited? – Article 2 (4) and the ‘Threshold’ of the Use of Force

89%
Kleczkowska A.
Adam Mickiewicz University Law Review
|
2018
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vol. 8
PL
This article advances the thesis that there is no threshold of the use of force. i.e. no level of the use of force which decides whether and which forcible actions undertaken by States are prohibited. The examples of actions discussed in the doctrine of law which supposedly would be ‘below’ such a threshold in fact either are regulated by other prin-ciples of international law, are not considered as regulated by ius ad bellum, or States deliberately resign from calling them a use of force for both legal and extra-legal reasons. Thus, the existence of such a threshold is not confirmed by States’ practice. This thesis will be explored using three examples: the cases of the evacuation of nationals, the extra-territorial and the Falklands/Malvinas Islands invasion of 2 April 1982. The article starts with a brief discussion of the opinions expressed in the doctrine of international law on the threshold, as well as the applicable case law.
4
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Hybrid Warfare or Hybrid Threat – The Weaponization of Migration as an Example of the Use of Lawfare – Case Study of Poland

88%
Łubiński P.
Polish Political Science Yearbook
|
2022
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issue 1(51)
43-55
EN
This article aims to address the issue of alleged hybrid warfare attacks on Lithuania, Latvia, and Poland. The scope of the article covers the Belarus operations conducted in 2021. Firstly, the author addresses the issue of pushing migrants from a descriptive perspective. Secondly, he debates whether Belarus operation was conducted within the scope of hybrid warfare, hybrid threat, and lawfare? The author concludes that the Republic of Belarus has operated lawfare falling within the hybrid threat spectrum. It means that the situation is not to be classified under the law of armed conflict from the perspective of international and non-international armed conflicts and ius ad bellum violation. Thirdly, the author claims that Belarus has violated international law, so certain legal redress is appropriate and justified. Belarus's actions may result in a court proceeding before the International Court of Justice and before other international institutions.
5

Prohibition of the use of force and legality of humanitarian intervention

75%
Gadkowski T.
Acta Iuris Stetinensis
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2016
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issue Acta Iuris nr 13
EN
This article addresses the problem of the legality and legitimacy of humanitarian intervention in the light of contemporary international law and practice. The Author discusses this issue in the context of a potential conflict between State’s sovereignty and its obligations under international human rights law. He points to the new concepts aimed at the legitimization, form the point of view of international law, of the use of force in defence of humanitarian values.
6
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Original Sin Reaffirmed: The Nicaragua Judgement’s Impact on the Notion of Armed Attack as the Most Grave Form of the Use of Force

75%
Kowalski M.
Polish Yearbook of International Law
|
2016
|
vol. 36
37-50
EN
This article is referenced to the thirtieth anniversary of the ICJ’s Nicaragua judgement on the merits of 1986. It acknowledges the significance of this much-debated judgement for the modern international law on the use of force (jus ad bellum). However the text focuses on one aspect of the judgement only, i.e. the definition of the notion of “armed attack” as the most grave form of the use of force. The impact of the judgement in this respect is critically analysed. It is argued that the introduction to the UN Charter text of undefined notions of the use of force, aggression, and armed attack may be labelled as the “original sin” of contemporary jus ad bellum, as it results in conceptual obscurity. It is also claimed that the ICJ reaffirmed this original sin in its Nicaragua judgement because it explicitly argued for the notion of “armed attack” as the most grave form of the use of armed force and, in consequence, distinguished it from the other, lesser forms of the use of force, while failing to introduce any sort of clarity in the conceptual ambiguity of jus ad bellum. The article also offers some remarks de lege ferenda and suggests abandoning the gravity criterion, which would require abandoning the well-established judicial and doctrinal interpretation approaches to jus ad bellum.
7
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‘New’ and ‘old’ wars – the changing dimensions of warfare

75%
Antczak A.
Przegląd Politologiczny
|
2018
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issue 3
199-216
EN
The article aims to present the issue of ‘old’ versus ‘new’ wars in relation to their specific features. It focuses on the characteristics of both phenomena, as well as providing an analysis of the causes and sources of armed conflicts and their changing dimensions. Methods of waging war have changed along with the political, economic, social and technological developments which have been observed over the years. The very philosophy of war has undergone changes in a similar way. The article aims to identify the direction of changes in the dimensions of war. It also provides an insight into the privatization of warfare and the constantly growing importance of non-state actors in shaping the international order, and therefore their role in post-modern wars.
8
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Navigating legal frontiers in cyber warfare: insights from the Russia-Ukraine conflict

75%
Khalil A., Bitar M., Krishna Raj S. A.
The Lawyer Quarterly
|
2024
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vol. 14
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issue 2
252-267
EN
Cyberspaces can be significantly influenced by simple tools and tactics, and offer cost-effective solutions for states to achieve their objectives. However, it can also be used for conducting cyberwarfare, and its effects remain in gray areas. The spectrum of cyberwarfare activities ranges from minor web disruptions to crippling attacks on critical national infrastructures. Nevertheless, cyberattacks present a unique challenge in applying well-established humanitarian legal principles, particularly regarding the distinction between civilian and military targets. This is because of the interconnectedness and shared infrastructure of cyberspace between civilian and military entities, which blurs the lines between combatants and civilian populations. This article seeks to shift the general perception of the problems associated with this manner of conducting hostilities by building on the learning of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. Furthermore, the authors examine the cyber activities that occurred during the conflict and the legal and ethical challenges that arise from classifying these activities and applying international law. They try to distinguish cyber activities as an act of force or armed attack, with a focus on determining the criteria that played a role in this classification, in light of Articles 2 (4) and 51 of the UN Charter. With reference to the United Nations (UN) Charter and the principles of self-defence, the concept of attack is scrutinised. Furthermore, the article addresses the principles of distinction and proportionality in relation to qualified cyber activities as an armed attack in the same conflict, emphasising the importance of the principle of proportionality in assessing cyber warfare.
9
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Release the bots of war: social media and Artificial Intelligence as international cyber attack

63%
Schellekens J.
Przegląd Europejski
|
2021
|
vol. 4
163-179
EN
The possibility of conducting attacks on critical infrastructure of States prompted a re-evaluation of the jus ad bellum in cyberspace and the drafting of the Tallinn Manual at the behest of the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence. Artificial intelligence combined with the use of social media platforms that have access to large audience has opened a new avenue of international dynamics, posing a potential threat to the political independence of states. This article presents the analogy in the use of algorithmic targeting misinformation and influence campaigns and cyber attacks, as well as examines the roles of the various actors in the international sphere with a view on understanding what actions, if any, nations can undertake to counter these threats to their political independence under international law.
10
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The Nicaragua Judgement and the Use of Force – 30 Years Later

63%
Kwiecień R.
Polish Yearbook of International Law
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2016
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vol. 36
21-36
EN
In light of contemporary circumstances, on the 30th anniversary of the Nicaragua judgement it is worth revisiting and considering again certain legal problems decided by – and raised by – the ICJ judgement. This article addresses the importance of the judgement in terms of international legal regulations on the use of force. First and foremost, the article examines the concept of armed attack based on the “gravity” criterion elaborated by the Court and the exercise of the right of self-defence. Moreover, the relationship between customary international law and treaty law, as well as forcible counter-measures and military actions against non-State actors are also discussed in the article. It is argued that the “gravity” criterion used by the ICJ seems controversial and, consequently, may limit the right of self-defence. On the other hand, however, the judgement established a strong barrier to the realization of individual political interests by militarily powerful States. This is the Nicaragua judgement’s long-lasting legacy. In this sense the judgement has stood the test of time.
11
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Zestrzelenie samolotu a zasada zwierzchnictwa powietrznego

63%
Osiecki M.
Studia Prawno-Ekonomiczne
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2016
|
vol. CI
99-111
PL
Artykuł jest próbą analizy prawnej zjawiska, które od lat stanowi zagrożenie dla lotnictwa cywilnego – zestrzeliwania samolotów. Zjawisko to jest związane z zasadą zwierzchnictwa powietrznego – fundamentalną dla światowej awiacji. Naruszenie jej przez jakiekolwiek państwo rodzi bowiem dlań szereg konsekwencji, wśród których niestety w obecnym świecie zdarzają się i zestrzelenia statków powietrznych. Celem artykuł jest omówienie problemu z perspektywy Konwencji chicagowskiej będącej swoistą „konstytucją” międzynarodowego lotnictwa cywilnego oraz jego praktyczne studium w formie analizy kilku wybranych przypadków zestrzeleń z ostatnich dekad. Należy zaznaczyć, że przypadki te uwzględniają jedynie udział podmiotów państwowych, ponieważ te, jako strony Konwencji chicagowskiej, są związane jej postanowieniami. Choć rdzeniem badań jest tutaj akt zestrzelenia samolotu cywilnego, nieco uwagi poświęcono także zjawisku strącenia maszyny wojskowej w oparciu o niedawny wypadek z udziałem rosyjskiego Su-24 przelatującego nad terytorium Turcji. Wnioski zawarte w końcowej części opracowania uwzględniają aprobatę dla działań społeczności międzynarodowej czyniącej starania, aby akty zestrzeleń wyeliminować całkowicie, przy jednoczesnej krytyce niekompletności obecnych regulacji prawno-międzynarodowych.
EN
Hereby article aims at juridical analysis of a phenomenon that has constituted a threat to civil aviation since years – shooting down aircraft. The phenomenon is connected with the principle of sovereignty in the airspace – fundamental one for global aviation. Breach of the rule by any state results in multiple consequence, among which unfortunately nowadays also aircraft shot-down occurs. The article features discussion on problem from the perspective of Chicago Convention being a “constitution” of international civil aviation and its practical study in a form of analysis of selected cases of shot-down from last decades. Vital is to note that the cases involve participation of states, due to the fact that only such entities, as parties to Chicago Convention are bound by its provisions. Although the core of research is shot-down of civil aeroplanes, also some attention is focused on loss of military aircraft based on the lastly occurred accident involving Russian Su-24 having performed an overflight in Turkish aerospace. Conclusions in the last part of the article include approval of international community’s actions taking efforts to eliminate the problem of aircraft shot-downs, as well as criticism of flaws of current international law regulations.
12
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Explaining the Meaning of ‘Grey Zones’ in Public International Law Based on the Example of the Conflict in Ukraine

63%
Kleczkowska A.
Contemporary Central and East European Law
|
2019
|
issue 1 (133)
75-93
EN
The aim of this paper is to analyse four domains of ‘grey zones’ in public international law exploited by Russia’s activities during the conflict in Ukraine – acknowledgement of Russia’s involvement in the conflict; the use of force against Ukraine; the application of the right to self-determination; and passportisation carried out in Donbass. As this paper will demonstrate, legal assessment of the Russian actions is not impossible, although also not straightforward. It is only the resilience of public international law that may allow for the declaration of Russian actions as illegal, and the bringing of Russia to justice. The paper is divided into five parts: the first part defines the term ‘grey zone’ with regard to international law. The four sections following this are focused on the analysis of particular Russian actions as examples of conduct undertaken in the grey zones of international law, namely the Russian involvement in the conflict in Ukraine, the legal classification of Russian actions, the right to self-determination and passportisation.
13
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Wizerunek wroga w retoryce prezydenta Donalda J. Trumpa w trakcie kryzysu w Zatoce Perskiej (2019-2020)

63%
Kobylska M.
Res Rhetorica
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2022
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vol. 9
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issue 2
43-61
EN
This article concerns enemy image construction in post-Cold War presidential foreign policy crisis rhetoric. It identifies the elements of President Donald J. Trump’s enemy imagery in the 2019-2020 Persian Gulf crisis. The analysis is based on Robert L. Ivie’s concept of savagery and John R. Butler’s and Jason A. Edward’s typology of savage imagery. The article makes a claim that Trump represented Iranian Major General Qassem Soleimani as a modern savage to justify the US’ taking military action to eliminate the enemy. A close reading of the president’s language is followed by a discussion of the implications of his choices for the American convention of foreign policy crisis rhetoric.
PL
Artykuł dotyczy wizerunku wroga w retoryce amerykańskich prezydentów w sytuacjach międzynarodowych kryzysów. Analizuje on obraz irańskiego generała Qassema Soleimaniego zawarty w wypowiedziach prezydenta Donalda J. Trumpa w trakcie kryzysu w Zatoce Perskiej w styczniu 2020 roku. Narzędziami analizy są koncepcje Roberta L. Iviego: topos barbarzyństwa oraz Johna R. Butlera i Jasona A. Edwarda: topos barbarzyńcy prymitywnego i współczesnego. W artykule postawiono tezę, że Trump przedstawił Soleimaniego jako współczesnego barbarzyńcę, aby uzasadnić decyzję o siłowym wyeliminowaniu wroga. Analiza wypowiedzi prezydenta jest wstępem do dyskusji o konsekwencjach wyborów retorycznych dla konwencji retoryki kryzysu.
14
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The use of force by the Frontex agency: International legal aspects

63%
Gruszczak A.
Studia Prawnicze KUL
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2021
|
issue 4
PL
Artykuł podejmuje zagadnienie prawnych regulacji stosowania siły przez Unię Europejską na przykładzie Europejskiej Agencji Straży Granicznej i Przybrzeżnej (Frontex) funkcjonującej w przestrzeni wolności, bezpieczeństwa i sprawiedliwości UE. Z uwagi na źródła ryzyka i zagrożeń związanych z ochroną granic i zarządzaniem migracjami agencja Frontex została wyposażona w szerokie uprawnienia w zakresie użycia siły w działaniach operacyjnych. Wykorzystując koncepcję instytucjonalnego izomorfizmu, autor argumentuje, żew obliczu szczególnych i wyjątkowo trudnych wyzwań na granicach zewnętrznych UE działania Fronteksu stają się składnikiem czynności podejmowanych przez służby graniczne państw członkowskich, prowadząc do izomorficznego „scalenia” czynności agencji UE i krajowych służb granicznych, również w wymiarze prawa do użycia siły.
EN
This article tackles the issue of legal regulation of the use of force by the European Union based on the example of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex), operating in the EU’s area of freedom, security, and justice. Due to the risks and threats related to border protection and migration management, Frontex has been endowed with extensive powers to use force in its operations. Using the concept of institutional isomorphism, the author argues that Frontex’s activities in the face of specific and extremely difficult challenges at the external borders of the EU have become a component of operations undertaken by the border services of the Member States, leading to an isomorphic “merging” of the activities of EU agencies and national border services, including the legal dimension of the use of force.
15
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Can cyberspace be recognised as a fifth warfighting domain under international law?

63%
Mielniczek P., Hapek N. A.
Rocznik Towarzystwa Naukowego Płockiego
|
2017
|
vol. 9
s. 659-674
PL
Na warszawskim szczycie NATO w 2016 r. szefowie państw i rządów krajów członkowskich Sojuszu uznali cyberprzestrzeń za „domenę operacji, w których NATO musi bronić się tak skutecznie, jak robi to w powietrzu, na lądzie i na morzu”. Choć ta deklaracja polityczna na wysokim szczeblu ma duże znaczenie strukturalne i operacyjne, pozostaje pytanie o prawnomiędzynarodowy wymiar cyberprzestrzeni. Ponieważ brak jest traktatu wprost normującego jej status prawny, niniejszy artykuł ma na celu odniesienie się do pytania postanowionego w tytule: „Czy cyberprzestrzeń może być uznana za piątą domenę działań wojennych w prawie międzynarodowym?”. Analiza rozpoczyna się od zbadania ontologicznych argumentów odnoszących się do definicji cyberprzestrzeni. Następnie przedstawione zostały argumenty funkcjonalne w zakresie znaczenia cyberprzestrzeni dla operacji wojskowych. Podjęto też próbę odpowiedzi na pytanie o wpływ cech cyberprzestrzeni na zastosowanie norm prawa międzynarodowego. W każdym z podrozdziałów przedstawiono liczne argumenty podnoszone przez badaczy, analizując je przez pryzmat aktualnych ram prawnomiędzynarodowych.
EN
At the NATO Warsaw Summit (2016), Allied Heads of State and Government recognised cyberspace as ‘a domain of operations in which NATO must defend itself as effectively as it does in the air, on land, and at sea’. Although this high-level political declaration certainly bears structural and operational significance, there is a question about the international legal dimension of cyberspace. As there is no treaty expressly regulating its legal status, this article aims to address the question posed in the title: ‘Can cyberspace be recognised as a fifth warfighting domain under international law?’. The analysis starts with examining ontological arguments as to what cyberspace is. Then, functional arguments regarding the significance of cyberspace to military operations are presented. Next, the question of how characteristics of cyberspace influence applicability of international legal norms will be answered. In each section, multiple arguments raised by scholars are outlined and analysed through the lens of current international legal framework.
16

Prawo okupacji a międzynarodowe budowanie państwa: mój przyjaciel wróg

55%
Gil G.
Studia Prawnicze
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2016
|
issue 4 (208)
7-38
EN
Following the end of the cold war, the incidence of statebuilding interventions has visibly increased in the case of dysfunctional (failed) states. Today, such interventionism in a good faith promotes liberal values and is believed to be in line with international legal regimes that makes it distinctive from neo-imperial politics. Even if state-building does not generally refer to regular warfare, it often takes analogous forms to occupation, which was codified in jus in bello at the beginning of the XXth century. While the occupation law requires occupants to maintain status quo on the occupying territory (article 43 of Hague Regulations), armed state-building is transformative by definition that seems to undermine conservative provisions of the former. The article presents traditional criteria for occupation in the Hague and Geneva conventions as well as prospects and limitations of its refinement (jus post bellum). In theory, such a redefinition could launch the formulation of the statebuilding regime, which aims to reduce deficits or double-standards in international state-building by focusing on the interests of local stakeholders of transformative projects. Hence, the Author addresses three interlocking issues: occupation within state-building, the occupation law and state-building, and transformative occupation as state-building.
17

Release the bots of war: social media and Artificial Intelligence as international cyber attack

51%
Schellekens J.
Przegląd Europejski
|
2021
|
issue 4(62)
163-179
EN
The possibility of conducting attacks on critical infrastructure of States prompted a re-evaluation of the jus ad bellum in cyberspace and the drafting of the Tallinn Manual at the behest of the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence. Artificial intelligence combined with the use of social media platforms that have access to large audience has opened a new avenue of international dynamics, posing a potential threat to the political independence of states. This article presents the analogy in the use of algorithmic targeting misinformation and influence campaigns and cyber attacks, as well as examines the roles of the various actors in the international sphere with a view on understanding what actions, if any, nations can undertake to counter these threats to their political independence under international law.
PL
Możliwość przeprowadzania ataków na infrastrukturę krytyczną państw skłoniła do ponownej oceny ius ad bellum w cyberprzestrzeni oraz opracowania podręcznika (ang. Tallinn Manual) na polecenie Centrum Doskonalenia Cyberobrony NATO. Sztuczna inteligencja w połączeniu z wykorzystaniem platform mediów społecznościowych, które mają dostęp do dużej liczby odbiorców, otworzyły nową drogę dynamiki międzynarodowej, stwarzając potencjalne zagrożenie dla niezależności politycznej państw. Niniejszy artykuł dokonuje analogii w stosowaniu algorytmicznego kierowania kampaniami dezinformacyjnymi i influencerskimi oraz ataków cybernetycznych. Analizuje role różnych aktorów w sferze międzynarodowej w celu zrozumienia, do czego, jeśli w ogóle, mogą zobowiązać się narody w imię przeciwdziałania tym zagrożeniom dla ich niezależności politycznej na mocy prawa międzynarodowego.
18
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The Budapest Memorandum of 5 December 1994: Political Engagement or Legal Obligation?

51%
Grant T.
Polish Yearbook of International Law
|
2014
|
vol. 34
89-114
EN
Ukraine, upon giving up the nuclear arsenal left on its territory by the USSR, entered in 1994 into a Memorandum on Security Assurances with the United Kingdom, United States and Russian Federation (Budapest Memorandum). Since the crisis began between the Russian Federation and Ukraine in February 2014, a number of States have invoked the Budapest Memorandum. Unclear, however, is whether this instrument constituted legal obligations among its Parties or, instead, is a political declaration having no legal effect. The distinction between political instruments and legal instruments is a recurring question in inter-State relations and claims practice. The present article considers the Budapest Memorandum in light of the question of general legal interest – namely, how do we distinguish between the legal and the political instrument?
19
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Challenges to the strategic art at the beginning of XXI century – the twelve fundamental problems that strategists cannot cope with

51%
Fryc M.
Scientific Journal of the Military University of Land Forces
|
2019
|
vol. 51
|
issue 3(193)
459-472
PL
Głównym celem prezentowanych badań jest zwrócenie uwagi teoretykom i praktykom bezpieczeństwa oraz obronności na powszechnie i często dostrzegane fundamentalne problemy dotyczące opracowywania i wdrażania strategii użycia siły w rozwiązywaniu problemów bezpieczeństwa w sytuacjach konfliktowych. Badania wykazały, że nieskuteczne strategie są często wynikiem dwunastu podstawowych błędów, z którymi stratedzy nie mogą sobie poradzić. Należą do nich: 1) niewystarczający poziom wiedzy przywódców wojskowych i politycznych na temat sztuki strategicznej i samej strategii; 2) trudności w określeniu stanu końcowego operacji, a także wytyczanie nieosiągalnych celów strategicznych; 3) formułowanie strategii w oparciu o błędne założenia; 4) niemożność ustanowienia równowagi między kluczowymi elementami każdej strategii, takimi jak: cele, sposoby i środki; 5) trudności w nawiązaniu i utrzymaniu dialogu polityczno-wojskowego; 6) przecenianie skuteczności i użyteczności „twardej” siły, a także deprecjonowanie użyteczność siły niemilitarnej; 7) niedocenianie wpływu aspektów społecznych i kulturowych na pożądany, końcowy stan operacji; 8) opracowywanie strategii na podstawie nieodpowiednich modeli teoretycznych i praktycznych; 9) stosowanie kompleksowego podejścia podczas opracowywania strategii osiągnięcia przewagi konkurencyjnej nad przeciwnikiem w mechaniczny i nietwórczy sposób; 10) mierzenie powodzenia w realizowanej operacji przez pryzmat efektów krótkoterminowych i taktycznych zamiast długoterminowych i systemowych; 11) postrzeganie „strategii wyjścia” jako z góry określonej daty wycofania sił zbrojnych z operacji; 12) lekceważenie stosowania „sprawiedliwych” strategii zgodnych z międzynarodowymi przepisami prawa. Eliminowanie powyższych błędów z obecnej praktyki strategicznej czynić będzie wszystkie wdrażane strategie zdecydowanie bardziej skutecznymi w swej naturze, a także umożliwi zwiększenie prawdopodobieństwa odniesienia sukcesu w złożonej sytuacji bezpieczeństwa, w której zdecydowano się na użycie siły.
EN
The main aim of this research is to attract security and defense practitioners as well as theorists attention to the common as well as frequently spotted fundamental problems concerning developing and implementing strategies of using force to solve security matters in conflicts. The research identified that ineffective strategies are often hampered by the twelve fundamental errors that strategists cannot cope with. Belong to them: 1) inadequate level of knowledge among military and political leaders concerning the strategic art and strategy itself; 2) hardship in defining the end state of the operation as well as creating unachievable strategic goals; 3) formulating a strategy on flawed assumptions; 4) inability to find the balance among the key components of each strategy like: goals, ways and means; 5) difficulties in achieving a political and military dialogue; 6) overestimating the effectiveness and usefulness of “hard” power as well deprecating utility of non-military power; 7) underestimating the influence of social and cultural aspects on the desired end state of the operation; 8) developing strategy upon inadequate theoretical and practical models; 9) using the comprehensive approach of developing strategy in an uninspired and mechanical way to achieve a competitive advantage over opponent; 10) measuring the success of the operation through the prism of shortterm and tactical effects instead of long-term and systemic one; 11) viewing an “exit strategy” as a predetermined date of withdrawal military forces from operation; 12) disregarding usage of the “just” strategies in accordance with international rules of law. Eliminating those errors form the contemporary practice will make all implemented strategies far for effective in its nature as well as significantly strengthen the probability of success in complex security situation where the force is intended to be applied.
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Bezpieczeństwo zbiorowe a suwerenność państw

45%
Diallo B. S.
Ruch Prawniczy, Ekonomiczny i Socjologiczny
|
2013
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vol. 75
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issue 4
37-50
EN
The subject of these reflections on the contemporary international relations is, on the one hand, sovereignty and, on the other, international security, and the analysis of the relationship between the system of collective security and the sovereignty of states in the context of sustainable peace and stability in the world. States have traditionally been tied to the idea of sovereignty. However, among the most characteristic features of the international relations of our time is the growing number of various types of threats originating in states (e.g. Iran, North Korea), in organisations or other entities (e.g. al-Qaeda). Security and sovereignty are two basic concepts most commonly discussed in literature and international legal doctrine. There are two reasons for that: (i) firstly, the main actors in international relations are states which are sovereign entities and the relations or cooperation between them is based on respect for the principle of that sovereignty, and (ii) secondly, the issue of safety is a key issue and a prerequisite for the performance of fully sovereign rights of these countries, necessary to ensure international cooperation and socio-economic development. This paper discusses the need to institutionalise legitimate use of force in global organisations as well as in their regional structures, and to rapidly and effectively manage situations and conflicts intercept to international peace and security. It also draws special attention to the role and place of international organisations in the maintenance of international peace and security both, at universal, and regional level.
PL
Przedmiotem niniejszych rozważań, dotyczących współczesnych stosunków międzynarodowych są z jednej strony suwerenność, a z drugiej – bezpieczeństwo międzynarodowe oraz analiza związku pomiędzy systemem bezpieczeństwa zbiorowego a suwerennością państw w kontekście utrzymania trwałego pokoju i stabilności na świecie. Państwa są tradycyjnie przywiązane do idei suwerenności, jednakże do najbardziej charakterystycznych cech stosunków międzynarodowych naszych czasów należy narastanie różnego rodzaju zagrożenia, zarówno ze strony państwa (np. Iran, Korea Północna), jak i ze strony innych podmiotów (np. Al-Kaida). Bezpieczeństwo i suwerenność to dwa podstawowe pojęcia w literaturze i doktrynie prawnomiędzynarodowej. Dzieje się tak z dwóch powodów: po pierwsze – głównymi aktorami w stosunkach międzynarodowych są państwa, będące suwerennymi podmiotami, a stosunki czy też współpraca między nimi oparte są w zasadzie na poszanowaniu owej suwerenności; po drugie – kwestia bezpieczeństwa jest podstawowym zagadnieniem i warunkiem niezbędnym do wykonywania w pełni suwerennych praw tychże państw oraz zapewnienia współpracy międzynarodowej i rozwoju społeczno-gospodarczego. W artykule tym poruszono również problem konieczności instytucjonalizacji legalnego użycia siły, zarówno w organizacjach ogólnoświatowych, jak i na gruncie struktur regionalnych organizacji międzynarodowych, aby szybko i skutecznie zarządzać sytuacjami i konfliktami zagrażającymi pokojowi i bezpieczeństwu międzynarodowemu. W artykule zwrócono również szczególną uwagę na rolę i miejsce organizacji międzynarodowych w procesie utrzymania pokoju i bezpieczeństwa międzynarodowego, zarówno na poziomie ogólnoświatowym, jak i regionalnym.
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