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EN
The premise of this article is to remind and raise awareness of the great role that chaplains played on the fronts of the „Great War“. They served their pastoral ministry in difficult times, not only because of the threat of warfare, but also because of ideological obstacles. In C. K. Austro-Hungarian ministry, religious chaplains had a very high value. Religious elements were included in the text of the soldier’s oath. Chaplains in their sermons encouraged the soldiers to remain faithful to the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Each regiment of the Habsburg army had its own chaplain. Overall, there were more than 4,000 military chaplains of all religions and faiths - among them 3500 Catholic chaplains.With the outbreak of war in imperial Germany, the German army invoked not only the young clergy, but also many elderly. In the Prussian army, which represented by far the largest part of the German army, it had 125 protestant chaplains. Their number increased in April 1915, to 372 people and by 1916 it reached 744 chaplains. They were supported by the voluntary parish ministers.In the anticlerical Third Republic of France chaplains were nominally assigned to each squadron, but in August 1914, there were only a hundred. In this situation, at the beginning of August 1914, the Ministry of War approved the nominations for chaplains "volunteers" who were employed in pastoral work on the front. In June of 1918, there was one chaplain for an average of 4000-5000 soldiers, which was insufficient to provide spiritual help. In addition to the Catholic chaplains on the front there were 19,000 priest soldiers, 4,000 seminarians and 7,000 religious novices. An unknown number of nuns, served in the hospitals. The effects of the French chaplains were excellent. Soldiers not close to the Church and religion started to approach God. In 1915 the number of soldiers taking communion and attending Masses increased.At the commencement of hostilities, there were 89 Anglican, 17 Catholic and 11 Presbyterian chaplains in the British Army. Only 12 of them were sent to France. The others were only able to serve in the country or overseas garrisons. Chief Chaplain of all the main Christian denominations was Dr. John Simms, an Irish Presbyterian. In 1915, about 45 000 Irish Catholics joined the British Army. They needed Catholic priests. They were finding such a service in the garrison towns, but they did not have it on the front. Irish hierarchy had no influence, as the military ministry was controlled by the Archbishop of Westminster. Irish soldiers used the ministry of Irish or non-Irish chaplains whoever were serving in a particular place. Austro-Hungary was during the war, the enemy of the British. This proved to be a problem for the Irish Catholics, because the Habsburg Empire was seen as an important European Catholic power. The presence of chaplains clearly affected the morale of the Irish soldiers. Unfortunately, the bishops did not always send their military service volunteers who were eligible for this task. Irish Chaplains were overworked. Some of the Irish chaplains were captured. They undertook activities in exchange for the release of their compatriots from POW camps. The Irish Catholic Church did not support the war effort in Britain, in the same way as the Church of Ireland, the Presbyterian Church in Ireland and even the Catholic Church in the rest of the UK. For various reasons, some Irish priests actively worked against the efforts of the war, which had a negative impact on the number of priests who volunteered as a chaplain in the British Army. Although Catholicism was the religion of the minority in the British Isles, War I reinforced their belief. In historiography, a lot of myths and misconceptions were accumulated relating to the British during World War I.The most damaging of these messages were that military chaplains lurked at the rear, while the soldiers fought and died in the trenches on the front.Many historians of the Great War emphasized the religiosity of the Italian soldiers. The army of the Kingdom of Sardinia functioned military chaplains, called "elemosinieri", but after 1866, due to the antagonism between the Church and the State, they were expelled from the army. In the face of Italy joining the Great War, the catholic Chief of Staff, General Luigi Cadorna restored religious service in the army. High Command facilitated the activities of chaplains in the belief that they would raise the soldiers’ spirts and discipline. Followers of the Waldensian Evangelical Church, Baptist Church and the Jewish had their own chaplains. Many chaplains served by the motives of sincere love were guided by the desire to proclaim the Gospel. Some of them remained in contact with the soldiers who fought, not wanting to remain in the comfort of hospitals. They often switched between the soldiers and their families. Chaplains were men of the Church, but they were also soldiers, who in moments of extreme danger during the fight went to the trenches to comfort the dying, and even in the event of the death of an officer to replace him in command. Many chaplains earned great respect and admiration from the ranks of combatants.
PL
Legionistę i poetę Józefa Mączkę z perspektywy czasu śmiało można nazwać prorokiem wolności. Jego teksty nie tylko ukazywały realia życia żołnierskiego, upamiętniały sylwetki walczących o wolność, były hołdem złożonym poległym. Poeta – niczym romantyczny wieszcz – zapowiadał nadejście upragnionej wolności. Śmierć z dala od kraju, u progu niepodległości, a potem triumfalny powrót do wolnej już Polski budowały legendę poety. Dorobek literacki Mączki i jego żołnierska biografia wywarły wpływ na pokolenia Polski niepodległej. Wiersze recytowane w szkołach i na uroczystościach stawały się elementem patriotycznego wychowania. Całym swoim życiem oraz twórczością Mączka zaświadczał, że zasługuje na szacunek i pamięć.
EN
From a time perspective, Józef Mączka - a legionnaire and a poet - can safely be called a prophet of freedom. His texts not only showed the realities of soldier’s life but also commemorated the silhouettes of those fighting for freedom, as well as paid a tribute to the fallen ones. The poet - like a romantic bard - announced the arrival of the desired freedom. Mączka’s death abroad at the threshold of independence, and then his triumphant return to free Poland, built the legend of the poet. Mączka’s literary output and his military life influenced whole generations of independent Poland. Recited in schools and at festivities, they became an element of patriotic education. Both the life and work of Mączka prove that he deserves respect and memory.
PL
Tekst jest próbą odpowiedzi na pytanie, dlaczego Wilno zachowało daleko posuniętą rezerwę wobec propozycji reaktywacji unii przedstawionej przez Józefa Piłsudskiego w Odezwie do mieszkańców byłego Wielkiego Księstwa Litewskiego (22 kwietnia 1919 r.) w oswobodzonym od bolszewików mieście. W czasie wojny polsko-sowieckiej J. Piłsudski podejmował liczne działania w celu doprowadzenia do odrodzenia unii lubelskiej w nowoczesnym, XX-wiecznym kształcie. Na niepowodzenie tej polityki federacyjnej miały głównie wpływ konsekwencje niemieckiej polityki specjalnej prowadzonej w latach 1915–1918 na terenie niemieckiej okupacji części ziem byłego Wielkiego Księstwa Litewskiego, tzw. Ober-Ost. Polityka Niemców mająca na celu osiągnięcie własnej dominacji politycznej i gospodarczej na okupowanym terytorium wykorzystywała ambicje polityczne innych niż polska narodowości, starała się o antagonizowanie przedstawicieli różnych grup narodowych z najsilniejszą i najniebezpieczniejszą dla niemieckich interesów na terytorium byłej Rzeczpospolitej Obojga Narodów grupą polską. W tej sytuacji liderzy litewscy i białoruscy pozostający pod okupacją niemiecką nie widzieli korzyści płynących z ewentualnego sojuszu z Polakami, a posunięcia mające wymowę antypolską przynosiły im konkretne dotacje ze strony niemieckich okupacyjnych władz wojskowych. Próby porozumienia się polityków polskich, litewskich i białoruskich kończyły się zatem niepowodzeniem, zwiększały się natomiast sprzeczności interesów spadkobierców byłego Wielkiego Księstwa Litewskiego (16 lutego 1918 r. Litwini ogłosili po raz drugi niepodległość, 25 marca 1918 r. liderzy BRL wydali III Hramotę, 11 listopada 1918 r. proklamowano powstanie pierwszego litewskiego rządu, 11 grudnia 1918 r. członkowie żydowskiej starszyzny weszli do litewskiej Taryby). Wejście bolszewików do Wilna dodatkowo zantagonizowało Polaków i Żydów. Niezależnie od narodowości mieszkańcy Wilna odnieśli się więc nieufnie do idei federacji. Nie była zatem możliwa realizacja projektu systemu (ew. unii) państw buforowych, oddzielających Polskę od Rosji. W wyniku politycznej klęski polityki federacyjnej po podpisaniu traktatu ryskiego na terenie b. Rzeczypospolitej Obojga Narodów nie było już silnego związku narodów mogącego skutecznie stawić opór różnego rodzaju ekspansji – czy to ze wschodu, czy z zachodu.
EN
The present study is an attempt to answer the question as to why the residents of Vilnius displayed such reluctance towards the idea of reactivating an international union, put forth by Józef Piłsudski in his “Proclamation to the inhabitants of the former Grand Duchy of Lithuania” (22 April 1919) in this city recently liberated from the Bolsheviks. During the Polish-Soviet War, Piłsudski undertook extensive efforts aimed at reviving the Union of Lublin in a modern, 20th-century form. The failure of the federalist concept resulted primarily from the consequences of the German special policy conducted in the years 1915–1918 in the German-occupied portion of the lands of the former Grand Duchy of Lithuania, known as Ober-Ost. The German strategy, aimed at achieving political and economic domination in the occupied territories, exploited the political ambitions of all national circles other than Polish by antagonizing the representatives of various ethnic groups with the strongest and most dangerous group within the former Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, i.e. the Poles. In this situation, Lithuanian and Belarusian leaders under German occupation saw no benefi t in a possible alliance with Poles, especially that anti-Polish measures were rewarded with subsidies from the German occupation military authorities. All attempts at a compromise made by Polish, Lithuanian and Belarusian politicians proved unsuccessful, while confl icts of interest between the successors of the former Grand Duchy of Lithuania grew (on 16 February 1918, the Lithuanian side declared independence for the second time; on 25 March 1918 the leaders of the BNR issued their Third Charter; on 11 November 1918 the formation of the fi rst Lithuanian government was proclaimed, and on 11 December 1918 the Jewish elders joined the Lithuanian Taryba). The Bolsheviks’ entry into Vilnius antagonised the Polish and Jewish populations even further. In summary, the citizens of Vilnius were sceptical of the federalist concept regardless of their nationality. Implementing a system (or union) of buffer states separating Poland from Russia was therefore out of the question. Due to the ultimate failure of the federalist policy sealed by the signing of the Peace of Riga, no powerful multinational union would emerge in the territories of the former Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth to effectively put a halt to any later expansionist attempts, either from the East or from the West.
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