Full-text resources of CEJSH and other databases are now available in the new Library of Science.
Visit https://bibliotekanauki.pl

Results found: 10

first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last

Search results

Search:
in the keywords:  wykroczenia
help Sort By:

help Limit search:
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
Vox Patrum
|
2009
|
vol. 53
563-578
EN
The author of the article: „The problem of sexual offences, as a result of the mystery of iniquity present in the world, in the light of St. Jerome’s letters”, shows paradox of human existence, in which men, as a real being, continually escapes into the world of dreams and utopia; as a social being, adores in himself anarchis­tic behaviors; moral and religious values are precious for him, however by the whole of his existence opposes them; he speaks about the ideals of truth, justice and love, but in practice uses false in the wide sense of this word, without diffe­rence of time in which he lives and systems under which he exists.
PL
W artykule poruszono problematykę dotyczącą zakresu odpowiedzialności Prezydenta RP za wykroczenia i ewentualnej jurysdykcji nad nimi. Dostrzegając brak wyraźnej regulacji tych zagadnień, autor wskazuje, iż – w związku z zakazem domniemywania immunitetów – zakres odpowiedzialności Prezydenta RP za wykroczenia musi być tożsamy jak w przypadku innych obywateli. Z uwagi jednak na szerokie niebezpieczeństwa nierozerwalnie związane z realizacją tej formy odpowiedzialności, proponuje objęcie jurysdykcji nad nimi przez Trybunał Stanu. Dla przyjęcia takiego stanowiska autora skłaniają zarówno treści obowiązującego porządku prawnego, jak również liczne argumenty natury funkcjonalnej i językowej. W konsekwencji zarysowuje on tezę, iż „przestępstwo” w rozumieniu art. 145 ust. 1 Konstytucji stanowi w istocie nazwę dla szeroko rozumianej odpowiedzialności karnej.
EN
The article discusses the scope of legal responsibility on the part of The President of the Republic of Poland. The lack of precise legal regulations concerning the matter in question leads to the following conclusion: taking into consideration the present prohibitionof implicit immunity the President of the Republic of Poland ought to share the same realm of legal responsibility as do other Polish citizens. Yet, due to the apparent dangers inherent in the execution of the legal responsibility the author proposes for the jurisdiction in question to be under the supervision of the State Tribunal. The author’s argument is founded on the present legal order as well as in numerous functional and language oriented factors. As a consequence, the author claims “the offense” as defined in the 145th article of the Constitution is in reality a general notion for criminal responsibility.
EN
The paper characterizes the evolution of penal policy with respect to per peetrators of transgressions, pursued in Poland by elected agencies attacbed to the state administration and called “transgression boards”. In the years 1972–1989, their decisions were supervised by the Minister of Internal Affairs. Most of the discussion, based on statistical materials, concerns changes in the structure and dynamics of penal measures applied by the boards. The measures have been defined as all legal reactions applicable upon the finding the perpetrator’s guilt. The present paper does not deal with all of those measures, though: for lack of statistical data, tukets imposed by the penal prosecution agencies and the possible reactions on part of those agencies if they renounce moving the case to the board for punishment according to the principle of  expediency of prosecution could not be discussed. Penal policy has been characterized against the background of amendments introduced in the period under analysis and of instructions issued by the Minister of Internal Affairs that shape the boards’ decisions. After 1982, such instructions usually aimed at aggravating repression. The statutory catalogue of penal measures contained in the transgressions code is relatively extensive. The most severe measure is detention which amounts to deprivation of liberty for up to 3 months. As stated in the code, it should be applied in exceptional cases only. In the first decade of validity of the code, detention was imposed in l–l.5 % of all decisions which meant the deprivation of liberty of 9,00–10,000 persons. It is therefore doubtful whether detention was indeed treated as an exceptional measure by practicians. In the next years, it was imposed much less often. The penalty of suspended detention played any role in the practice of transgression boards. As shown by studies, those who applied law  treated suspended detention as a separate penal measure to replace other measures not involving deprivation of liberty rather than a way of limiting the use of immediaste detention. Also disappointed were the  expectations related to another new measure, formally more severe than fine, that is limitation of liberty which was to “educate through work”. According to the legislators’ assumptions, that penalty was to  be the main alternative to detention; in practice, it was imposed rather often  (about 5% of all measures applied) but served mainly as a substitute for fine. The basic measure applied to perpetrators of transgressions was fine, imposed on 90% of cases of those punished by the boards. According to provisions of the Transgressions Code, though, a substitute penalty of detention can be imposed in the case of justified doubts as to the possibility of execution of fine. For this reason, it was found advisable in the present analysis to treat this form of fine as a measure different in quality from fine imposed without a substitute penalty which could in no case lead to imprisonment. Also research findings encouraged the treatment of these two kinds of fine as separate penal measures: the substitute penalty was treated in practice as a specific method of aggravating repression, and imposed in defiance with provisions of the Code. Owing to this approach it could be evidenced that the proportion of fines combined with the threat of deprivation of liberty (another measures designed as exceptional) went up rapidly in mid-1910s to become stabilized at about 20% of all decisions of the  transgression boards. The abuse of that measure, also designed as exceptional, was accompanied mainly by less frequent fines without a substitute penalty. At the same time, the proportion of the two most lenient measures, that is admonition and renouncement of inflicting punishment, went down regularly and amounted to a mere 2% of decisions despite the broad applications of those measures contained in the Code. This reflects the practicians’ tendency to use the aggravating legal solutions much more often than those which mitigate penalty; this led to increased repressiveness of penal policy. Beside the above-mentioned reactions, the Transgressions Code provides for a number of measures called additional penalties which are to accompany the principal ones. They can also be applied as self-standing measures in specific situations. Yet the agencies that apply law never availed themselves of this latter possibility. Instead, additional penalties were lavishly imposed (particularly the witholrawal it driving licence and the penalty of making the sentence publicly known) which led to accumulation of repressions suffered by the punished person. This is why the serious growth in the number of additional penalties, after the legal changes introduced in mid-l980s and instructions issued by the Minister of Internal Affairs in particular, was still another proof of the aggravation of penal policy with respect to perpertrators of transgressions. Characteristically, the Polish Transgressions Code combines the application of some of the non-custodical measures with the threat of deprivation of liberty in the case of failure in the execution of those measures. This concerns the above-mentioned fine but also, in definite conditions, the limitation of liberty and suspended detention. In practice, the threat of imprisonment was used very often, the total proportion of the three above measures becoming stabilized, after an initial growth, at about 20–25% of decisions which mainly resulted from excessive imposition of fines with a substitute penalty of detention. Most importantly, though, that threat was realized with respect to every fifth or sixth person in that group. As a result, the average of 20–25 thousand persons a year were imprisoned despite the fact that a measure not involving deprivation of liberty had originally been applied to them. A paradoxical situation arose where persons sentenced to the principal penalty of detention constituted a small percentage of those imprisoned by force of decisions of the transgression boards, while most served a substitute penalty due to a failure in the execution of the previously applied non-custodial measure. Still another expression of the growing repressiveness of penal policy was the greater and greater involved in the most frequently imposed penalty of fines in both of its forms: due to amendments of the Transgressions Code, the amound of fine went up a quicker pace than the average wages in socialized economy during most of the 1980s. A statutory solution concerning transgression that was most vehemently critized by the doctrine was the most limited judicial supervision over  decisions of the transgression boards. The appel instance were boards of  the second instance; only decisions imposing detention and limitation of liberty could be appealed against to the court. Thus judicial supervision concerned neither the substitute penalties which involved deprivation of liberty nor the most acute ban on driving motor vehicles. Meanwhile as shown by experimental findings, 6–15% of persons punished by the boards were acquitted by the court to which they complained, and a non-isolation measure was  substituted for deprivation of  liberty in over one-third of the cases. This shows that courts saw decisions of the boards not only as essentially defective but also as excessively repressive. This latter conclusion is rather symptomatic the fact considered that penal policy pursued by courts with respect to offenders was sewere, too. What has also to be stressed when characterizing the decisions in cases of transgressions is the frequent use of the statutory possibility of deciding in expedited proceedings and proceedings  by writ of payment. From the viewpoint of rational penal policy, that tendency deserves to be criticized as protection of the defendant’s basic processual guaranties suffers statutory limitation in those modes of procedure, and the speed and simplification of proceedings affect the individualization of punishment. Also of importance was the fact that the frequent decisions in expedited proceedings served as a specific form of aggravation of represion since – as shown by research findings – the penalties imposed in that mode were more severe than in the ordinary proceedings. Analysis of the evolution of decisions of the transgression boards has led to the conclusion that throughout the period under analysis, penal policy was regularly aggravated which was largely influenced by punitive instructions of the Minister of Internal Affairs. The only periods of mitigation of penalties were  the years 1981 and 1989: this resulted mainly from social conflicts and public opinion pressure on reduction of repressiveness of the penal system. For this reason, the 1989 amendment of the Transgression Code, forced by systemic changes, which deprived the Minister of Internal Affairs of his original control over decisions of the transgression boards and submitted all of those decisions to judical review brings the hope for liberalization and rationalization of penal policy in cases of transgressions.
EN
The present article deals with the development of restriction of freedom under the Polish legal system. Its original formulation is presented as well as the changes has undergone, and finally its present form. This penalty was introduced into the Polish legal order by the act passed on 14 May 1969 (Penal Code). Further, it features as a sanction for offences in the Petty Offences Code (20 May 1971) and in the Fiscal Penal Act passed on 26 October 1971 – as a sanction for financial offences. The penalty of restriction of freedom in its current form was enacted on 10 September 1999 (Fiscal Penal Code). The presented article outlines the many distinctions between this kind of sanction under the Fiscal Penal Code and the one under the Criminal Code. Moreover, differences regarding this penalty in relation to soldiers are discussed. New prospects concerning restriction of freedom are presented in the light of planned changes to Penal Code Changes drafted by the Criminal Law Codification Commission on 9 November 2013.
DE
Der Artikel stellt den Verlauf der Diskussion über das Projekt des Strafgesetzbuches der Volksrepublik Polen von 1969 im Kontext des Ordnungswidrigkeitenrechts dar. Es wurden zwei Fragen analysiert. Die erste war der Einfluss des materiellen Elements einer verbotenen Handlung (soziale Gefährlichkeit) auf die Frage der Abgrenzung der Ordnungswidrigkeit vom Verbrechen. Das zweite Problem war die Einstufung des Führens eines Kraftfahrzeugs im Straßenverkehr unter dem Einfluss von Alkohol oder einem anderen Rauschmittel.Die durchgeführten Überlegungen haben gezeigt, dass die Unterscheidung zwischen einer Ordnungswidrigkeit und einem Verbrechen weniger mit theoretischen, als vielmehr mit ideologisch-politischen Problemen zu tun hatte. Denn für den Fall einer geringfügigen Gefährdung der Gesellschaft durch eine verbotene Handlung im Sinne des Strafgesetzbuches war die Möglichkeit einer Haftung vor einer anderen Behörde vorgesehen, darunter für eine Ordnungswidrigkeit. Dieser Mechanismus entsprach dem ideologischen Ansatz des angeblichen Verschwindens - „Aussterbens“ - der Kriminalität im Volksstaat im Zuge der sozialistischen Revolution. Im Gegensatz dazu wurde das Fahren unter Alkohol- oder Rauschmitteleinfluss nur aus Sorge um die Verurteilungsstatistiken als Ordnungswidrigkeit behandelt und nicht wegen seiner geringen Schädlichkeit (Gefährlichkeit).
EN
The article examines the course of the debate on the draft criminal code of the Polish People’s Republic of 1969 in the context of the law on misdemeanors. Two issues have been analyzed. The first is the influence of the material element of the prohibited act (social danger) on the distinction between misdemeanors and crimes. The second is the problem of qualifying the act of driving a motor vehicle in land traffic under the influence of alcohol or other intoxicants. The analysis has shown that the distinction between crime and misdemeanor was associated not so much with theoretical concerns, but primarily with ideological and political ones. In the case of a negligible social danger of a prohibited act in the sense stipulated by the Criminal Code, the legislator provided the possibility of the offender being held liable before another authority, including for a misdemeanor. This mechanism was consistent with the ideological approach to the alleged disappearance - or the “withering away” - of crime in the people’s state as the socialist revolution progressed. On the other hand, the issue of driving a vehicle under the influence of alcohol or another intoxicant was treated as a misdemeanor exclusively due to the need to keep the statistics of convictions down, and not because of this act’s low harmfulness (danger).
PL
W artykule ukazano przebieg dyskusji nad projektem kodeksu karnego PRL z 1969 roku, w kontekście prawa wykroczeń. Analizie zostały poddane dwa zagadnienia. Pierwsze, czyli wpływ materialnego elementu czynu zabronionego (społecznego niebezpieczeństwa) na kwestię rozgraniczenia wykroczeń od przestępstw. Drugie, czyli problem zakwalifikowania prowadzenia pojazdu mechanicznego w ruchu lądowym pod wpływem alkoholu lub innego środka odurzającego. Przeprowadzone rozważania dowiodły, że z rozgraniczeniem przestępstwa od wykroczenia wiązały się nie tyle problemy teoretyczne, co przede wszystkim ideologiczno-polityczne. W przypadku bowiem znikomego społecznego-niebezpieczeństwa czynu zabronionego w rozumieniu kodeksu karnego została przewidziana możliwości poniesienia odpowiedzialności przed innym organem, w tym za wykroczenie. Mechanizm ten był zgodny z ideologicznym podejściem do rzekomego zanikania -„obumierania”- przestępczości w państwie ludowym w miarę postępu rewolucji socjalistycznej. Z kolei, zagadnienie kierowania pojazdem pod wpływem alkoholu lub środka odurzającego, zostało potraktowane jako wykroczenie, tylko i wyłączenie z obawy o statystykę skazań, a nie ze względu na jego niską szkodliwość (niebezpieczeństwo).
PL
Opracowanie ma na celu poddanie analizie działań Inspektora Pracy w trakcie prowadzonej przez niego procedury kontrolnej oraz w trakcie postępowania w sprawach o  wykroczenie przeciwko prawom pracownika. Badania ogniskują wokół założeń zachowania na opisywanych etapach konstytucyjnych zasad postępowania mającego na celu wymierzenie sankcji. Innowacyjność analizy polega na rozciągnięciu jej na działania wykonywane przez Inspektora Pracy określone w ustawie o  Państwowej Inspekcji Pracy. Autor prezentuje podejście zarówno teoretyczne, jak i praktyczne przejawy postępowania zasad zachowania się stron w procesie karnym oraz w procesie o  wykroczenia na płaszczyźnie stricte niekarnistycznej. Udowadnia istnienie tej zależności, jednocześnie podając jej przykłady.
EN
The work is aimed to review the activities of the Inspector of Labour during the course of his inspection procedure and proceedings in cases of oqense against the rights of the employee. Research focuses on labor inspector’s work and rules of criminal procedure during and additional procedural rules occurring at the stage of control. Innovation is the study of rules of criminal procedure on the basis of inspections conducted by the Labour Inspector. The author presents a theoretical and practical approach. The author examines the the manifestations of the behavior of the parties in a criminal trial and in the process of oqenses under strictly not a criminal. Proves the existence of this relationship at the same time giving her examples.
|
2022
|
vol. 16
|
issue 4
57-72
EN
Due to the amendment, which entered into force on January 1, 2022, a number of provisions in Chapter XI of Misdemeanour Code concerning safety and order in communication were significantly changed. The legislator decided to introduce new types of prohibited acts and significantly increased the amount of the fine for certain offenses. These changes are revolutionary, which is also associated with controversy. This is because some of the changes made raise doubts due to the higher degree of their repression, which makes the punishability of certain offenses disproportionate in relation to similar crimes under the Penal Code. This issue will be presented later in the article.
PL
Na mocy nowelizacji, która weszła w życie 1 stycznia 2022 r., w sposób bardzo istotny zmieniono wiele przepisów w rozdziale XI Kodeksu wykroczeń, dotyczącym bezpieczeństwa i porządku w komunikacji. Ustawodawca zdecydował się wprowadzić nowe typy czynówzabronionych oraz w sposób znaczący podwyższyć wysokość grzywny za niektóre wykroczenia.Zmiany te mają wręcz rewolucyjny charakter, co wiąże się także z kontrowersjami. Część bowiem z dokonanych zmian budzi wątpliwości ze względu na wyższy stopień represji tychprzepisów, co czyni karalność niektórych wykroczeń nieproporcjonalną w stosunku do analogicznych przestępstw z Kodeksu karnego. Zagadnienie to zostanie przedstawione w dalszejczęści artykułu.
EN
  The paper describes and appraises the policy of prosecution and punishment in cases of transgressions in the years 1990‒1994, i.e. after the systemic transformations in Poland. It is a continuation of a study of penal policy carried out while the former Code of Transgressions was still in force; the aim now is to draw a comparison between the old and new tendencies in the practice of prosecution and punishment. The comparison, however, encounters specific difficulties. The first reason for this is that a full judicial control over decisions of transgression boards was introduced and the boards were submitted to the Ministry of Justice supervision. The second reason is that the statistical data gathered now by that department are much scantier as compared to those formerly gathered by the Ministry of Internal Affairs while the transgression boards were still subordinated to it. In the seventies, a systematic aggravation of the penal policy took place. Admittedly, that policy was then temporarily mitigated with the birth of Solidarity; yet after the imposition of martial law in 1982, followed by the passing of the 1985 act, penal policy once again grew repressive, this time much more so. Then, at the close of the past decade, as a result of social pressure, penal policy was quite distinctly liberalized. To show the transformations of that policy in the nineties, it has usually been compared to the tendencies found in both a “repressive” year of 1987 and a “liberal” one of 1988. As follows from analysis of the prosecution policy measured by the number of motions for punishment submitted to transgression boards, the number of such motions was greatly reduced in the years 1990-1994 as compared to preceding decades. The fact considered that recorded crime went up distinctly in that period, as probably did also the number of petty infringements of the law – that is, transgressions – this reduction can be interpreted as a limitation of the scope of prosecution with respect to such acts. On the one hand, this resulted from a lowered activity of the police, on the other hand – from the force’s aim towards improving their image in society. A similar trend could be found in the case of police orders the number of which was also reduced. Characteristically, the average fine imposed by police order amounted to not even a half of the statutory upper limit. This notwithstanding, a draft amendment of the code of transgressions was published in the Spring of 1994 which suggested that the limit be raised tenfold; the draft also provided for an identical raise in the upper limit of fine as a main penalty, This solution was sharply criticized by the present author as its actual implanentation would result in a general aggravation of economic repression. The structure of transgressions for which the boards imposed punishment in the nineties underwent a rather significant change: the number of persons brought before the boards for traffic transgressions went up considerably (to about 70%) while that of persons guilty of disturbance of public order went down. This latter trend should be seen as advantageous since the formerly mass-scale prosecution of perpetrators of such acts, most of them alcohol dependent, was generally considered futile. Also liberalized was the structure of penal measures imposed on all perpetrators of transgressions. Admittedly, fine remained the prevalent response (about 95% of decisions); yet the proportion of the strictest measures (arrest and limitation of liberty) went down distinctly, and that of the most lenient ones (reprimand and renouncement of inflicting punishment) went up. The fact considered that the penalty of arrest was limited to the minimum and imposed chiefly on persons guilty of the acts that are to be classified as offenses under the draft of the Penal Code, the proposed preservation of that penalty in the future Code of Transgressions cannot be praised. This same conclusion is also true for conditional suspention the execution of arrest which is nearly a dead institution in practice. As clearly follows from statistical data used in the present analysis, changes in the structure of penal measures imposed reflected a mitigation of penal policy. Instead, no data are gathered as to the severity load of those measures. This situation is bound to provoke criticism, chiefly because of the lack of data on the amounts of fines. Fines being the most frequently imposed measures, their amounts constitute the basic index of punitiveness of the boards’ decisions. The fact considered that the statutory amount of fine was last raised in 1992 while nominal wages showed a regular upwards trend, the conclusion is justified that we in fact dealt with what was perhaps an unintended mitigation of the actual severity of economic repression. As follows from the principles of rational penal policy, the provions legal in force have to be to be amended. Due, however, to pauperization of society, the raise in the maximum statutory fine cannot be as drastic as suggested in the above-mentioned draft amendment of 1994. This might well lead to revival of the once pursued practice of using fines as an instrument of adding to the budget. The statistical data under analysis also provide no information on the imposition of additional penal measures, the sole exception being prohibition of operating motor driven vehicles. All that can be observed is a very serious growth in the proportion of this latter penalty which was due to a mass prosecution of perpetrators of petty traffic offenses. Characteristically, though, the incidence of imposition of this measure on such persons (those additionally guilty of drunken driving included) has been on a regular decrease. Also astonishing is the fact that despite the introduction of judicial review of the boards’ decisions (which had been postulated for many decades by the scientific circles), no statistical data are gathered showing the extent to which penal policy pursued by those boards is actually corrected by courts. Admittedly, it follows from the findings of the solo relevant research project conducted in the nineties that today as in the past, courts usually tend to reduce the penalties imposed by transgression boards (the penalty of prohibition of operating motor driven vehicles in particular). What remains unknown, though, is both the general number of persons who demand that their cases be examined by courts and the actual decisions of those courts. Although penal policy in cases of transgressions grew slightly more severe in 1990‒1994, its present liberalization as compared to the two preceding decades is generally seen as favorable. What probably accounts for this liberalization is the exclusion of transgression boards from under the supervision of Ministry of Internal Affairs and the resulting deprivation of the head of that particular Ministry of the right to issue instructions as to the sentencing policy which invariably increased its punitiveness. Thus an instrument of pressure was abolished which limited the discretion of members of transgression boards. This shows that respect for the independence of those appointed to apply tbe law may result in a reduction of repressiveness even with no legislative changes in the system of penal measures. This is not to say, though, that – still  based on rigorous provisions as it is – the system does not require a possibly prompt amendment.
EN
In the minutes of the meetings of the Public Education Council, referred to as the ‘supreme school authority in the Kingdom of Poland’ of the interuprising period, a lot of space between 1845 and 1850 was devoted to the matters of male secondary school students of the Warsaw Academic District. Among many decisions taken in this regard were also the issues of disciplinary penalties students received at that time. The punished can be divided into two groups. The first group consisted of 42 students, including those who, for patriotic reasons, escaped from schools and went abroad, probably to take part in the 1846 Kraków Uprising and the Spring of Nations afterwards. They were all expelled without the right to resume education. The second group consisted of 33 students who violated school discipline or committed criminal offences. Most often, they were punished with expulsion as well as flogging, a practice allowed by the law of the time. The information contained in the article complements the knowledge about secondary school students in academic circulation.
10
45%
UK
Заборонена дія має бути визначена в певний спосіб. «Кожна особа, яка підлягає кримінальномупровадженню, має право на захист на всіх стадіях провадження. Він може, зокрема, обрати захисника або,на умовах, визначених Законом, використовувати державного захисника» – йдеться в Конституції Респу-бліки Польща у ст. 42 абзац 2. Ця норма має поширюватися і на правове становище обвинуваченого у про-вадженні у справах про проступки. Метою статті є критика спроб надмірного покарання за забороненідії, кваліфіковані як проступки, на підставі друку Сейму № 911, на тлі змін, запропонованих у друку Сейму№ 866, також від 2021 року. Відповідно до ст. 42 абзац 3 Конституції Польщі: «Кожен вважається невин-ним, доки його вину не буде підтверджено остаточним вироком суду». Відповідно до поправки, зазначеноїв сеймових документах № 866 і 911, це правило буде порушено.
RU
   Уголовное правонарушение должно быть определено конкретным образом. «Каждый, против кого ведется уголовное производство, имеет право на защиту на всех стадиях производства. В частности, он может выбрать себе защитника или, в соответствии с принципами, определенными законом, пользоваться услугами защитника, назначенного судом» – гласит Конституция Республики Польша в статье 42, пункт 2. Эту норму следует отнести и к правовому положению обвиняемого в производстве по делам о правонарушениях. Целью данной статьи является критика попытки чрезмерного наказания за преступные деяния, квалифицируемые как правонарушения, на основе Парламентского документа № 911, на фоне изменений, предложенных в Парламентском документе № 866, также датированном 2021 годом. Как указано в статье 42 пункт 3 Конституции Республики Польша: «Каждый считается невиновным, пока его вина не будет подтверждена вступившим в законную силу приговором суда». Согласно изменениям, указанным в Парламентских документах № 866 и 911, это правило будет нарушено.
EN
Prohibited acts must be defined in concrete terms. “Anyone against whom criminal proceedings have been brought shall have the right to defence at all stages of such proceedings. He may, in particular, choose counsel or avail himself – in accordance with principles specified by statute – of counsel appointed by the court” – stipulates Article 42 (2) of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland. This norm should also apply to the legal situation of the accused in proceedings in minor offence cases. The purpose of this article is to criticize attempts to over-penalize the prohibited acts classified as minor offences, based on Sejm (Parliament) Print No. 911, against the background of amendments proposed in Print No. 866, also from the year 2021. Pursuant to Article 42 (3) of the Constitution, “Everyone shall be presumed innocent of a charge until his guilt is determined by the final judgment of a court.” According to the above-described amendment listed in Prints No. 866 and 911, this rule will be violated.
PL
Czyn zabroniony musi być określony w konkretny sposób. „Każdy, przeciw komu prowadzone jest postępowanie karne, ma prawo do obrony we wszystkich stadiach postępowania. Może on w szczególności wybrać obrońcę lub na zasadach określonych w ustawie korzystać z obrońcy z urzędu” – stanowi Konstytucja RP w art. 42 ust. 2. Normę tę należy odnosić również do sytuacji prawnej obwinionego w postępowaniu w sprawach o wykroczenia. Celem artykułu jest krytyka próby nadmiernej penalizacji czynów zabronionych stypizowanych jako wykroczenia, na podstawie druku sejmowego nr 911 z 2021 r., na tle zmian proponowanych w druku sejmowym nr 866, również z 2021 r. Jak stanowi art. 42 ust. 3 Konstytucji RP, „Każdego uważa się za niewinnego, dopóki jego wina nie zostanie stwierdzona prawomocnym wyrokiem sądu”. W myśl nowelizacji wskazanej w drukach sejmowych nr 866 oraz 911 reguła ta będzie złamana.
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
JavaScript is turned off in your web browser. Turn it on to take full advantage of this site, then refresh the page.