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Quel modéle pour penser l'inappropriable?

100%
Guibet Lafaye C.
Humanistyka i Przyrodoznawstwo
|
2016
|
issue 22
7-37
EN
The inappropriable has until now been relegated to the margins of the law. It has been thought of as an accidental property of the legal regime concerning some entities, such as the commons. Nevertheless a positive status can be conferred to it. This paper aims to define this positive status. To this end, we will first identify the requirements for recognizing something as the inappropriable and a status for it. Then, we will consider the models in terms of which the inappropriable can be understood, for example the inalienability and the commons. Finally, we will analyse the conditions for the institutionalization of the inappropriable, including the guarantee of universal usability, the private reservation of utilities and the prohibition of exclusion.
2
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Instytucje i środowisko

84%
Ostrom E.
Zarządzanie Publiczne / Public Governance
|
2012
|
issue 2(20)
83-99
PL
W swoim artykule Elinor Ostrom przedstawia krytyczną analizę wyników wielu badań empirycznych, współczesnej teorii gier i własnych eksperymentów z dziedziny projektowania instytucji w odniesieniu do nadmiernej eksploatacji zasobów wspólnych. Autorka wskazuje na fakt, iż mając możliwość porozumiewania się, eksperymentowania i modyfikacji reguł instytucjonalnych, ludzie wypracowują różnorodne − niekoniecznie rynkowe − rozwiązania prowadzące do zrównoważonego zarządzania dobrami wspólnymi, do których rzekomo ma zastosowanie pojęcie "tragedii wspólnego pastwiska".
EN
In her article, Elinor Ostrom offers a critical account of a number of empirical studies, game-theoretic analyses and her own experiments in institutional design as applicable to the issue of overexploitation of common-pool resources. She argues that, given people's ability to communicate, experiment and modify institutional rules, they can develop various − not necessarily market-based − solutions with a view to achieving sustainable management of such resources to which the concept of the tragedy of the commons supposedly applies.
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