At each introduction of a new edition of psychiatric classifications, a vivid debate resurfaces and concerns their very validity: should classifications be based on etiology or should they be descriptive, based on observation, and not on some or other theories of etiopathogenesis? I shift the attention to the philosophical aspect of the debate. Psychiatric classifications employ (and have always employed) taxonomic methodology but in fact are not (and never were) based on biological mechanisms leading to mental disorders. Therefore I tried to catch the moment where certain observable features, recognized as symptoms, begins to be perceived as an ontologically independent entities and we start to think that nosological units must have a specific cause (e.g. a neuropathogenesis), which is simply reflected in the diagnostic picture. I tried to catch the moment, when by naming, classifying and diagnosing, we, in a sense, create objects. Then I show how from there we can slide into objectification: we can stop to see a person and start to an illness.
The Evolutionary Developmental Biology (in abbreviation Evo-Devo) gains in popularity among psychologists. It would be a “synthesis of development and evolution” which would finally allow a rapprochement of psychology and biology. The Evo-Devo redefines epigenetics and opposes it to the (alleged) genetic determinism, genetic reductionism and preformationism of the Modern Synthesis (MS), proposes the concept of the extended inheritance and a mechanism of inheritance of acquired characters, which are claimed to be (neo-) Lamarckian, fuses the three questions separated by the MS: the origin of variation, fate of variation and inheritance of variation. These points of the Evo-Devo’s programme particularly resonate with psychologists’ expectations: genes alone do not explain the question of transgenerationality, the ontogeny of the attachment, e.g. early experience with caregivers (e.g. separation and loss) have a long-term effects on adult development can span a person’s lifetime, can even span generations. However, in the paper I show that the inheritance of acquired characters is indeed impossible, that Lamarck never proposed a theory of the inheritance of acquired characters and that it is a confusion rather than fusion to link the question of the origin of variation, the question of development and the one of inheritance. If the Evo-Devo is so appealing to psychologists, it is not because there is “a new biology for psychology.” I show that psychologists’ attitude towards monism was ambivalent and such was the relationship between psychology and biology. The paper is a standpoint of a philosopher of biology interested in psychology.
Evolutionary Developmental Biology (Evo-Devo) is becoming to be popular in psychology, and by certain is even seen as a new biology for psychology (Hofer 2014). In particular, it is about the concept of extended inheritance This concept claims to be (neo-) Lamarckian. According to it inherited is everything that contributes to resemblance across generations and that strongly affects the fitness of the offspring-starting by nuclear genes, by genes expression, maternal care, ecological niche, cultural niche, language, etc. In this paper I analyse the potential of the concept of extended inheritance on the example of transgenerational transmission of attachment style and mentalizing capacity. I present the neuroendocrine mechanism of transmission. Then I show that a) DNA methylation is complementary to neuroendocrine mechanism, but it does not revolutionize the latter as it is claimed; b) the concept of extended inheritance confounds the three questions rightly separated by Neo-Darwinism: origin of variation, fate of variation and inheritance, c) although the motivation of Evo-Devo goes against the alleged genetic determinism of neodarwinism, the concept of transgeneration inheritance is determinist (although it is an epigenetic determinism).
PL
Ewolucyjna biologia rozwojowa (evo-devo) zaczyna być popularna wśród psychologów, a przez niektórych jest widziana jako „nowa biologia dla psychologii” (Hofer 2014). W szczególności chodzi o koncepcję rozszerzonej dziedziczności (Extended Inheritance), którą się uważa za (neo-)lamarkowską, i zgodnie z którą dziedziczone jest wszystko to, co przyczynia się do utrzymania podobieństwa na przestrzeni pokoleń i do fitness potomstwa – od genów jądrowych, przez ekspresję genów, matczyną opiekę, aż po niszę ekologiczną, kulturową, językową, etc. W artykule analizuję potencjał koncepcji rozszerzonej dziedziczności, biorąc za przykład międzypokoleniowy przekaz stylu przywiązania i zdolności do mentalizowania. Przedstawiam opis mechanizmu neuroendokrynnego tego przekazu. Pokazuję następnie, że a) zjawisko metylacji DNA jest komplementarne w stosunku do mechanizmu neuroendokrynnego, ale nie rewolucyjne, tak jak to zapowiada; b) pojęcie rozszerzonego dziedziczenia miesza trzy kwestie zasadnie rozdzielone przez neodarwinizm: pochodzenia zmienności, losu zmienności i dziedziczenia; c) choć motywacją evo-devo jest sprzeciw wobec rzekomego determinizmu genetycznego neodarwinizmu, to pojęcie transgeneracyjnego dziedziczenia jest deterministyczne (choć to determinizm epigenetyczny).
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