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1

Fizyk ocenia Oświecenie francuskie

100%

Czerniawski J.

Diametros

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2012

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issue 32

236-240

PL

Profesor Andrzej Staruszkiewicz wykorzystał swój artykuł o Newtonie w czasopiśmie dla nauczycieli fizyki do przeprowadzenia bezpardonowej krytyki francuskiego Oświecenia. Dla uzasadnienia surowej oceny kwalifikacji intelektualnych przedstawicieli tego nurtu, zwłaszcza Woltera, powołał się na opinię zagorzałego monarchisty Gaxotte’a. Przedstawił też naciąganą in-terpretację dwóch cytatów z książki Woltera o Newtonie jako rzekomy dowód braku zrozumienia przez niego fizycznych treści „Principiów”. Te i inne treści artykułu wydają się uzasadniać podej-rzenie jego autora o intencję zdyskontowania autorytetu z dziedziny fizyki dla narzucenia niespe-cjalistycznym czytelnikom swoich filozoficznych antypatii.

EN

Professor Andrzej Staruszkiewicz has taken his article on Newton in a journal for physics teachers as an opportunity for merciless criticism of French Enlightenment. In order to justify his low appraisal of intellectual qualifications of the representatives of this philosophical movement, especially of Voltaire, he quotes the opinion of the ardent monarchist Gaxotte. He also takes strained interpretations of two quotations from Voltaire’s book on Newton as a proof of his lack of understanding of physical contents of „Principia”. These and other contents of the article seem to justify the suspicion of its author of the intention to discount his authority from theoretical physics for imposing on non-specialist readers his own philosophical antipathies.

2

„Czarnoskrzynkowy” model eksperymentu EPR-B

100%

Czerniawski J.

Filozofia i Nauka

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2023

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vol. 11

113-131

PL

Zgodnie z twierdzeniem Bella, żaden model lokalny i realistyczny nie odtworzy wszystkich przewidywań mechaniki kwantowej dla eksperymentu EPR-B. Każdy taki model musiałby przewidzieć zarazem doskonałą korelację i złamanie nierówności CHSH, lecz to wydaje się niemożliwe, gdyż aby dostarczyć pierwszego z tych przewidywań, musiałby być deterministyczny, podczas gdy to wydawałoby się uniemożliwiać drugie. Przedstawiony zostanie model eksperymentu EPR-B, w którym spodziewane jest uniknięcie tej pozornej sprzeczności dzięki deterministycznie chaotycznemu mechanizmowi leżącemu u podstaw pomiarów. Model jest w fazie modelu „czarnoskrzynkowego”, gdyż nie został jeszcze sprecyzowany ten mechanizm, lecz jedynie odpowiadająca mu funkcja odpowiedzi.

3

Idealism and the nature of intentional relation

100%

Czerniawski J.

Filozofia Nauki

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1998

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vol. 6

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issue 2

23-33

PL

If metaphysical realism could be equated with epistemological realism and the latter with representationism, then impossibility of representationism would imply impossibility of both realisms. However, at least the second identification is illegitimate, since a presentationist realism is possible. Its alleged impossibility results from misconceiving the intentional relation as consisting in creating the intentional correlate of mental act. In fact, such act, at least in the case of non-divine subject, never creates its intentional object, but only ascribes various properties - and sometimes real existence or non-existence - to it. Even in the case of literary fiction there is no genuine creation of invented characters, since the author is unable of making them existing. If the intentional object exists, then some of its actual properties may differ from the ones ascribed to it. The above solution makes possible to relate our cognitive acts directly to the reality «in itself» and not to its phenomenal «representation» in Kantian style.

4

Reality of Relativistic Effects

100%

Czerniawski J.

Filozofia Nauki

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1996

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vol. 4

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issue 4

19-21

PL

This is a defence of some kind of reality of relativistic effects, against the thesis that they are mere kinematic appearances or deceptions.

5

A New Formalization of Putnam's Proof that Time Does Not Flow

100%

Czerniawski J.

Filozofia Nauki

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2014

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vol. 22

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issue 1

45-57

PL

Virtually all known attempts to formalize, at least partially, Putnam's two-stage proof contained in his famous article Time and Physical Geometry, follow Stein's advice to interpret the relation R as ”x is real to y”. However, Putnam has explicitly rejected this interpretation, stating that it ”misses the issue” he was addressing. The present attempt to formalize the proof regards reality as an absolute property, in accord with Putnam's intention. The formalization reveals both the strength and the weak point of his reasoning. On the one hand, it shows that the popular assumption that ”all and only things that exist now are real” is incompatible with Special Relativity in its standard interpretation. What is more, its weaker version "all things that exist now are real" implies that future things must be real, which clearly contradicts the popular belief in time flow, i.e. in successive becoming of events. Effectiveness of the proof does not depend on the original choice of simultaneity-in-the-observer's-coordinate-system as R. What is more, its transitivity is not demanded, and after some reasonable strengthening of one of the assumptions, not even symmetry. Without this strengthening, it is still proved that Relativity is incompatible with the presentist conception of time flow and compatible at most with its Growing Block Universe version. Even taking into account the local character of Special Relativity does not help, since the formalization can be easily generalized to hold in the framework of General Relativity. On the other hand, the popular view is compatible with Relativity in the Lorentzian interpretation. Thus, what Putnam has really proved is not incompatibility of time flow with Relativity as such, but only with its standard interpretation.

6

Analytical Philosophy and the Phenomenological Method

100%

Czerniawski J.

Filozofia Nauki

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2000

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vol. 8

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issue 3-4

133-138

PL

This paper is a reply to Jan Wolenski's polemics (Filozofia Nauki 1/2000) against the author's essay „On the Epistemic Impotence of Analytical Philosophy” (Filozofia Nauki 3-4/1998). The author expresses his conviction that it is in analytical philosophy that the most interesting - and at the same time well-established - cognitive results have been reached, but many of these results have been obtained, not thanks to the declared semantic method, but thanks to the phenomenological method, which have been used at least unconsciously. Therefore the gap between phenomenology and analytical philosophy is not so huge as it might seem at first glance.

7

Negative Consequences of the Quantum-Relativistic Breakthrough in the Philosophy of Nature

100%

Czerniawski J.

Filozofia Nauki

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1996

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vol. 4

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issue 2

17-22

PL

The quantum-relativistic breakthrough in physics has radically changed the scientific worldview. Several basic intuitions, which underlie traditional philosophy of nature, has been abandoned. As a result of this fact, scientists started to pronounce themselves as the highest authority in the philosophy of nature, leaving for the philosophers only the role of commentators. However, it is not physical theories, but their certain interpretations, or disinterpretations, which contradict common intuitions. In the case of relativistic theory, there is an alternative interpretation which allows us to reconcile its content with pre-relativistic intuitions. Therefore it suggest that we should be critical also to other alleged consequences of the „new physics”.

8

Theory of Relativity and the Passage of Time

100%

Czerniawski J.

Filozofia Nauki

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1994

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vol. 2

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issue 1

95-100

PL

The author proposes a formalization of Hilary Putnam's proof of the thesis that time does not pass. This enables one to eliminate difficulties connected with the original formulation.

9

On Epistemic Infirmity of Analytic Philosophy

63%

Czerniawski J.

Filozofia Nauki

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1998

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vol. 6

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issue 3-4

149-150

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Fizyk ocenia Oświecenie francuskie

„Czarnoskrzynkowy” model eksperymentu EPR-B

Idealism and the nature of intentional relation

Reality of Relativistic Effects

A New Formalization of Putnam's Proof that Time Does Not Flow

Analytical Philosophy and the Phenomenological Method

Negative Consequences of the Quantum-Relativistic Breakthrough in the Philosophy of Nature

Theory of Relativity and the Passage of Time

On Epistemic Infirmity of Analytic Philosophy