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DE
The relationship between Hegel’s conception of Sittlichkeit and Kant’s moral philosophy is much-discussed, highly controversial and accompanied by many misunderstandings. Relating it to Kant’s philosophy, this article shows that and how Hegel’s elaborations on Sittlichkeit can be understood as an attempt to comprehend the actuality of freedom in the human world. By contrast, the formalism of a Kantian approach of moral philosophy hinders it willy-nilly to comprehend the actuality, hence, the ‘fact’ of freedom properly. Hegel’s Sittlichkeit is a conception of the facticity of freedom. Kant’s conception of Sittlichkeit presupposes such a conception.
EN
Hegel criticizes the mode of reflection that is typical of the transcendental philosophy of his age. The present article explores the relevance of Hegel’s criticism with regard to contemporary transcendental philosophy, in particular that of Werner Flach. Christian Krijnen shows that, despite substantial modifications of Kant’s conception of transcendental philosophy, not least inspired by Hegel, contemporary transcendental philosophy absolutizes the logic of essence. More precisely, from the perspective of its mode of reflection, contemporary transcendental philosophy basically is an absolutized form of external reflection.
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