The article deals with a Jerzy Perzanowski's question about the semantic status of metaphysical expressions. Perzanowski suggests that metaphysics very often starts with serious substantial problems but ends with considerations that refer only to conceptual and logical properties of language. The Author of the article tries to diagnose that situation by putting forward the thesis about difficulties with propositional status of metaphysics (a way metaphysical expressions are understood). The common argument says that if propositionality of metaphysical expressions is defined in terms of a theory of meaning (as it is widely accepted), the only way of saving metaphysics is to settle it up at the metapropositional level that eventually appears to give a deflationary disciplin that eventually comes up with verbal disputes and delivers trivial statements. In addition to that the Author sketches an alternative picture that consists in a belief that problems with propositionality of metaphysical expressions may also motivate to step back from the propostional level appraching so-called prepropositional level. Both metapropositionality and prepropositionality as key features of contemporary analytic and continental metaphysics appear to be ways of overcoming the essential problem with propositionality of metaphysical expressions.
The crisis of metaphysics has many roots. One of them is recognized to be a kind of semantic failure. It lies in the fact that the meaning and reference of metaphysical propositions as well as metaphysical terms seems to be problematic. This diagnosis was first established by I. Kant and then repeated by some of the XXth century philosophers. In this paper I will show what role is played by what I called the Requirement of Reference (RR) in the analysis of the metaphysical discourse. I will argue that the RR draws the limitations for the conceptual and propositional schemata of metaphysics and, at the same time, prevents metaphysics from making de re assertions and utterances. I shall also examine in this light some of Ludwig Wittgenstein's theses from Tractatus and Philosophical Investigations in order to argue that two sorts of metaphysical considerations are possible despite of the above-mentioned criticism. One of them is the analysis of what might be shown but cannot be expressed in language. The other is the deep analysis of the conceptual schemata that constitute the foundations of human thought.
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