The aim of this paper is to bring the resources of virtue epistemology to bear on the issue of the epistemic objectivity of science. A distinction is made between theoretical virtues, which may be possessed by scientific theories, and epistemic virtues, which may be exercised by individual scientists. A distinction is then made between ontological objectivity, objectivity of truth, and epistemic objectivity, the last being the principal focus of the paper. It is then noted that a role must be played by deliberative judgement in determining how to apply the theoretical virtues. It is suggested that such judgement may be virtuous in light of the exercise of the epistemic virtues. It is argued that the primary location of epistemic objectivity is the theoretical virtues, whereas the epistemic virtues of scientists play a subordinate role.
Truth about matters of fact is objective. This is not just because truth is objective. It is also because facts are objective. An objective fact makes an assertion of that fact true. The objectivity of the fact adds a further element of objectivity to the objective truth of the assertion. True assertions of fact are true because truth is objective and because the facts that make them true are objective. True assertions of fact are objective twice over. Their objectivity is twofold. Or, at least, that is the point I seek to establish here.
JavaScript is turned off in your web browser. Turn it on to take full advantage of this site, then refresh the page.