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Kwartalnik Historyczny
|
2023
|
vol. 130
|
issue 3
493-528
EN
The picture of Poland and Poles painted by the hand of Georg Forster, botanist and traveller staying in Vilnius between 1784 and 1787, has been covered with a thick layer of varnish by successive generations of historians. It decayed, darkened, and lost its transparency, making it impossible to see the details of the composition. The author tries to pull back this veil by analysing Forster’s correspondence from his stay in the Commonwealth against the broad background of the late eighteenth-century literary phenomena. He also undertakes a polemic against the myth of Forster as an objective observer and cosmopolitan.
PL
Obraz Polski i Polaków malowany ręką Georga Forstera, botanika i podróżnika, bawiącego w latach 1784–1787 w Wilnie, kolejne pokolenia historyków pokryły grubą warstwą werniksu. Zżółkł on, ściemniał i stracił przezroczystość, nie pozwalając dostrzec detali kompozycji. Analizując Forsteriańską korespondencję z okresu pobytu w Rzeczypospolitej na szerokim tle literackich zjawisk końca XVIII w., autor stara się tę zasłonę odsunąć. Podejmuje także polemikę z mitem Forstera jako obiektywnego obserwatora i kosmopolity.
PL
When in 1719 Augustus II of Poland made an attempt to emancipate himself from the influence of the Russian emperor, the latter entered into alliance with the Prussian king, with the intent of preventing emancipation of the monarch and his country. The alliance concluded by Tsar Peter the Great with King Frederick William I of Prussia expressed the substantial interests of both monarchies. It was all about keeping watchful oversight of political and military weakness of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and rendering the country isolated in the international arena. The programme established by Petersburg and Berlin remained valid until the end of the eighteenth century and the final, third, partition of Poland. The monarchs guaranteed that they would do everything possible to prevent the Polish constitutional system from altering (keeping the king’s rights restrained against the liberties maintained – primarily the liberum veto and free election of monarch), and treasury and military reforms from implementing. The preponderance over the Commonwealth implied the participation of Russia in what is termed the concert of the European powers. For the country of the Hohenzollerns, the debilitation of the nobility-based republic was, in turn, an opportunity for increasing the its territory, which had been policy energetically pursued since the Great Elector Frederick William’s reign (1640–88). For these reasons, the whole series of Russo-Prussian alliance treaties (1726, 1729, 1740, 1743, 1764, 1769, and 1772) comprised provisions regarding Polish affairs. The range of the issues covered by these bipartite agreements was ever-broadening, extending to the dissenters’ affair, among other things. Other reasons stood behind the inclusion of clauses related to the Commonwealth in Russian-Austrian treaties. Of substantial importance was the antagonism prevalent in the Reich between Austria and Prussia, which from 1740 onwards turned into acrimonious hostility. The Viennese Burg, which solicited favour from Petersburg, endeavoured to persuade its Russian ally that it was ready and willing to replace the Prussian partner in Poland-related matters of importance to Russia (cf. the treaties of 1726, 1730, 1733, 1746). Discussed is also a never-ratified tripartite agreement of 1732 – the so-called Löwenwolde’s treaty – which was momentous for the designs of the contracting parties, as well as the partition treaties of 1772.
Zapiski Historyczne
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2022
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vol. 87
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issue 3
69-100
EN
In the early 1780s, the St. Petersburg court decided to establish a new Russian diplomatic post in Frankfurt am Main; the mission in the German Reich was entrusted to a young diplomat, Nikolai P. Rumyantsev. Attempts to clarify the purpose of establishing a new legation have been made since mid-nineteenth century. Prussian historians wanted to see it as an instrument of support for the Berlin court, Austrian authors, on the other hand, the Viennese Burg. According to Russian historiography, on the other hand, the establishment of a diplomatic post in Frankfurt was to manifest the achievement of a significant position in the Reich by the St. Petersburg court. These judgements were pronounced without considering the primary source: the instructions received by the minister. The article is based precisely on that Russian diplomatic correspondence stored at the Foreign Policy Archive of Imperial Russia in Moscow. An analysis of the instructions sent to Rumyantsev proves that Russian plans for expansion in the Holy Roman Empire, to gain supremacy over the “Third Germany” i.e. the lesser and middle states of the Reich, were but political wishful thinking. The Russian domination in the empire, especially over the lesser states of the Reich, was completely unattainable for the empress. The expansion model tried in Courland, Poland and Sweden did not work in Germany.
PL
Austrian Efforts for Achieving an Extradition Agreement with the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. 1786–1787The author discussed efforts pursued in 1786–1787 by the Viennese court and aimed at signing an extradition convention with the Commonwealth. Ostensibly, the object of the convention involved principles regulating the capture of criminals and army deserters. Actually, the Austrian side was concerned predominantly with the second part of the convention dealing with deserters and the unconstrained right of the Austrian troops to enter the territory of the Commonwealth in order to seek defectors.Sources serving as the foundation of the text include Austrian and Polish diplomatic correspondence, attached notes and other associated material. The author also used protocols of the Permanent Council and the latter’s Department of Foreign Interests as well as letters written by King Stanisław Augustus to Debole, the Polish minister in St. Petersburg and the monarch’s confidant.The negotiations conducted from April 1786 secretly and then openly by Primate Michał Poniatowski and Secretary of the Department of Foreign Interests Antoni Dzieduszycki ended in failure for the Austrians. In February 1787 the Permanent Council rejected the project prepared in Vienna and permitting incursions of Austrian soldiers into Polish territory. The Commonwealth did not intend to consent to such a restriction of sovereignty, this time for the sake of its southern neighbour. Equally important was the stand represented by Russia, which was uninterested in the presence of the Austrian army on Polish state territory, which it treated as a terrain of its exclusive impact.
EN
Devoted to the notion of religious war in French, German, and English historiography and journalism of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, Christian Mühling’s study stimulates reflection on the content, methods, and effectiveness of a pen war of words in the modern era. It also encourages thinking about the role of areas outside the Old Continent’s dominant political and cultural centres in journalistic discussion and their influence on the formation of European public opinion. Finally, it provokes questions about the possibilities and limitations of using full-text databases in historical research.
PL
Poświęcona pojęciu wojny religijnej we francuskim, niemieckim i angielskim dziejopisarstwie oraz publicystyce przełomu XVII i XVIII w. rozprawa Christiana Mühlinga pobudza do refleksji nad treścią, metodami i skutecznością prowadzonej w epoce nowożytnej walki na pióra. Zachęca również do zastanowienia się nad rolą obszarów położonych poza dominującymi ośrodkami politycznymi i kulturalnymi Starego Kontynentu w dyskusji publicystycznej oraz ich wpływem na formowanie europejskiej opinii publicznej. Prowokuje wreszcie do postawienia pytania o możliwości i ograniczenia związane z korzystaniem z pełnotekstowych baz danych w badaniach historycznych.
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