In this paper, the empirical and theoretical contributions of an attribution approach to emotion and motivation are reviewed. It is contended that reported empirical findings regarding when causal search is initiated, the perceived causes of events, the three underlying properties of causes (locus, stability, and control), and the relations between these properties and emotion and expectancy are definitively replicable. In addition, these data provide the foundation for both interpersonal (e.g., help-giving) and intrapersonal (e.g., achievement strivings) theories of motivation. Hence, attribution theory has left a theoretical foundation and a supporting array of data. In addition, the theory sheds light on some weaknesses of other approaches to motivation, which err in their understanding of phenomenal causality. The characterization of attribution theory as naïve or “grandmother” psychology is discussed and it is contended that a distinction must be made between its empirical versus conceptual features.
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