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Vzestup a pád rudého jezdectva v ruské občanské válce, 1918‒1920. Případ 1. jízdní armády

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Litera B.
Moderní dějiny: sborník k dějinám 19. a 20. století (Modern History: Studies into 19th and 20th century history)
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2014
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vol. 22
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issue 2
71-88
EN
Between 1918 and 1920, the 1st Cavalry Army, a formation of the Red Army, reflected the way in which the peasant world had been transformed and deformed by the civil war. The army itself drafted or rather forcibly conscripted young men, its members chose their own lower-rank commanders, and it ensured its own supplies, arms and equipment. It didn’t originate from the initiative of either the military or the political authorities in Moscow, but rather it evolved from „below“, more precisely from partisan divisions. Formed mainly by peasants, these divisions arose out of local conditions and resources, and aimed at defending the people from the „whites“. The crisis of the 1st Cavalry Army, the elite unit of the Red Army, was a sign that the Bolshevik regime was to about to face new trends: the disintegration of its power base, without which it could never have won the civil war, but which now threatened to destroy it, i.e. the unrest and rebellion of Red Army units which had begun to fall apart. The Red Army soldiers were mostly peasants, who tired, disillusioned and hungry, were rife to start a rebellion. Furthermore, the country was afflicted by widespread famines and there were outbreaks of several larger and minor uprisings in the countryside. The only solution was to effectuate a fundamental change in the overall state political system: the transition from the politics of War Communism to the New Economic Policy.
2
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Rudá armáda a problém loajality za občanské války v Rusku

100%
Litera B.
Moderní dějiny: sborník k dějinám 19. a 20. století (Modern History: Studies into 19th and 20th century history)
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2011
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vol. 19
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issue 2
45-70
EN
A specific feature of the civil war in Russia in the years 1917-1920 consisted in the fact that the original loyalties had disappeared. The Tsar had officially abdicated and the Russian population, primarily soldiers, was relieved of the official commitments to him as Commander in Chief. The new Provisional Government was rapidly losing its initial legitimacy, which was not only due to the existence of two parallel governments where the power of Soviets was steadily increasing, but also owing to a number of its own actions that nobody could sanction. The main reason, however, was the step taken by the government that absolutely ignored the prevailing opinion of soldiers and common people. While the overwhelming majority of soldiers, due to the huge losses at war, insufficient supply and total indifference to their fate, were requiring peace, the Provisional Government ordered an offensive against the Central Powers' armies in summer 1917. The rapid decline of the Provisional Government regime was proved by the total failure of the attack that was intended to support Russia's Entente Allies, by the conflicts existing within the Government camp, and also by the fact that at the moment of the Bolshevist revolution the Provisional Government had only some small and unreliable military units for its defense. The paradigm of loyalty during the Russian civil war exhibited an infinite variety of aspects and motives, but it was quite often reduced under the circumstances down to the basic problem of self-preservation, particularly in the case of people who failed to have strong ideological and political motivation. In extreme cases the decision was reduced to a mere choice between loyalty and physical destruction. In the wide range of other alternatives the attitudes and loyalty of men were determined by the particular situation and motives, the most important of which was probably the wish to survive. Nevertheless, we should be aware of the fact that the Bolshevists made very cleverly use of the fact that they came to power without any relation to the governing classes of population (in fact their program was aimed against them) and as representatives of the poorest people. This made it possible for them to take measures intended to stimulate the loyalty of population. In the army, the 'honey and whip' method was applied in graded way in order to ensure or extort the loyalty of Red Army officers and soldiers.
3
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Soupeření centra a regionů ve stalinském Sovětském svazu od počátku 30. let do konce „velkého teroru“ v roce 1938

100%
Litera B.
Moderní dějiny: sborník k dějinám 19. a 20. století (Modern History: Studies into 19th and 20th century history)
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2013
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vol. 21
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issue 1
123-145
EN
The history of relations between the center and the particular regions during one of the vital periods following the first Five-Year-Plan (1932) until the end of the “great terror” late in 1938 is discussed. It was a short period of certain stabilization after the preceding chaos produced by the Stalinist transformation of the country in the early 1930s until the end of unprecedented terror of 1937–1938. Much attention is paid to the key moments in the center-vs.-regions relations and the author shows that the regional officials were always able to resist the centralization policy of Moscow by applying a variety of strategies and procedures. This changed with the launch of “great terror” in 1937–38 and the regions with their officials mostly turned to willing executors of the orders coming from Moscow. The terror also aimed at the existing regional officials at all levels, who were replaced by a new generation, fully dependent on Stalin. The regime also started using terror as one of the main tools of controlling the state and society.
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