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1

O fenomenologii konstytucji przestrzeni

100%
Płotka W.
Kwartalnik Filozoficzny
|
2014
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vol. 42
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issue 3
187-202
EN
The article reconstructs main topics presented by Husserl in his “D 17” research manuscript entitled Foundational Investigations of the Phenomenological Origin of the Spatiality of Nature. The author claims that in the “D 17” manuscript Husserl introduces a non-idealistic concept of constitution, i.e., he understands constitution as a correlation of the ground (Boden), living body, and a perceived object. A phenomenological analysis of the phenomenon of the ground, however, leads to generative phenomenology which introduces intersubjectivity and history into the process of constitution.
2

Andrzej Półtawski o fenomenologii asubiektywnej Jana Patočki: analiza krytyczna i próba zestawienia

100%
Płotka W.
Kwartalnik Filozoficzny
|
2020
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vol. 48
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issue 1-2
51-68
EN
The article examines Półtawski’s reading of Patočka’s concept of asubjective phenomenology as presented in § 24 of the 1973 book Świat, spostrzeżenie, świadomość [The World, Perception, Consciousness]. The author discusses the main points of Patočka’s philosophy, especially his views on Husserl. For Patočka, phenomenology consists in a systematic analysis of whatever presents itself in experience. The method which problematizes the manifestation of phenomena is epoché. But the theory of transcendental reduction reduces phenomena to mere subjective appearances. For this reason, phenomenology should be pursued as an “a-subjective” project. Półtawski claims that Patočka is right in criticizing Husserl for falling into Cartesianism, but that he fails in defining the “phenomenal sphere” as the main subject matter of phenomenology. Półtawski holds that Patočka in fact continues the dogmatic motif of Husserl’ phenomenology and, moreover, that he reduces phenomena to their subjective being. The author analyzes Półtawski’s reading and claims that it has some limitations, including a misinterpretation of Patočka’s epoché, or the emphasis put on metaphysical claims of phenomenology.
3

Problem praxis w fenomenologii transcendentalnej

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Płotka W.
Kwartalnik Filozoficzny
|
2013
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vol. 41
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issue 2
25 - 47
EN
The main problem of the article is the possibility of a phenomenology of praxis. The article argues that it is necessary to pose two more questions: what is human action, and how should one act? The first question can be answered within a descriptive-eidetic framework, both from a noetic and a noematic point of view. The second question requires an investigation in pure ethics and in formal axiology. Nonetheless, as the author shows, the two ethical projects need to be replaced by an ethics of love.
4

O wyobrażaniu sobie, fikcji i przedmiotach wyobrażonych: przyczynek do fenomenologii wyobraźni (Husserl, Ingarden, Blaustein)

100%
Płotka W.
Kwartalnik Filozoficzny
|
2017
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vol. 45
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issue 1
31-52
EN
The article attempts to investigate the essence of imagination by questioning the status of imagined objects. The author refers to Husserl’s concept of imagination as a form of consciousness that functions by presenting its object as imagined, i.e., as absent. Although Husserl formulated at least two theories of non-existent objects, his descriptions of imagination – states the author – are only partial, since he did not describe the noematical aspect of consciousness. In this context, Ingarden’s ontology provides useful tools for describing the imagined object as a purely intentional object. The author claims that Ingarden’s analysis of fiction can serve to supplement Husserl’s phenomenology of imagination. In this context, Blaustein seems to bind both perspectives – noetic and noematic – by indicating a transcendent content as a necessary element of any act of imagining. On this basis, the author defines the conditions of identity for imagined objects.
5
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Epistemiczna funkcja habitualności: elementy fenomenologii poznania zawodnego

100%
Płotka W., Gdański U.
Internetowy Magazyn Filozoficzny Hybris
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2015
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vol. 31 (4)
PL
Numer został przygotowany przy wsparciu Ministerstwa Nauki i Szkolnictwa Wyższego (1222/P-DUN/2015).
EN
The article analyses the phenomenon of fallible knowledge as knowledge constituted in inadequate way of givenness. The key concept in this context is habituality, i.e., passive structure of consciousness that co-constitutes the object of cognition. It is argued that habitual moment of consciousness contextualizes cognition of unknown objects by presenting them as typical for a subject in a certain cognitive relation. One can describe this phenomenon by referring to the broad notion of horizon. As the author claims, phenomenology of fallible knowledge presents human cognition as defined by horizons, so as essentially “open.” The descriptions enables one to understand phenomena of cognitive situatedness of a subject and of embodied exploration of the world by the lived body.
6

Analiza struktury i geneza egzystencji: dwie postacie metody fenomenologicznej

100%
Płotka W.
Kwartalnik Filozoficzny
|
2012
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vol. 40
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issue 3
23 - 41
EN
The article argues that the static and genetic phenomenological methods are complementary rather than opposed. In claiming this, it challenges Jacques Derrida’s interpretation of Edmund Husserl’s philosophy. It is claimed that a proper understanding of the two methods must take into consideration Husserl’s B III 10 manuscript. Using the manuscript the author reconstructs the object, limits, and character of both methods of inquiry. Then it is argued that one is able to use the genetic method to investigate human existence. Indeed, Husserl studies the topic of existence in the E III 6 manuscript and in the Crisis.
7

Introduction. A Topography of Heresies or the Road to Renewal? Many Faces of Contemporary Phenomenology

100%
Płotka W.
Dialogue and Universalism
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2015
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issue 3
7-8
EN
This issue of Dialogue and Universalism presents a collection of essays on the topic: A TOPOGRAPHY OF HERESIES OR THE ROAD TO RENE-WAL? MANY FACES OF CONTEMPORARY PHENOMENOLOGY. By posing the question and suggesting an answer we propose to investigate the problem of the plurality or unity of the contemporary phenomenological move-ment. The main idea of this Dialogue and Universalism issue originates with a recognition of the paradox that today the many applications of phenomenolo-gy—from the classical theory of knowledge and metaphysical inquiry to increasingly popular studies in cognitive science, philosophy of mind, and her-meneutics, as well as, beyond philosophy, to mathematics, architecture, and medicine—represent diverse conceptions of how to do phenomenology, even as some of these conceptions transcend the limits of phenomenology as demarcat-ed by its founder Edmund Husserl. Already Paul Ricoeur claimed that, “for a good part,” one has to understand the history of the phenomenological movement as “the history of Husserlian heresies.” In light of his observation, more than one hundred years after the publication of the Ideas I, this issue of Dialogue and Universalism reposes the perennial questions about the contemporary significance of phenomenology. What is the most important heritage of Husserl’s phenomenology for contempo-rary philosophy? Does phenomenology today present a consistent and unified philosophy? Or does it rather represent a vast mosaic, inviting but confusing? Is it a kind of philosophical Olympics of different, heteronymous “games” orga-nized internationally but by national federations? Should we understand con-temporary phenomenology as a series of heresies, or can we rather observe a genuine renewal of classical phenomenology in it? Within the horizon of more than a century of development in the phenomenological movement, we know that such thinkers as Max Scheler, Martin Heidegger, Emmanuel Levinas, Ro-man Ingarden, Jacques Derrida, Hermann Schmitz, and Michel Henry have questioned the adequacy not only of some of Husserl’s key positions and argu-ments, but also—and above all—his very idea of phenomenology in general, calling for a new phenomenology. With all this in mind, A TOPOGRAPHY OF HERESIES OR THE ROAD TO RENEWAL? MANY FACES OF CONTEMPORARY PHENOMENO-LOGY also considers the following questions: How does phenomenology adapt in the face of other styles of philosophizing, for example, Neo-Kantianism, phi-losophy of dialogue, French existentialisme and German Existenzphilosophie, and hermeneutics? What about the impact of phenomenology on hermeneutics or ethics and vice versa? Is there any such thing as the phenomenological meth-od? Are there any limits of the application of a phenomenological method? How do phenomenological methods apply to topics in contemporary analytical phi-losophy? Do the many different ways of doing phenomenology display any methodological consistency? Is it possible to do phenomenology “correctly” and to exceed the limits of the philosophies of Husserl, Heidegger, Scheler, and Ingarden—to name only a few of the classical phenomenologists? Finally, can we say that today we have one phenomenology, or do we rather face many phenomenologies? As a matter of fact, this collection of essays does not represent any uniform, “orthodox,” view of phenomenology. It seems, however, that phenomenology can be defined only within the pluralist horizon of a plethora of perspectives. And thus it is good. For it is well known that phenomenology introduces to contemporary philosophy a strong conviction that there is no such thing as the “view from nowhere”. It also appears, for this very reason, that it is senseless to determine any universal perspective on what phenomenology is. On the other hand, can phenomenology be developed apart from the project of first phi-losophy? How can we define principle methodological instruments that ground the phenomenological way of doing philosophy? Shall we go back to the original Husserlian intuitions on how to do phenomenology? Or rather shall we do phenomenology over and beyond its heritage? All these problems are expressed by the question: A topography of heresies or the road to renewal?
8
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Zarys fenomenologii solidarności: O genezie konstytuowania się grup

100%
Płotka W.
Studia Philosophiae Christianae
|
2018
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vol. 54
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issue 4
27-51
EN
The article is an attempt at a phenomenology of solidarity as a social phenomenon. The author differentiates subjective and intersubjective solidarization, and he emphasizes that the latter concerns the process of the constituting of a group. The article is divided into three main parts. In the first part, so-called bridge problem is analysed. The problem concerns a justificatory transition of the analysis from subjective solidarization to the intersubjective one. A point of departure are here theories of Ingarden and Father Tischner. Next, the author presents a description of the structure and elements of solidarity as elements of a complex act. At this basis, the author formulates an outline of an alternative approach to solidarity, namely as the constituting groups, and as a relation to the world as a common world.
PL
Artykuł jest próbą sformułowania fenomenologii solidarności jako zjawiska społecznego. Autor odróżnia solidaryzację subiektywną od intersubiektywnej, podkreślając, że w tym drugim przypadku ma się do czynienia z konstytucją grup. Artykuł jest podzielony na trzy zasadnicze części. W pierwszej z nich analizuje się tzw. problem mostu, czyli prezentuje się zasadność przejścia od analizy solidaryzacji subiektywnej do intersubiektywnej. Punktem wyjścia są przy tym teorie Ingardena i Tischnera. Następnie prezentuje się opis struktury i elementów solidarności jako aktu złożonego. Na tej podstawie autor formułuje zarys alternatywnego ujęcia solidarności jako konstytucji grup i odniesienia się do świata jako wspólnego.
9
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Uniwersytet na rozdrożu

45%
Stępień A. B., Andrzejuk A., Płotka M., Andrzejuk I., Płotka W.
Rocznik Tomistyczny
|
2015
|
vol. 4
13-23
XX
O uniwersytecie i nauczaniu uniwersyteckim z Antonim B. Stępniem rozmawiają Artur Andrzejuk, Magdalena Płotka, Izabella Andrzejuk i Widold Płotka
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