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Několik poznámek k problematice individuality

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Beran O.
Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)
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2011
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vol. 59
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issue 6
837-850
EN
The article is concerned with the question of individuality from the perspective of (mainly analytical) philosophy of language. It examines various concepts of individuality and their relation to normative structures of responsibility: individuality in the sense of concrete identity as situated personal irreplaceability; individuality in the sense of exclusion as situated irreplaceability of role/office/function. In conclusion a suggestion is put forward for the analysis of the concept of identity as the specific realisation of the possibilities of a human a linguistic being.
2
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Nedorozumění

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Beran O.
Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)
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2009
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vol. 57
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issue 5
683-708
EN
The text concerns the question of misunderstanding in the context of Wittgenstein’s philosophy. Misunderstanding is analysed in the first place as a language-game situation having “external criteria” – incapacity to adopt the whole habitus (“life-form”) of someone who is a stranger to me, or to orientate in it. A detailed attention is paid to the importance of the emancipation of “external” criteria with respect to “inner” process understood as accessible only indirectly, with difficulty, or not at all. A particular problem is then represented by the language game of lying/pretending, where the situation of misunderstanding is intentionally produced. The philosophical analysis of the concept “pretending” (linking it to its outer criteria – detectability) is shown to contradict the basic motivation usually connected with the language game of pretending (to block the correct understanding).
3
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Ryle, čtenář Austenové : Behaviorismus jako průhled do lidských srdcí

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Beran O.
Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)
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2018
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vol. 66
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issue 1
75-96
EN
The article offers and discusses a possible understanding of Ryle’s behaviourism against the background of Ryle’s philosophical reflections on the novels of Jane Austen. The first part presents Ryle’s account of Austen’s charaterology as an Aristotelian anthropology (people do not divide into the good and the bad, rather each one presents a concrete exemplification of a series of heterogenous traits) and its philosophi­cal setting in virtue theory. In the second part I examine how Ryle’s dispositional analysis can be applied to more complex character traits too: character traits should be understood as dispositions with an open spectrum of behavioural expressions, to which we lend a certain quality (extending also into behavior that goes “against the disposition”). In the third part, with the help of a (Wittgensteinian) concept of verification, I reconstruct a hypothetical Ryle-Wittgenstein conception of behaviourism as the specific analysis of the relation between non-identical, though inseparable, reports of behavior and reports of the “mental”: reports about concrete expressions and acts are the only means by which a meaningful dispute about the sense and accuracy of reports about character traits can be conducted. In the final, fourth, part I add some notes on the question of how the two types of report can throw light on each other. The ability to know character traits is a specific kind of perceiving or seeing (which exercises itself on people who express themselves in different ways, but which does not amount to a peering “within” their minds or heads), at the root of which is an ability to judge which requires cultivation.
4
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Problémy s teodiceou ve wittgen­steinovské tradici

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Beran O.
Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)
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2019
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vol. 67
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issue 3
361-381
EN
The article discusses a unique approach to the consequentialist solution to the problem of evil in the framework of Christian philosophy and theodicy that was employed by the Wittgensteinian philosophy of religion and ethics, particularly as is represented by D. Z. Phillips. Unlike traditional solutions to the problem, Phillips’ analysis of the problem of evil rests in the questioning of its meaningfulness – he questions the very idea of God being all-powerful and the absolute good, and the need to weigh and add up God’s goodness against the evil to be found in the world. A possible weakness of Phillips’ approach is his unexamined use of the concept of “our religious language”, on whose basis he assesses the meaningfulness of theodicy. At the same time he evidently minimizes both the heterogeneousness of the “ours” and the extent to which philosophical thoughts pervade and influence the actual. On the other hand, Phillips correctly discerns that some theodical conceptions, if we understand them as general theories, permit a certain cold-heartedness (cruelty) in regards to human suffering, for which they don’t take a sound view. The reason is that they gloss over the substantial difference between theodic deliberations in the first person and third person. It is, however, possible that Phillips faults theodicy for failing at a task that theodicists never intended to take upon themselves. Certain problems also arise from Phillips’ use of the Holocaust as a key example in the discussion.
DE
Der Autor erörtert in seinem Artikel den spezifischen Ansatz der konsequentialistischen Problemlösung im Rahmen der christlichen Philosophie und Theodizee, der in den Wittgensteinschen Religionsphilosophie und Ethik insbesondere in der Auffassung von D. Z. Phillips verfolgt wird. Phillips kritisiert die konsequentialistische Theodizee: Seine Analyse des Problems des Üblen besteht in der Anzweifelung von dessen Sinn. Phillips kritisiert den Gedanken von Gottes Allmacht und vollkommener Güte sowie die Notwendigkeit, Gottes Güte gegen das Übel in der Welt aufzurechnen und mit diesem zu vergleichen. Ein möglicher Schwachpunkt im Ansatz von Phillips besteht in dessen unreflektierter Verwendung des Begriffs „unsere religiöse Sprache“, auf dessen Grundlage er den Sinn der Theodizee beurteilt. Dabei unterschätzt er offensichtlich sowohl die Heterogenität des „Unseren“, als auch den Einfluss philosophischer Gedanken auf die Praxis. Auf der anderen Seite bemerkt Phillips sehr richtig, dass bestimmte Theodizeen, sofern wir sie als allgemeine Theorien auffassen, eine gewisse Mitleidlosigkeit (Grausamkeit) gegenüber dem menschlichen Leid aufweisen, dem sie nicht die gebührende Rücksicht gewähren. Der Grund dafür liegt darin, dass der wesentliche Unterscheid zwischen Überlegungen der Theodizee in der 1. und in der 3. Person übersehen werden. Es ist freilich auch möglich, dass Phillips die Theodizee des Versagens bei der Erfüllung einer Aufgabe bezichtigt, die von den Vertretern der Theodizee nie als deren Aufgabe angesehen wurde. Bestimmte Probleme ergeben sich auch aus Phillips’ Beispiel des Holocaust als Schlüsselargument der Diskussion.
CS
Článek diskutuje wittgensteinovskou kritiku konsekvencialistických teodicejí, zvláště v textech D. Z. Phillipse. Phillipsova analýza spočívá ve zpochybnění smysluplnosti problému zla. Kritizuje samotné myšlenky Boží všemocnosti a dokonalé dobroty a nutnost poměřovat Boží dobrotu se zlem ve světě. Slabinou Phillipsova přístupu je nereflektovaná práce s pojmem „našeho náboženského jazyka“. Přitom podceňuje jak heterogennost „našeho“, tak míru vlivu, s nímž filosofické myšlenky vstupují do praxe a ovlivňují ji. Na druhou stranu Phillips správně postřehuje, že konsekvencialistické teodiceje se vyznačují jistou bezcitností vůči lidskému utrpení. Důvodem je přehlížení rozdílu mezi teodiceálními úvahami v první a ve třetí osobě. Phillips však možná viní teodiceje ze selhání při plnění úkolu, který na sebe nemínily vzít. Určité problémy vyplývají také z Phillipsova klíčového příkladu holocaustu.
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