The concept of intellectual intuition was one of main objects of Kant’s critique of classic metaphysics (represented by such philosophers as Christian Wolff or Alexander Gotllieb Baumgarten). After being denied by Critique of pure reason, the concept of intellectual intuition comes back in the philosophy of Johann Gottlieb Fichte (and other German idealists), who builds the whole conception of the science of knowledge on it. Is Fichte’s understanding of intellectual intuition the same as Kant’s? And if not, can we assume that Fichte’s science can be regarded as fully compatible with Kant’s transcendental philosophy?
The main subject of the fifteenth paragraph of the chapter of Critique of Pure Reason entitled “Transcendental deduction of the pure concepts of understanding” is the concept of connection. It is interesting that in the chapter Kant used the word “connection” thirty two times in the edition from 1787, whereas in the first edition published in 1781 the word occurs five times only. The idea of the present paper is to show the importance of the concept of connection as conjunction by showing that it cannot be used as a synonym of synthesis. The article is intended as an introduction to further and more detailed study on the concept of connection.
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