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Interpretation of constitutional standards from the perspective of legal philosophy

100%
Gizbert-Studnicki T.
Constitutional Review
|
2018
|
issue 3
PL
The provisions contained in the constitution have different characteristics. Specific problems arise in connection with interpretation of those provisions which contain standards. Traditional canons of interpretation (linguistic, systematic and purposive interpretation) fail, since constitutional standards refer to essentially contested concepts. The understanding of such concepts as equality, human dignity or social market economy depends on the accepted political philosophy. A deficit of legitimacy of decisions arises, since decisions based on a particular political philosophy are challenged by adherents of competing political philosophies. Such a deficit may be reduced by reference to the conception of “incompletely theorized agreements”. It may be demonstrated that a dispute relating to an abstract principle or value does not preclude the possibility of reaching a consensus with respect to a particular decision. Such a decision may be differently justified on the basis of different political philosophies.
2
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Filozofia polityczna a pozytywistyczna teoria prawa

100%
Gizbert-Studnicki T.
Przegląd Prawa i Administracji
|
2017
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vol. 110
15-39
EN
The purpose of the paper is to explore the question whether the positivistic legal theory may be developed without any assumptions pertaining to political philosophy. The legal theory of H.L. Hart is examined. The author comes to the conclusion that Hart (notwithstanding the declaration that his theory is purely descriptive) adopts certain tacit evaluative assumptions, and, therefore does not maintain absolute neutrality vis-a-vis political values. Hart’s assumption are, however, minimal and therefore uncontroversial. This causes that his theory is not able to propose asatisfactory explanation of the normativity of law. Various understandings of the role of alegal theory in such an explanation are discussed.
3
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Professor Ryszard Sarkowicz (1952–2021)

100%
Gizbert-Studnicki T.
Archiwum Filozofii Prawa i Filozofii Społecznej
|
2021
|
issue 2(27)
123-124
4
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Czy systemowość jest konieczną właściwością prawa?

63%
Dyrda A., Gizbert-Studnicki T.
Przegląd Prawa i Administracji
|
2016
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vol. 104
19-37
EN
This question is a metaphysical question, as it relates to the nature of law. The answer must be based on the conceptual analysis. The method of conceptual analysis applied by contemporary analytic theories of law may be interpreted as a „modest” conceptual analysis in the terminology of F. Jackson. The basis of such an analysis are platitudes about law, generally accepted in a given society and the purpose of analysis is the rational reconstruction of the folk theory of law. Using this method, the authors come to the conclusion that necessarily any rationally reconstructed folk theory of law must contain the claim that the law constitutes a system, at least in the weak sense of the word.
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