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Dvě složky vládnutí

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Kokešová J.
Právník. Teoretický časopis pro otázky státu a práva (The Lawyer - Scientific Review for Problems of State and Law)
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2020
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vol. 159
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issue 6
473-490
EN
Abraham Lincoln, in the well known Gettyggsburg Address, said that democracy is the “government of the people, by the people, for the people”. This definition is neither as eloquent as others offered by political philosophy, nor does it enumerate necessary elements of democratic regimes. However, it is one of the best known and most cited definitions of democracy. Do we know what we are saying when we quote Lincoln? According to his definition, those who govern are the ones who are governed. However, not only adults (with legal capacity) are governed, but also children, people in come or people with intellectual disabilities. How do they participate in governing? I offer an answer on the basis of the idea that the government has two components: control and influence. Only adults (with legal capacity) could govern by means of control but everyone can and must govern by means of influence.
CS
Abraham Lincoln v roce 1863 pronesl slavný a dodnes citovaný výrok, jímž charakterizoval demokracii jako „vládu lidu, lidem a pro lid“. Výrok se sice nevyznačuje výmluvností definic demokracie, poskytnutých politickými filozofy, a ani nepodává výčet všech nutných náležitostí, které by snad měl demokratický režim naplňovat. Přesto jde o jednu z nejslavnějších a nejznámějších definic demokratického režimu. Víme ale, co vlastně říkáme, když ho opakujeme? Podle výroku vládne každý ten, kdo je ovládán. Ovládáni jsou ale nejen svéprávní dospělí lidé, nýbrž také děti, lidé v kómatu nebo lidé s mentálním postižením. Jak ti vládnou? Nabízím odpověď, podle níž má vládnutí dvě složky, a to kontrolu a vliv. Kontrolou vládnou jen ti, co jí jsou schopni, tedy svéprávní dospělí. Vlivem ale vládnou a musí vládnout všichni.
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Ústavní soud a reprezentace lidu : abduktivní interference

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Kokešová J.
Právník. Teoretický časopis pro otázky státu a práva (The Lawyer - Scientific Review for Problems of State and Law)
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2019
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vol. 158
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issue 6
575-593
EN
The will of the people expressed in elections legitimates the work of parliament, but the content of the laws does not necessarily match the will of the people since the parliament is not a perfect representation of the people. This gap can be filled by the law-applying authority, which can gain information about the people from its authority’s own sources and add it into the law in the process of interpretation. This article argues that this is exactly what the Constitutional Court does. It enriches the laws by new information, and thus not only completes the law, but co-creates it. The sources of information to which the Court has access are of a dual nature. Firstly, the source are parties to the proceedings who express their personal preferences (related to their own lives). The adoption of laws in Parliament is mainly based on external preferences (about the lives of other people) or on a conglomerate of both. Personal preferences thus could be exogenous information brought to the legal order by the Court. Another source are judges of the Constitutional Court, who brings know-how. However, the know-how itself is not always enough. Sometimes the judge has to eventually work with other exogenous elements such as moral judgments, expectations or political ideologies to decide the case.
CS
Vůlí lidu vyjádřenou ve volbách je poskytnout parlamentu legitimitu k jeho činnosti, ovšem obsah zákonů už vůlí lidu být nemusí. Parlament není dokonalou reprezentací lidu, proto ani výsledky jeho činnosti – zákony – se s vůlí lidu neshodují. Tato mezera může být vyplněna v rámci interpretace, kdy orgán aplikující právo z vlastních zdrojů získá další informace o lidu a prostřednictvím výkladu o ně zákony doplní. Článek navrhuje hypotézu, že právě to dělá Ústavní soud, že obohacuje zákony o nové informace, a tedy nikoliv jen dotváří právo, ale spoluutváří ho. Zdroje informací, k nimž má soud přístup, jsou dvojího druhu. Zaprvé jde o účastníky řízení vyjadřující své osobní preference (týkající se jejich vlastního života). Přijímání zákonů v parlamentu se totiž odehrává především na základě preferencí vnějších (preferencí jednotlivce o životě jiných lidí), anebo na konglomerátu osobních a vnějších. Osobní preference zjištěné soudem jsou tak exogenním vnosem do práva. Dalším zdrojem je samotný soudce Ústavního soudu, který přináší know-how. Nicméně samotné know-how mu alespoň v některých případech postačovat nebude, proto musí pracovat i s dalšími exogenními prvky, jako jsou morální úsudky, předsudky, očekávání a politické ideologie.
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Non-Originalism Differently: the Obligation of the Legislator to Respond to Changing Conditions

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Kokešová J.
Adam Mickiewicz University Law Review
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2018
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vol. 8
217-236
PL
The question that the paper seeks to answer is formulated through reflections on the is-sues of non-originalism. Non-originalism refers to an approach to the interpretation of the Constitution where the text of the Constitution adapts to new conditions without any formal change. This approach is applied by courts which, in the light of new circumstances, interpret the Constitution in a different way. The question is whether the same approach should also be applied by the legislator. Should it be the legislator who monitors whether the Constitution has changed in substance as a result of changes in society and that some existing statutes thus have become unconstitutional? The paper concludes that the legisla-tor has an obligation to monitor and respond to such changes by amending or abolishing certain statutes or by adopting new ones. If the legislator fails to respond, then his behav-iour – inaction – is unconstitutional. However, the paper does not claim that the legislator must respond to all the changes in society, but only to those that are significant and obvi-ous. The legislator is understood as an institution, not as a member of the legislative body (based on the theory of the legislative intent). However, the institution of the legislator is a human creation and composed of individuals, and it is their knowledge that makes up the knowledge of the legislator. And it is precisely their possibilities that determine the bound-aries of what the legislator should know. In this text, the creation of law is understood as communication between the legislator, who is the author of statutes, and public bodies, who interpret and apply them. As with any communication, context is what determines it. The legislator’s obligations are derived from the content of the context, its function, and its essential position in communication.
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