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Sowiniec
|
2011
|
issue 38-39
19-32
EN
As a result of the First World War, the historical Hungarian state was divided. Two Central European nations: the Hungarians and the Poles, lost a millennium-old common border. The Treaty of Trianon (1920), and the emergence of Czechoslovakia, which separated Poland and Hungary, did not eliminate the idea of the re-creation of a common border. There were projects to annex Slovakia by, or divide and incorporate it into the two countries. After the collapse of the historical Hungarian state, the Polish-Hungarian friendship took on a new meaning: Hungary strongly supported the Polish government, grappling with the problem of borders following the Great War, and expected in return the support of Warsaw with regard to a possible revision of the Trianon borders. During the Polish-Soviet war and its decisive moments in the summer of 1920, the Hungarian government offered to send a 30 thousand-strong cavalry corps, and - in the most crucial time - sent to Poland military equipment and ammunition which proved crucial in repulsing the Red Army. Unfortunately, Hungarian help did not result in Warsaw's support for Budapest in the international arena. However, Hungary’s noble gesture demonstrates the closeness of the Polish and Hungarian national interests.
EN
The article discusses the cooperation between lay Catholics from Poland and Hungary in the 1960s. 20th century.
PL
Artykuł omawia współpracę pomiędzy świeckimi katolikami z Polski i Węgier w latach 60. XX wieku.
EN
Revolution committees existing in the period of national uprising in Hungary in October and November 1956 were an extremely important element of the activity of democratic forces and an expression of revival of self-government institutions, which in the previous centuries played an important role in shaping a parliamentary democracy in this country. The committees tried to organize the political life and provide solutions for current political and social problems. They were created in almost every institution and plant in Hungary, and often their aim was to draw the authorities of communist origin back from the power. In the countryside their introduction was arousing hope for restoring the pre-war land owning situation. There was a wide range of revolution committees and councils, they were also created among political prisoners who were released during the uprising, ministry employees and in such strategic companies as Hungarian State Railways. The Central Workers’ Council of the Great Budapest in Budapest was a kind of supervisory authority. These institutions were also advisors in the Nagy government. Their functioning was at large terminated by the Soviet intervention. The most important committees, as the Central Workers’ Council of the Great Budapest, had to be counted with to such an extent, that Soviet authorities had negotiated the way of dissolving them with their members, after which the latter were arrested and sentenced. The functioning of committees and councils was connected with revival of political parties existing in the interwar period, because one of the basic demands of the committees sent to the government was reintroduction of the multiparty system, common and democratic parliament elections and leaving the Warsaw Treaty.
EN
Poland and Hungary were experiencing very similar political transformations within their long history. Mostly, those changes were caused by a great similarity in the social and political structures between the two countries, but also by the simple fact of continued existence of the communist system in both societies. On the other hand, Poland and Hungary differed significantly on the issue concerning the specific Church’s position in Hungary and in Poland and on the role of masses in social movements. Peoples’ flexible attitude toward changing political situation in Hungary was revealed firstly, during the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 when the Imre Nagy’s government received an endorsement of the overwhelming majority of Hungarians. Then, after few years, people became drained of powerful emotions which led them – especially working class’ members – to the political inactivity. At the same time, in Poland, the opposition started playing crucial role in a way that, in the 1980s, resulted in establishing a framework of the civil society. This text deals with some major aspects of unique relation that existed between Poland and Hungary, especially from the mid-1970s till 1980s. For instance, the development of the opposition’s activity in both countries was dependent of each other’s influence. In consequence, it enabled them to build strong relationship thanks to which it became possible to commemorate the next anniversary of the 1956 Revolution (it happened for the first time on the east side of the Iron Curtain, before 1989). That relationship also provided a firm foundation for mutual assistance such as: Polish support for the development of Hungarian underground literature or formal visits in Poland of particular Hungarian activists (Gábor Demszky). The Hungarian authorities channeled their efforts into stopping the wave of Polish transformations from occurring in Hungary, therefore any attempts of making direct contact were impeded and limited. What is more, the Hungarian agents of the security apparatus were being sent in Poland in order to scrutinize the nature of Polish political transformations. This article is rich in opinions of the Hungarian society concerning the revolutionary changes in Poland, as well as in their reactions to the formation of trade unions in the PRL (the Polish People’s Republic). The Author makes an attempt to find out why Hungarian workers’ mass did not follow suit the Polish ones which might seem to have been a logical consequence of better economic situation in Hungary.
PL
Po stłumieniu powstania na Węgrzech w 1956 r. na Zachód wyjechała liczna grupa uchodźców politycznych, w większości młodych i często wysoko wykwalifikowanych fachowców. Większość uchodźców uciekła do Austrii. Austria natychmiast wezwała państwa do pomocy zarówno finansowej, jak i fizycznej poprzez przesiedlenie uchodźców. Większość uchodźców została bardzo szybko przesiedlona do innych krajów. Fakty te stoją w jaskrawym kontraście ze współczesną praktyką przesiedleńczą, która charakteryzuje się niedoborem miejsc przesiedlenia i niewielką liczbą państw przesiedleńczych. Niedobory miejsc pracy oraz specyfika polityki migracyjnej niektórych krajów (np. Wielkiej Brytanii) spowodowały, że część uchodźców nie znalazła na dłużej miejsca w krajach europejskich i dlatego szukali schronienia za oceanem. W latach 1956 i 1957 Kanada przyjęła ponad 37 500 węgierskich uchodźców. Stany Zjednoczone były też częściej wybierane przez uchodźców niż np. Wielka Brytania.
EN
After the suppression of the 1956 uprising in Hungary, a large group of political refugees, most of them young and often highly skilled professionals, left for the West. Most of the refugees fled to Austria. Austria immediately called on countries to help both financially and physically by resettling the refugees. Most of the refugees were very quickly resettled in other countries. These facts stand in stark contrast to contemporary resettlement practice, which is characterized by a shortage of resettlement sites and a small number of resettlement countries. The scarcity of jobs and the peculiarities of the migration policies of some countries (e.g., the United Kingdom) meant that some refugees could not find a long-term place in European countries and therefore sought refuge overseas. In 1956 and 1957, Canada took in more than 37,500 Hungarian refugees. The United States was also a more common c Hungarian Refugees in the United Kingdom in the Context hoice for refugees than the United Kingdom, for example.
EN
Since Hungary's accession to the European Union, the disappointment of the Hungarian society has grown and resulted in a decline in trust in EU institutions. Fidesz is a moderately Eurosceptic party, while Jobbik was a strongly anti-EU party. In July 2010, Viktor Orbán stated that Western societies were in crisis, had lost their moral foundations. After the election success in 2010 and the formation of a new party-based government, Fidesz used Euroscepticism to expand the government's room for maneuver in foreign policy. The source of this tendency in politics is the concept of Turanism – the idea of Hungarians being related to peoples of Turkish and Finno-Ugric origin – popular in the interwar period. Is this idea detectable today in Hungarian foreign policy? It seems that the "policy of opening to the East" and the more radical idea of “Eurasianism” have become the modern embodiment of the idea that was present and quite popular on the Danube in the first half of the 20th century. It proves that some Hungarian elites have a clear inclination towards the East.
PL
Od czasu przystąpienia Węgier do Unii Europejskiej narastało rozczarowanie społeczeństwa węgierskiego co skutkowało spadkiem zaufania do instytucji unijnych. Fidesz jest partią umiarkowanie eurosceptyczną, natomiast Jobbik jest partią zdecydowanie antyunijną, W lipcu 2010 r. Viktor Orbán stwierdził, że zachodnie społeczeństwa są w kryzysie, zatraciły swoje dawne podstawy moralne, a po sukcesie wyborczym w 2010 r. była nowe władze mające oparcie w partii Fidesz wykorzystywały eurosceptycyzm do poszerzenia pola manewru rządu w polityce zagranicznej. Za źródło tej tendencji w polityce można uznać popularną w okresie międzywojennym koncepcję turanizmu (idea pokrewieństwa Węgrów z ludami o tureckim i ugrofińskim pochodzeniu). Czy idea ta dziś widoczna jest w polityce zagranicznej Węgier. Wydaje się, że „polityka otwarcia na Wschód” oraz bardziej radykalna idea - euroazjanizm stały się współczesnym ucieleśnieniem idei obecnej i dość popularnej nad Dunajem w pierwszej połowie XX wieku i dowodzą faktu, że część elit węgierskich wykazuje wyraźne inklinacje w kierunku Wschodu
EN
The declining years of the communist regimes towards the end of the 80s as well as the on-going process of a thaw in political relations was also reflected in the Vatican’s policy towards Christians in Eastern Europe. The task was not easy as the hierarchs of the Orthodox Church in Russia were afraid of ecumenical slogans propagated by the pope. They even presented their own, competitive ideas, whose aim was to discredit John Paul II’s diplomatic efforts. The Pope’s policy towards churches in other European countries (Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland) did not assume a common approach as the fate of Christians there was shaped independently from each other and even with certain respect granted by the Kremlin towards the uniqueness of each country. The key aspect of John Paul II’s policy towards the countries of Eastern Europe was the pursuit of spiritual renewal of Christianity in the East, which was supposed to be started with the pilgrimage to the USSR (Ukraine, Moscow and Lithuania).
EN
In Hungarian history, the Crown of St. Stephen was an important relic symbolizing the unity of the Hungarian state. It was not merely a coronation jewel or symbol of royal prerogatives, but a respected element of the country’s historic “millennial” constitution. Although the doctrine associated with it was a unique Hungarian constitutional theory, symbolizing national independence, it was flexible enough to serve various political ideas and ambitions. The Crown has always embodied the monarchical form of the Hungarian State, and its sacred character symbolized the strong alliance of the monarchy with the Catholic Church. Is this historical doctrine compatible with the values and requirements of modern Europe and the requirements of present-day Hungarian constitutionalism?
EN
Deepening ideological divisions, intense political polarization, and the presence of external political actors negatively impact South American countries' ability to formulate and implement public policies based on consensus and sustain them in the long term. The lack of agreement among these countries on how to resolve contentious regional issues has paralyzed South America and Latin America as international actors. The political and refugee crisis in Venezuela has hindered the Organization of American States (OAS) and other continental bodies from functioning coherently, preventing nations from reaching a consensus based on democratic values. These differences led to the dissolution of the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) by liberal-conservative governments and have paralyzed the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC). Recently established forums, such as the Forum for the Progress of South America (PROSUR) and the Lima Group, promoted by right-wing governments to foster regional integration, are not universally recognized because their member states closely align with the United States. Consequently, a more fragmented South America and Latin America have become arenas of growing global geopolitical competition. China is gaining influence, Russia is engaging in military and intelligence activities, and the United States is adopting a more interventionist approach. This study employs qualitative research methods, including critical literature analysis, direct observation of phenomena, and interviews with researchers from the University of Santa Fe in Argentina. Additionally, quantitative methods and a process analysis of regional organizations from 2013 to 2024 were applied.
PL
Uwypuklające się w krajach Ameryki Południowej podziały ideologiczne, głęboka polaryzacja polityczna oraz obecność zewnętrznych aktorów politycznych negatywnie wpływa na zdolność tych krajów do formułowania i realizacji polityk publicznych opartych na konsensusie i możliwość ich utrzymania w dłuższej perspektywie czasowej. Brak zgodności pomiędzy tymi krajami w rozwiązywaniu spornych procesów na kontynencie doprowadziła do paraliżu zdolności Ameryki Południowej oraz Łacińskiej jako podmiotu międzynarodowego. Kryzys polityczny i uchodźczy w Wenezueli utrudnił spójne działanie Organizacji Państw Amerykańskich (OPA) oraz innych organów na kontynencie i uniemożliwił znalezienie państwom znalezienie konsensusu na bazie wartości demokratycznych. Wskutek tych różnic Unia Narodów Południowo-amerykańskich (UNASUR) została zdemontowana przez liberalno-konserwatywne rządy, a Wspólnota Państw Ameryki Łacińskiej i Karaibów (CELAC) jest sparaliżowana. Powołane przez prawicowe rządy ostatnio nowe fora promowane integrujące region, takie jak Forum Postępu Ameryki Południowej (PROSUR) i Grupa z Limy, nie są respektowane przez wszystkie kraje, ponieważ ich członkowie są powiązani ze Stanami Zjednoczonymi. W ten sposób bardziej rozdrobniona Ameryka Południowa i Łacińska stają się w ten sposób areną rosnącej globalnej rywalizacji geopolitycznej, z rosnącym znaczeniem Chin, i wpływami wojskowymi i wywiadu Rosją i bardziej interwencjonistycznymi Stanami Zjednoczonymi. W badaniach zastosowano jakościowe metody, takie jak krytyczna analiza literatury, obserwacja bezpośrednia zjawisk oraz rozmowy z pracownikami naukowymi Uniwersytetu w Santa Fe w Argentynie, a także metodę ilościową oraz analizę procesów zachodzących w organizacjach regionalnych w latach 2013-2024.
EN
The evolution of the Hungarian conception of nation is marked by a gradual shift from a loose political and cultural identity, centred around monarchy and state, to a more ethnically defined and linguistically marked conception of nation. In particular, the 19th and 20th centuries played a key role in defining Hungarian nationalism, with a significant emphasis on the Hungarian language, territorial integrity and national sovereignty. The aim of this article is to analyse how the concept of nation has been shaped and evolved in Hungary after the political transition, since 1989. The analysis focuses on comparisons of politicians’ statements and legal acts influencing the formation of the concept of nation. The focus is on the emergence and characteristics of a new vision of the Hungarian nation at a crucial moment in Hungary’s regaining of sovereignty and pursuit of integration with the European Union, as well as in the unique situation of the Hungarian nation (a large Hungarian minority of approximately 5 million and a diaspora in European countries). Furthermore, the aim of the analysis is to try to find an answer who to the Hungarian nation in the circumstances of the breakdown of national unity in 1920 as a result of the Treaty of Trianon. It is also an attempt to present how national politics and national discourse changed not in Hungary after 1989. The subject has already been taken up many times by Hungarian researchers, but it is little known in Poland. We will also try to answer the question of what conception of the nation was tried to adopt in Hungary after the political transformation.
PL
Ewolucja węgierskiej koncepcji narodu jest naznaczona stopniowym przejściem od luźnej tożsamości politycznej i kulturowej, skupionej wokół monarchii i państwa, do bardziej etnicznie zdefiniowanej i językowo naznaczonej koncepcji narodu. W szczególności wiek XIX i XX odegrały kluczową rolę w definiowaniu węgierskiego nacjonalizmu, ze znacznym naciskiem na język węgierski, integralność terytorialną i suwerenność narodową. Obecnie naród węgierski jest definiowany zarówno przez silne poczucie ciągłości historycznej, jak i zaangażowanie w określony zestaw wartości kulturowych i politycznych, ale napięcie między nacjonalizmem a integracją europejską nadal kształtuje jego ewoluującą tożsamość. Rząd Orbána, szczególnie po 2010 r., opowiadał się za wizją „chrześcijańskich Węgier”, rozwijał kontakty z mniejszością węgierską w krajach sąsiednich i podkreślał zachowanie narodowych wartości i kultury w kontekście europejskim. Podczas gdy Orbán, pragmatycznie popiera członkostwo w UE, jego rząd jednocześnie krytykował instytucje UE za to, co określano jako nadmierne wkraczanie w wewnętrzne sprawy Węgier.
EN
Turkey’s foreign policy behavior in a given period can be understood by examining the ruling party and domestic relations, the interests and composition of the governing coalition and prevalent international dynamics. The aim of the article is to show, that paradigmatic shifts in foreign policy and the drivers of Turkey’s quest for autonomous policy space can be understood as an outcome of interrelated transformations at global, regional and domestic levels. After 2010, Turkish foreign policy was marked by a period of „autonomization”, in which the ruling party decided to fill the geopolitical vacuum created in the region after the failure of negotiations with the European Union in the gradual withdrawal of the United States from the local diplomatic chessboard.
PL
Zachowania polityki zagranicznej Turcji w danym okresie można zrozumieć analizując partię rządzącą i stosunki wewnętrzne, interesy i skład rządzącej koalicji oraz dominującą dynamikę międzynarodową. Celem artykułu jest pokazanie, że zmiany paradygmatyczne w polityce zagranicznej i motory dążenia Turcji do autonomicznej przestrzeni politycznej mogą być rozumiane jako wynik powiązanych ze sobą przemian na poziomie globalnym, regionalnym i krajowym. Po 2010 r. turecka polityka zagraniczna naznaczona była okresem „autonomizacji”, w którym rządząca partia postanowiła wypełnić geopolityczną próżnię powstałą w regionie po fiasku negocjacji z Unią Europejską w zakresie stopniowego wycofywania się Stanów Zjednoczonych z lokalnej szachownicy dyplomatycznej.  
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