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Exponent of intellect products of good taste. Obituary for Professor Jerzy Pelc (30.09.1924, Warsaw – 2.06.2017, therein)

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Jadacki J.
Nauka
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2017
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issue 4
PL
Professor Jerzy Pelc was the creator and long-time manager of the Department of Logical Semiotics, University of Warsaw. He also founded the Polish Society of Semiotics. He published six own books, among others Studies in Functional Logical Semiotics of Natural Language (1971; in English); he edited also dozens of volumes of Semiotic Studies and Library of Semiotic Thought.  As Kotarbiński, his master, and Twardowski, the master of his master, Professor Pelc was a radical rationalist. This radical rationalism has linked him to atheism, anti-communism, a distance to politics, and a frown on the falsehood of public life. He was a great patriot – in his life and in his work. He considered himself a successor of the Lvov-Warsaw School tradition. In the field of metaphysics, Professor Pelc combined theoretical minimalism with anti-rationalist attitudes, including the postulate of precision and the requirement of criticism. The main field of his interest was logical – and broader: theoretical – semiotics. He advocated and largely developed the functional concept of signs. To traditional paradigms of research: historical, teleological, causal and prognostic ones – Professor Pelc has added a semiotic paradigm, determined by the question “What does it mean that p?”. Referring to the interdisciplinary fashion for interdisciplinary research, he conducted an analysis of the notion of interdisciplinarity. In ontology, he analyzed the notions of object and causality. In his approach, aesthetics was treated form a semiotic point of view: he sought mainly ways to logically rewrite its terminology. In particular, he reconstructed the main aesthetic notions: form and ideology (of literary works), theme, motive, metaphor and (literary) fiction – as well as semiotic notions essential to the description of literary arts, namely the notions of assertion and intensionality. In the field of ethics, Professor Pelc declared himself as an advocate of the ideal of trustworthy guardian, which he took over from his teacher, Kotarbiński. In metaethics, he analyzed the notions of norm, evaluation and humanity. A master of Polish: beautiful Polish – he was certainly a true humanist.
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Wkład Kazimierza Twardowskiego w rozwój logiki w Polsce

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Jadacki J.
Studia Philosophica Wratislaviensia
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2018
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vol. 13
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issue 4
7-18
EN
Kazimierz Twardowski’s contribution to the evolution of logicin Poland Twardowski’s legacy, which has been published so far—and the detailed analysis of it—suf fices to consider him a classic of Polish semiotics. The published results of Twardowski in the field of methodology also deserve high scores. A new light on the contribution of Twardowski to the development of logic in Poland sheds the content of his unpublished legacy, including the content of his lectures on logic and unedited logical monographs. Firstly, Twardowski conducted fruitful research on many methodological problems. The result of this research was—an unknown to a wider audience—a new approach to the theory of induction and an original sketch of the perspectives of the inductive method in metaphysics, the first in our literature such a comprehensive monograph on reasoning and reconstruction of the concept of understanding. Secondly, Twardowski referred in his unpublished lectures and monographs to the important results of the nineteenth-century formal logic, thus giving their students an important impulse for individual research in this field. In this text, I focus my attention on the logical issues raised by Twardowski just in his unpublished texts.
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Jakub Karpiński w kręgu Szkoły Lwowsko-Warszawskiej

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Jadacki J.
Studia Socjologiczne
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2013
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issue 4(211)
67–83
PL
Artykuł przedstawia filozoficzne tło poglądów Jakuba Karpińskiego. Nawiązywał on do programu Szkoły Lwowsko-Warszawskiej. Jest to zrozumiałe, gdyż jego głównymi nauczycielami byli przedstawiciele tej szkoły. Na wspomniane tło składają się następujące założenia: (1) rzeczywistość, którą opisuje nauka, jest bardzo zróżnicowana ontologicznie (pluralizm ontologiczny); (2) zdarzenia składające się na tę rzeczywistość są powtarzalne i powiązane ze sobą związkami przyczynowo-skutkowymi (determinizm); (3) teorie naukowe są oceniane pod wieloma względami – nie tylko co do tego, czy tezy tych teorii są prawdziwe. W artykule omawiane są ponadto: (a) poglądy Karpińskiego dotyczące pojęcia przyczyny; (b) jego ujęcie zagadnienia operacyjnego definiowania terminów naukowych; (c) przeprowadzoną przez Karpińskiego typologię schematów (scil. metod) badań socjologicznych; (d) jego analizę sporów w nauce.
EN
The paper presents the philosophical background of Jakub Karpiński’s views. In this respect, he took his stand on the program of the Lvov-Warsaw School. This fact is understandable, because his main teachers where representatives of this school. The following suppositions compose the aforementioned background: (1) the reality described by science is ontologically very differential (ontological pluralism); (2) events that compose this reality are repeatable and mutually connected by causal relations (determinism); (3) scientific theories are estimated in many respects – not only on account of truthfulness of their theses. In the paper, the following problems are also discussed: (a) Karpiński’s views concerning the notion of cause; (b) his approach to the problem of operational defining scientific terms; (c) Karpiński’s typology of schemes (scil. methods) of sociological research; (d) his analysis of controversies in science.
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Wolność słowa contra zakaz prowadzenia sporów światopoglądowych

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Jadacki J.
Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne
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2017
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vol. 40
111-125
PL
brak
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Uogólnione pojęcie rozumowania

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Jadacki J., Brożek A.
Studia Philosophica Wratislaviensia
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2012
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vol. 7
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issue 1
105-119
EN
The article proposes some extension of the concept of reasoning that includes also operations on interrogative sentences (interrogatives) and imperative sentences (imperatives), or rather on their contents — interrogations (issues) and prescriptions.
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Thought Experiments in Philosophy

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Brożek A., Jadacki J.
Filozofia Nauki
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2012
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vol. 20
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issue 2
5-27
PL
It is not surprising for us that thought experiments are so popular among philosophers and among readers of some philosophical journals. As we showed in our paper - they are either would-be real experiments or stimulators of revealing convictions and opinions of people on which experiments are prosecuted. Besides the fact that thought experiments fulfill an illustrative and a fortiori persuasive function, they do not play any important theoretical role. They are simply exemplifications - usually inventive and funny ones - of some «pure» processes of reasoning. Their popularity has its source in the fact that since their childhood people like reading books with… illustrations. There would be nothing wrong with making use of such illustrations if texts in which they are described contained clearly expressed theses and transparently presented argumentation. Unfortunately - texts illustrated by thought experiments are lacking of such clarity and transparency. This is probably the reason for the fact that texts containing thought experiments are so widely commented. It is a very known truth that the less clear and transparent the text is, the more interpretative comments it needs. And in comments, there appear - instead of clearly formulated theses and transparently presented argumentation - new thought experiments…
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Thought Experiments in Science

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Brożek A., Jadacki J.
Filozofia Nauki
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2012
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vol. 20
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issue 1
5-32
PL
Our conception of thought experiment may be summarized as follows. Let us suppose that we want to know what is entailed by the occurrence of a given state of affairs αk. Let us call the state of affairs entailed by it ‘βk’. If αk is «ready», it is sufficient to conduct respective observation: thanks to it we shall «see» βk. Otherwise, we have to bring out the occurrence of αk. This is what real experiment consists in. We have called αk “the basis of experiment”, and we call βk - “the result of experiment”. If establishing that the occurrence of αk entails the occurrence of βk is the first step to put the hypothesis - let us call it ‘γ’ - stating that the occurrence of the phenomenon α entails the occurrence of the phenomenon β, the experiment is heuristic (α is here a type of states of affairs exemplified by αk, and β - is a type of states of affairs exemplified by βk). Other experiments are of testing character. If we already had put γ, then establishing that the occurrence of αk entails the occurrence of βk confirms this hypothesis, and if the occurrence of αk does not entail the occurrence of βk - the hypothesis is falsified. If we are not able or we do not want to bring out the occurrence of αk, we may make use of a thought experiment: we suppose or imagine that αk occurs. Imagining or assuming only that αk occurs does not suffice, of course, for establishing what state of affairs occurs as an effect of the occurrence of αk (for instance, that βk is such one). At our disposal, we have to have a hypothesis - let us call it ‘δ’ - different from γ, such that δ and the sentence stating the occurrence of αk entails the occurrence of βk. We have called γ “the horizon of experiment”. Sometimes it happens that we realize that we accept γ by carrying out the thought experiment - when we ask ourselves why we presuppose or imagine that the presented basis has this, rather than some other, effect. The result of thought experiment follows from its horizon; thus presenting the basis of the experiment is - from the theoretical point of view - superfluous. A thought experiment is nothing but the inference of the result from the horizon and basis. However, experiments fulfill some practical functions: they help us to realize the elements of the horizon and to illustrate or to exemplify important dependencies. Let us ask ourselves why physicists use counterfactual thought experiments. Firstly, the differences in alternative descriptions of a certain part of reality come out in boundary situations and such situations are difficult to bring out (it is usually at least technically difficult) - they may be only thought (presented). All observable bodies move in accordance with both Newtonian and Einstein’s theories - the differences come out by enormous velocities. Secondly, one uses thought experiments because in our thoughts one may «arrange» idealized conditions which cannot be «created» in reality. Thirdly, the exemplifications presented as thought experiments appeal illustriously to imagination what simplifies the reception of new, unintuitive ideas among scientists.
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