This paper discusses agency, regulatory capture, counterparty and political risks as aspects of the nonmarket financial risks that pension plans and their participants bear, using as examples the United States and Poland. The intent of the paper is to expand beyond financial market risks the discussion of financial risks that pension plans and participants bear in funded pension systems. Thus, this paper fits into the broader discussion of the relative merits of funded and unfunded pensions. The paper also relates to analysis of the increasingly complex environment in which pension plans operate.
Are simpler governmental institutional structures generally better? This paper analyzes the effects of complexity in the allocation of government regulatory authority for pensions on various outcomes, focusing on the ease with which participants, plan sponsors, and the regulated industry have in interacting with the regulator. We argue that the less complex allocation of regulatory authority for private sector pension plans in Ireland (one regulator), compared to the United States (multiple regulators), facilitates participants and plan sponsors receiving assistance from the government in dealing with pensions issues. It does so by lowering information costs in dealing with the regulator.
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