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The Jagiellonian Idea and Poland's Eastern Policy: Historical Echoes in Today's Approach

100%
Reeves C.
Politeja : Pismo Wydziału Studiów Miedzynarodowych i Politycznych Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego
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2017
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issue 51
141-163
EN
This paper analyses the extent to which the Jagiellonian idea still has a discernible influence over contemporary Polish foreign policy. More particularly, it addresses the question whether this tradition in some way still informs Poland’s approach towards its eastern neighbours that possess territories that once belonged to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. The paper argues that it is possible to discern the legacy (or afterlife) of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth when it comes to the way in which Poland manages its relations with its eastern neighbours. The civilizing mission that was once associated with the Jagiellonian idea can still be seen in Poland’s efforts to promote democracy and liberal values in the East; this is most evident in the contribution that Poland has made to the European Union’s Eastern Partnership. Nevertheless, differing collective memories among these states also continue to cause tensions between them.
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Making the Best of a Bad Job? The Nixon Administration and the 1971 Four Power Berlin Agreement

100%
Reeves C.
Politeja : Pismo Wydziału Studiów Miedzynarodowych i Politycznych Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego
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2014
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issue 6(32)
287-314
EN
In the period 1969‑1971, the Nixon administration had significant misgivings regarding the Eastern Policy (Ostpolitik) of the new West German government led by Willy Brandt. These mainly stemmed from a fear that it could create divisions within NATO and instability within the Federal Republic. Of particular concern was that Brandt had made ratification of the renunciation of force treaty he signed with the Soviet Union in August 1970 contingent upon a Four Power Berlin Agreement. Nixon and his national security adviser, Henry Kissinger, did not view the talks with any enthusiasm, believing that it would be extremely difficult to achieve a satisfactory agreement. Moreover, they feared that the Three Western Powers would be negotiating from a position of weakness. Accordingly, in 1969 and 1970 the White House did not view the Berlin negotiations as a priority. At the beginning of 1971, however, Kissinger and Nixon appeared to perform a volte‑face when they decided, using their secret backchannel with the Soviets, to actively work to bring the talks to a successful conclusion. It is argued that this change was partly prompted by their wider diplomatic strategy; in particular, Nixon’s desire to obtain a summit meeting in Moscow with his Soviet counterpart. It is also suggested that political calculations, especially the pressing need for a foreign policy success before the 1972 presidential election, played a significant role. Nixon and Kissinger established a secret set of tripartite discussions in Bonn that ultimately resulted in the successful conclusion of a Four Power Berlin Agreement. In doing so, they effectively negotiated behind the backs of two of their chief allies in Western Europe, Britain and France, and officials in their own State Department.
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