Full-text resources of CEJSH and other databases are now available in the new Library of Science.
Visit https://bibliotekanauki.pl

Results found: 2

first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last

Search results

help Sort By:

help Limit search:
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
1
Content available remote

David Hume a jeho pojetí prostoru a času

100%
Novotný Z.
Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)
|
2011
|
vol. 59
|
issue 4
533-546
EN
It is generally agreed that the account of space and time in the Treatise of Human Nature does not belong to the best of Hume’s writings, although running against this general consensus is the opinion of V. F. Kruse. This article argues that Hume’s treatment of space and time, especially his argument against infinite divisibility, suffers from serious imperfections. It must be admitted, however, that Hume’s difficulties arise mostly from the consistent application of his doctrine of impressions and ideas. Perhaps Hume’s own dissatisfaction and his ambition to find favour with the public were the reasons why there is no corresponding part dealing with space and time in the Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. But as the main principles have not been changed in this later work, Hume would not have come to substantially different conclusions if he had dealt with the same subject in detail in the Enquiry.
2
Content available remote

Teorie idejí Davida Huma

100%
Novotný Z.
Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)
|
2008
|
vol. 56
|
issue 2
185-198
EN
The epistemological priority of consciousness in modern philosophy, starting with Descartes, brings with it a new understanding of ideas that, in contrast to the Platonic conception, become the immediate objects of the mind. This stand-point is also accepted by the line of the British empirical sensationalism that comprises Locke, Berkeley and Hume. In Locke ideas still have what might be called a representative character – they refer to assumed existences outside consciousness (real essences). Berkeley, rejecting any sort of materiality, anticipates to a degree Hume’s sceptical position where there is a conscious abandonment of any attempt to seek the origin of perceptions. Hume divides perceptions into impressions (original sense data) and ideas (which are derived from impressions as their copies). Perception works with the first; imagination and thinking with the second. In addition to impressions being primary and ideas secondary, the two kinds of perceptions differ from one another in their strength and vivacity, which are higher in impressions. This seemingly simple doctrine brings with it, however, many problems and objections. In spite of the varie­ty of critical viewpoints, among which straightforward misunderstandings are included, most commentators agree that Hume is interested not so much in a theory as in a procedural rule (allowing the possibility of exceptions), and that Hume’s originali­ty does not consist in this psychological foundation, which he more or less took over from his precursors, but more especially in his deep and penetrating analyses.
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
JavaScript is turned off in your web browser. Turn it on to take full advantage of this site, then refresh the page.