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W kwestii dowodów na istnienie Boga i dowodu na jedyność Spinozjańskiej substancji

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Kąkol T.
Filo-Sofija
|
2012
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vol. 12
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issue 2(17)
83-100
EN
Abstract In this paper I analyze Spinozian ontological arguments for God’s existence from Ethica ordine geometrico demonstrata. I argue that the first proof suffers from circulus vitiosus, whereas the others have at least one non-obvious premise. I also consider P. Gut’s modification of the first proof, reported to me during the conference “The Philosophy of the 17th Century—Its Origins and Continuations” (Gdańsk, 16.06.2011). Meanwhile, I address D. Chlastawa’s remark that theorem 7 and 14 from Ethica… makes Spinoza’s theory inconsistent.
2
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„Monadologia” Leibniza dziś

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Kąkol T.
Studia Philosophica Wratislaviensia
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2018
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vol. 13
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issue 1
39-53
EN
Leibniz’s Monadology today In this article I would like to show that the famous Leibniz’s Monadology can serve not only as an admirable monument of a brilliant philosophical thought but also as an inspiration for taking up the issues which Leibniz dealt with. As a result, I chose 10 quotes from Monadology with whom I discuss, taking into account the contemporary knowledge, both scientific and philosophical.
3
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Against Substantialism

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Kąkol T.
Filozofia Nauki
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2010
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vol. 18
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issue 4
121-134
PL
In this paper I criticize substantialism by analyzing two well-known puzzles con-cerning identity and change - Tibbles the Cat puzzle and the fission paradox. All the approaches assuming substantialism I know lead to untenable consequences (e.g. bilocation) and I conclude that we should seriously take the possibility of processual or eventistic picture of our material life world.
4
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Ingarden’s Ontology of Time and Process and Presentism

100%
Kąkol T.
Filozofia Nauki
|
2013
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vol. 21
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issue 2
117-129
PL
Presentism is described as the theory according to which there is an objective time flow and that there is neither past nor future. Roman Ingarden’s ontology of time does not seem to be presentist then, since it supposedly rejects the second component of that doctrine. In this article, I show that this view misconstrues the spirit of Ingarden’s account, and I defend a certain ontology of time (inspired by Ingarden’s works) against several objections (e.g. the ‘how fast does time flow’ question). Since becoming of a process (in the sense of its mode of existence) is just this process’s time, I consider in turn several possible responses to the charge of an infinite regress leveled against Ingarden’s ontology of process. If his original position is set aside, two extreme proposals will remain: the rebuttal of the objectual aspect of a process and giving up the categorial difference between objects enduring through time and processes (i.e. accepting perdurantism). While not discussing in detail the former one, I point out that the adequacy of perdurantism is an open question: in particular, reasons appealing to problems of material constitution, given by perdurantists, are unsatisfactory.
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