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PESSIMISTIC INDUCTION AGAINST SCIENTIFIC REALISM

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Park S.

Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu

2014

vol. 21

issue 1

3 – 21

There are nine antirealist explanations of the success of science in the literature. The author raise difficulties against all of them except the latest one, and then construct a pessimistic induction that the latest one will turn out to be problematic because its eight forerunners turned out to be problematic. This pessimistic induction is on a par with the traditional pessimistic induction that successful present scientific theories will be revealed to be false because successful past scientific theories were revealed to be false.

AGAINST THE BESIRE THEORY OF MORAL JUDGMENT

100%

Park S.

Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu

2013

vol. 20

issue 1

5 - 17

This paper critically examines two objections and raises a new objection against the besire theory of moral judgment. Firstly, Smith (1994) observes that a belief that p tends to expire whereas a desire that p tends to endure on the perception that not p. His observation does not refute the sophisticated version of the besire theory that to besire that p is to believe that p and to desire to act in accordance with the belief that p. Secondly, Zangwill (2008) claims that the strength of motivation may vary while the degree of belief remains constant. Besirists would reply that a besire admits of both degree and strength. Finally, the author argues that the belief that p endures while the desire to act on the belief that p expires with the introduction of a new bodily condition, and hence that the belief and the desire are distinct mental states.

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2 Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu

2 Park S.

1 2014

1 2013

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PESSIMISTIC INDUCTION AGAINST SCIENTIFIC REALISM

AGAINST THE BESIRE THEORY OF MORAL JUDGMENT