The study is aimed at introducing the short, less than 5 years lasting existence of the 73rd Infantry. This is a unit existing from 1949 to 1954, which has been almost forgotten. The author describes the task of the Infantry, in particular to prepare a sufficient cadre of soldiers who were to be assigned the intelligence and preparatory tasks in the rear of the enemy troops after the outbreak of armed conflict in Europe. He also outlined its structure, pointing out to the complications and conflict of competencies between the intelligence and counterintelligence, which had a negative impact on the very functioning of the unit. In the first period, the soldiers were also suffering due to poor material equipment and the fact that the applicants for service could have been chosen only from among the trainees of exploratory courses may be considered as a great disadvantage of the unit. Later on, the unit was no longer subject only to the Intelligence Department of the General Staff and thereby its background, security and replenishment have improved. Even in spite of that, its members, including the commanders, were not able to meet the expectations and the soldiers, in some cases, had troubles with demonstrating basic skills. Probably due to poor results of inspections, the unit was cancelled in 1954. Later on, similar units were established within the Czechoslovak People’s Army. The study itself works only as a more comprehensive probe into the issue. Its incompleteness is obvious from the documentation studied, which is apparently caused by relatively extensive shredding of documents of the General Staff Intelligence Department during its whole existence as well as insufficient interest in the archival records of the former military intelligence after 1989.
While preparing the Operation Barbarossa the Nazi Germany did not originally consider participation of other countries apart from Romania and Finland that had territorial demands against Soviet Union. German military planners considered for some time the possibility to appoint two Slovak infantry divisions with security tasks in the rear, and in May 1941 there were voices calling for the utilization of two Slovak divisions to enforce the 17th Army of the Army Group South even despite open distrust of Adolf Hitler towards Slavs. Since the preparations were taking place on the Slovak territory as well, Slovak Minister of Defence Gen. Ferdinand Čatloš, in a conversation with German military attaché, Lt. Col. Heinrich Becker, stated that in case of Hungarian participation Slovakia would like to take part in the campaign as well. Germans, at first, pointed out an overall unreadiness of the Slovak Armed Forces but finally – only shortly before June 22nd, 1941 – Hitler declared his wish that the “Slovak Army attended some prospective action”. With the goal to show more loyalty than Hungarians, Slovak politicians and especially the Prime Minister Vojtech Tuka acted proactively without waiting for the Germans to specify their requirements. The paper analyses the circumstances of Slovak entry into the war against the Soviet Union in the summer of 1941, and summarizes the latest findings of Slovak historiography.
In the reviewed material, the three historians decided to publish an excerpt from the large and unpublished work of the former Czechoslovak intelligence officer, František Fárek. The paper deals with the development of Austrian or Austro-Hungarian military intelligence, while the author himself based his ideas on the works already published. The materials by František Fárek are written engagingly, with his drafting skills being also confirmed by the memorial work issued later, entitled Stopy mizí v archivu (The Traces Disappear in the Archive). In terms of composition, the paper consists of a broader introduction and the very transcription of the passage mentioned above. The percipient comes across the case of a text incorporated in the text, with some moments being duplicate in both parts.
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