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  1. 3 Filozofia (Philosophy)

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  1. 3 Neština M.

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  1. 2 2022

  2. 1 2017

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LUTHEROVO ROZLIŠOVANIE MEDZI FILOZOFIOU A TEOLÓGIOU Z POHĽADU LOGIKY A SÉMANTIKY

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Neština M.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2017
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vol. 72
|
issue 6
463 – 474
EN
The article deals with some of Luther’s disputes from logical and semantic perspectives. It shows how Luther made use of some parts of medieval logic and semantics in order to elucidate the relationship between philosophy and theology. The author argues that Luther introduced the conception of „new language“ which offers a basis on which to differentiate between theology and philosophy. This difference between „old“ and „new“ language is a matter of a different significations of the terms used. From the exploration of the relationship between the two languages comes the conclusion: Luther’s theologically differentiating between theology and philosophy corresponds with his differentiating between „new“ and „old“ language.
2

POJEM VERZUS KONCEPCIA SPRAVODLIVOSTI V ANALYTICKEJ FILOZOFII PRÁVA (2. časť)

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Neština M.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2022
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vol. 77
|
issue 5
339 – 356
EN
The article is a continuation of the author’s contribution Concept vs. Conception of Justice in Analytic Philosophy of Law (Filozofia 2022/4). It focuses on explaining polysemy as a kind of linguistic indeterminacy that constitutes one of the main reasons why courts come to interpret legal texts. The study discusses polysemy from the perspective of the theory of language used by A. Marmor in his theory of interpretation. The author shows the limits of semantic analysis in law and the role of normative presuppositions, which influence the final outcome of judicial decision-making not only in terms of content, but are also important for the choice of formal means that are applied in the context of this decision-making.
3

POJEM VERZUS KONCEPCIA SPRAVODLIVOSTI V ANALYTICKEJ FILOZOFII PRÁVA (1. ČASŤ)

100%
Neština M.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2022
|
vol. 77
|
issue 4
233 – 250
EN
The author analyses the difference between a concept and its different conceptions by using the example of the difference between the concept and conceptions of justice in analytic philosophy in the context of constitutional interpretation. The difference between the concept and distinct conceptions of the concept appears within a section of constitutional interpretation theory illustrating the change in the meaning of moral terms that denote constitutional rights and liberties, principles and values. The author argues that the distinction between a concept and its distinct conceptions may generate more controversy than it resolves in constitutional interpretation theory and should therefore be rejected. This distinction, however, points to one significant linguistic phenomenon that clearly deserves attention, and that is polysemy.
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