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Zmiana pozycji Wysokiego Przedstawiciela w świetle zasady podziału władzy w Bośni i Hercegowinie

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Zdeb A.
Politeja : Pismo Wydziału Studiów Miedzynarodowych i Politycznych Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego
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2012
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issue 3(21)
387-400
EN
Separation of power principle is one of the oldest principles accompanying the evolution of constitutional thought and a foundation of democratic political systems. Its basic goal is to protect the system against concentration of powers in one organ of government, so it can be described as a fundamental guaranty of democratic political system. Separation of powers is also a part of the political system of Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, Dayton Agreement created there unprecedented situation of international supervision in peace process – among others in the form of Office of the High Representative. Its position is exceptional and unique – OHR was positioned outside the constitutional structure of the state and, in connection with that, outside separation of powers principle. Moreover, alongside with evolution of its capacities, three kinds of power were unified in its hands. Therefore, the assumption that position and power of OHR are inconsistent with democratic character of the country, mainly because they violate separation of powers principle, seems to be justified.
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Doomed to Fail? Rebound Effect and Conflict Management Problems in Bosnia and Herzegovina

100%
Zdeb A.
Studia Środkowoeuropejskie i Bałkanistyczne
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2023
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vol. XXXII
169-184
EN
New institutionalism resurrected political institutions, arguing that they constrain behavior of political actors. Consequently, the consociational model was founded on the assumption that the institutions and practices associated with it create a structure of incentives for leaders of ethnic groups that should encourage them to moderate and cooperate. However, in post-conflict, deeply divided countries where institutions are weak and often externally imposed, political actors can interpret and exploit them, stretching their boundaries and adapting them to new conditions, or simply avoiding them. As Robert D. Putnam notes, “two centuries of constitution-writing around the world warn us that the designers of new institutions often write on water – institutional reform does not always change fundamental patterns of politics” (1993: 17). Following this statement, the main aim of the article is an analysis, rooted in the new institutionalism, of the relationship and the inevitable tension between political institutions and actors in post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina. By proposing the term “rebound effect”, the paper tries to explain the dysfunctionality of the Bosnian model of consociationalism. Using congruence theory (Almond & Verba 1965), I also hypothesize that coherence between political actors (their political culture) and political institutions (the patterns of behavior they imply) is crucial for the so-called “behavioral realisation” of any constructed structure – institution, and, as a result, for the entire political system and its functionality
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